Soviet Union Archives

Iran, Russia, and the Politics of Expediency

October 20, 2022 by Lisa Reynolds Wolfe

How did the headlines change from “Arming the Shah” to “Iran Sends Drone Trainers to Crimea to Aid Russian Military”? It’s perplexing, isn’t it?

The relationship between Russia and Iran has been turbulent and fraught with controversy – even conflict. Stalin refused to withdraw Soviet troops from the country after World War II, leading to a debate in the Security Council of the United Nations, the first test for the infant organization.

Despite the residual ‘bad blood’, however, in January 1966, the Iran and the Soviet Union signed an agreement for the construction of a steel mill in Isfahan, Iran, a gas pipeline to the Soviet Union, and a machine tool plant. The USSR was to advance credits of $286 million at 2.5 percent interest over a 12 year period to facilitate financing.

Later, Iran’s revolutionary leader, the Ayatollah Khomeini, labeled Russia the Lesser Satan and said that Iran should not support side during the on-going Cold War.

More recently, in defiance of their government’s policy, Iran International (a privately-owned UK news entity) reports:

. . . videos on social media appeared to show police dispersing protesters chanting “Death to Putin” outside the Ukrainian embassy in Tehran. . . . those assembled also chanted “Russian Embassy Is Den of Spies,” “Death to Warmongers and Putin Supporters,” “Putin Murders, the Stupid Ones Support,””Long Live Ukraine,” and “Long Live Peace.”

Trying to make sense of everything that’s contradictory may seem like enough to make your head spin. But actually it’s just about political and economic expediency. We can make sense of it if we’re willing to dig a little deeper.

Russia, Britain, and Iran: The Great Game

Iran has long been geopolitically and strategically significant. Remember the Great Game, the political and diplomatic confrontation between Britain and Russia during the 19th century. Britain feared that Russia planned to invade India and that an invasion was the goal of Russia’s expansion in Central Asia. Russia, on the other hand, feared the expansion of British interests in Central Asia.

Regarding Iran, the British believed that a large-scale infusion of capital was the best way to secure British control over the country, and, thus, to guard the gates of India. Conversely, the Russians were concerned with cementing their dominance over the administration of northern Persia and expanding southward toward warm water ports in the Persian Gulf. Constant interference from both meant that the continuing development of Iranian cities was subject to the activities and needs of these two imperialist rivals.

In 1907, the Anglo-Russian Entente divided the country into three spheres, with northern and central Iran, including Tehran and Isfahan, in the Russian sphere. Southeast Iran was in the British zone. The territory in-between was neutral and included the area where Iranian oil was first discovered in 1908.

Despite this agreement, Iran was never “officially” colonized. Still, the country was formally occupied in 1941 with the onset of World War II and the permanent billeting of British and Soviet troops. The Americans arrived in 1942-1943 to expedite the delivery of supplies to the Soviet Union through a Persian Corridor.

1945 – 1947: The Russian Grab for Control is Defeated

As World War II neared its end, traditional rivalries flared, and conflict between the Allied forces intensified. Despite some friction, United States and British interests eventually coincided. An implicit partnership developed with the two allies jointly opposing Soviet activities in Iran.

While the last American troops left the country on January 1, 1946, and Britain announced that it would meet a March 1 deadline, Moscow refused to withdraw its forces. Instead, the Soviets supported a separatist movement in the northern province of Azerbaijan, establishing a “puppet Kurdish state” as well. These activities (along with on-going concern over communist operations in other parts of the country) convinced the United States that the Soviets were scheming to take over part or even all of Iran.

Such interference was unacceptable to both Iran and the United States. Not only did Iran border the Soviet Union, in an area targeted by the US for “forward defense,” but the country possessed vast oil resources considered vital to the West’s campaign against ‘international communism’.

Soviet troop strength in Iran was not insignificant. Estimates allowed for 30,000 in Azerbaijan and 75,000 in northern Iran, compared to 5,000 British troops and 6,000 American troops in the rest of the country. The total number of Soviet troops was at least three times that of the Iranian Army.

In addition to military force, Stalin also reapplied previously employed techniques of economic penetration. He seized Azerbaijan’s fertile grain fields, directing and controlling the area’s vast wheat harvest. This had a critical impact since the province ordinarily supplied enough grain for its own consumption and, additionally, provided almost half of Tehran’s yearly needs. As a consequence of Stalin’s actions, the Western allies were required to import wheat in order to prevent starvation in parts of southern Iran.

Similar tactics affected other goods. For example, Iran was forced to export shoes manufactured in Azerbaijani factories to the Soviet Union, making it necessary to import higher priced shoes for Iran’s own population in return.

In the end, the Americans saw Soviet actions geostrategically, and also as an implicit threat to the oil fields of the Middle East, a matter affecting national security. The conflict over oil became quite explicit when the Soviets demanded an oil concession in northern Iran.

With American support, Iran complained to the United Nations Security Council about Moscow’s behavior. Soviet activity in the north violated the Russian-Iranian Treaty of 1921 which promised noninterference by the Soviets in the internal affairs of Iran. It also violated the Allied troop withdrawal agreement of 1943.

The USSR left Iran in May 1946 after the Iranians promised them an oil concession. There was a caveat: the concession was subject to approval by the Iranian Majles. In December 1946, Stalin suffered a diplomatic defeat when the Majles refused to approve the concession.

To show support for the shah’s government, the US decided “that a limited amount of armaments not to exceed $10 million in value would be sold to Iran. The United States would also give favorable consideration to the credits necessary to furnish such arms.”

Based on the American showing of support, the Iranian government sent security forces into Azerbaijan, finally suppressing a Soviet-sponsored revolt. Over the next three years, the shah embraced American assistance as a means of eliminating the Soviet presence in his country, preserving the integrity of Iran’s borders and solidifying support for his policies internally.

It wasn’t long, though, before American popularity took a big hit. You can read all about the CIA and Mohammad Mossadeq in these Cold War Studies posts: Gaming Cold War Iran: Mosaddegh, Kashani and Iranian Oil; Early Cold War Years: Nationalizing Iran’s Oil

The US Loses Influence and the Shah Turns to the Soviets

A 1964 US-Iran military sales agreement provided for up to $50 million a year of weaponry (increased to $100 million after 2 years). However, there were strings attached. The US was concerned that Iran’s military purchases were interfering with the country’s economic and social progress, so sales were contingent on an annual review of Iran’s economic development and social programs, a policy that the shah perceived to be unwarranted interference in his country’s domestic affairs. There were other differences also.

When US and Iranian interests diverged, the shah decided he would have to act on his own by diversifying sources of foreign aid.

In an unprecedented move, in 1967-1968, the shah obtained some military equipment from the Soviet Union. He also went forward with a prior agreement for the USSR to construct a steel mill in Isfahan.

‘Besties’ Again: The USSR and the Isfahan Steel Mill

In January 1966, Iran and the Soviet Union had signed an agreement which provided that the USSR would advance credits of $286 million at 2.5 percent interest over a twelve year period for the construction of a steel mill, a gas pipeline to the Soviet Union, and a machine tool plant.

A site for the steel mill was quickly agreed upon (near the Zayendeh River on the outskirts of Isfahan) and the facility was named Aryamehr. It was built using the latest technology, with Soviet engineers and technicians supervising both construction and the installation of machinery and equipment obtained from the USSR.

The complex employed 1,300 Russian engineers and technicians, 900 Iranian engineers and technicians, and 33,000 other Iranians, including 8,000 specialists.

Business was to be conducted in both Russian and Persian, so three years of language classes were provided for the technicians and other specialists.

Since essential ingredients for its industrial processes came directly to the site, new rail lines were constructed.

A cement block factory in the vicinity of the plant provided some of the required materials for the construction of housing for staff and workers.

The plant increased mining activity in the Isfahan region and, in addition to steel, produced secondary products which were beneficial to the city’s chemical industries.

The agreement also called for the construction of a mechanical engineering facility in the Isfahan area which was projected to have an annual output of 25,000 to 30,000 tons of metal products.

Overall, the total cost of the mill was estimated at $1.4 billion, an amount which includes the housing project and associated mining operations.

Shortly after the first blast furnace came into operation in January 1972, production was rated at 750,000 tons per year. A later agreement with the Soviets (August 10, 1972) provided a basis for increasing capacity to 2 million tons and later to 4 million tons annually.

As mentioned above, a planned community, Aryashahr, was constructed to house workers and their families. The first stage called for the building of 200 multiple family units which were to provide housing for 50,000 inhabitants. A later phase would increase the number of residents to 300,000 and the number of dwellings to 800.

In addition to housing, Aryashahr, a modern community built in the Soviet manner, would allow for 4,200 hectares of greenspace, two schools, a dispensary, and a large 400 room hotel.

In sum, the Russians provided a turnkey operation with workers housed in a self-contained complex, a distance from the center of Isfahan. Buses were used to transport advisers and specialists for downtown shopping and other excursions.

In all instances, workers were supervised and there was little opportunity for the (supposedly) improper and highly visible activities that the Americans living in Isfahan later became known for.

Interestingly, many Isfahanis were not even aware of the Russian presence — or even of the mill’s existence. R.K. Ramazani says that

Ruffled political relations between Iran and the Soviet Union pushed the news of the Aryamehr Steel Mill off the front pages of Iranian newspapers.

Back to the Americans

For some insight into the American presence in Iran, you’ll find the following post helpful: Cold War Iran: Bell Helicopter and Grumman. You may remember that the shah of Iran purchased 80 F-14 fighter jets from the Grumman Aerospace Corporation. At the time, the early 1970s, the F-14s were the most expensive fighters ever built, because they carried the Phoenix weapons system, the only system capable of reaching the high-flying Soviet Migs that the shah was convinced threatened his country. The $2 billion dollar sale amounts $10.11 billion in 2015 dollars.

Neither East, Nor West, Islamic Republic

Since the Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979, Iran’s foreign policy motto has been “Neither East, Nor West, Islamic Republic.” Nevertheless, faced with the economic consequences of American sanctions, Iran has once again put aside its historic rivalry with Russia.

Today, along with China and perhaps India, Russia seems central to Iran’s “Look East” policy.

As early as 2015, Russia and Iran set an extremely unrealistic target for trade of between $10 and $15 billion dollars per year. This economic cooperation is said to be driven by political will rather than economics.

While, at first, Russia was helping Iran counter US sanctions, it appears that now, Iran is helping Russia counter western support for Ukraine. Ukraine has reported a large number of Russian attacks using Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones in recent weeks, and just this week, The New York Times reported that “Iran has sent trainers to occupied Ukraine to help Russians overcome problems with the fleet of drones that they purchased from Tehran.” There are also reports that Iran will be supplying surface to surface missiles to the Russians.

According to Reuters:

Chafing under Western economic sanctions, Iran’s rulers are keen to strengthen strategic ties to Russia against an emerging, U.S.-backed Gulf Arab-Israeli bloc that could shift the Middle East balance of power further away from the Islamic Republic.

Clearly Iran and Russia have a deepening relationship. But as the review of Iran’s friendships over the years has shown, the country can be a fickle friend. Whether under the shah, or as the Islamic Republic, Iran tends to act in its own self interest. Perhaps they should come up with a new motto. Something like “Expediency First.”

_________________________________________________________________

Cold War Cities: Taipei, Isfahan, Havana: Competitive Grand Strategy and Urban Change (Lisa Reynolds Wolfe)

“Arming the Shah” (Washington Post – 1/20/1980)

“Iran Sends Drone Trainers to Crimea to Aid Russian Military” (New York Times – 10/18/2022)

Iran’s” Neither East Nor West” Slogan Today – ISPI https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/irans-neither-east-nor-west-slogan-today-22234

___________________________________________________________________

Featured Photo by KYRYLO TYMOSHENKO (Flickr)

Unmanned drones, believed to be Iranian-made, killed at least eight people in the capital and the northern city of Sumy, and struck critical infrastructure, with power outages reported in hundreds of towns and villages.

Cold War Soviet Meddling in US Politics

August 1, 2018 by Lisa Reynolds Wolfe

I’ve just finished reading a 2017 policy memo by Mark Kramer, the Director of the Cold War Studies Program at Harvard. In his memo, The Soviet Roots of Meddling in US Politics. he argues that

efforts by Russian security services to influence last year’s U.S. presidential campaign in favor of Donald Trump evoked a sense of deja vu. Despite the advent of cyberwarfare, the Russian government’s attempts to sway the U.S. election in 2016 were strikingly reminiscent of Soviet ‘active measures’ during the Cold War.

Kramer goes on to say

the two main Soviet intelligence and security agencies — the KGB and GRU (military intelligence) — kept up a vigorous campaign for several decades to meddle in U.S. politics and discredit the United States. The ‘active measures’ used by the KGB and GRU during the Cold War, including disinformation, forgeries of documents and letters, and the spread of propaganda through sympathetic individuals and front organizations, were remarkably similar to the tactics and goals of Russian intelligence agencies in 2016.

The KGB’s Service A was formed in the 1950s. Its work included spreading disinformation, producing forgeries, transmitting propaganda, and disrupting US and Western public diplomacy, all aimed at destabilizing the United States and undermining American influence in the world. Here are some of the things it did.

One of its earliest operations involved linking the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to President John F. Kennedy’s assassination. The KGB funded the publication of conspiracy inspired books by Western authors and forged materials that tied the assassin Lee Harvey Oswald to the CIA and FBI. For example, the American lawyer Mark Lane wrote a book called Rush to Judgment (1966). Lane was probably unaware that financial support for his “research” was coming from the KGB.
The KGB, working with the East German State Security Ministry, widely spread rumours that the AIDs epidemic was started by US government experiments at the Fort Detrick biological warfare defense lab in Maryland.
Service A forged homophobic letters to the editors of major US newspapers, claiming that FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover was a gay transvestite seeking to establish “a network of like-minded homosexuals” within the FBI. According to Kramer, “the baseless allegations continue to enjoy credence in some circles in the United States even now.”

Disparaging Martin Luther King

Martin Luther King came under attack from the KGB when he declined to embrace a Communist agenda for the civil rights movement. His achievements

threatened one of Service A’s main selling points. The entrenchment of racial segregation and racial discrimination in the United States during the first two decades of the Cold War had been a service burden on U.S. policy, belying the U.S. government’s claims to be promoting democracy and human rights….

Soviet propaganda, on the other hand, “highlighted the iniquities of racial discrimination in the United States.” The Soviets feared that if Congress was able to pass civil rights legislation, one of the major attacks would be undermined.

Service A used forgeries to depict King and other civil rights activists as “Uncle Toms” who were secretly colluding with the government. Later, they spread disinformation that President Johnson had taken secret steps (with King’s approval) to ensure the continued subordination of blacks.

Service A continued these provocations throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s, viewing race relations “as the issue most likely to destabilize the U.S. political system and divide American society.

Soviet Efforts to Influence U.S. Presidential Elections

Prior to 2016, the Soviet Union secretly tried to influence at least three other American presidential elections.

In 1968, the Politburo strongly favored Hubert Humphrey, the Democratic candidate, fearing that Richard Nixon, the Republican candidate, would take a harsh stance against the Soviet Union. Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador to Washington, was ordered to approach Humphrey with an offer of clandestine funding for his campaign. Humphrey immediately declined. Nixon ended up winning, but surprised many by embarking on a broad detente with the USSR. The Soviets were dismayed when he was forced to resign in 1974.
In 1976, the Soviets opposed Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson’s attempt to gain the Denocratic nomination. Known as a fierce anti-communist, the Soviet Union feared Scoop’s nomination. “The KGB sent forged FBI letters to leading U.S. newspapers and journalists claimed that Jackson was a closeted gay. . . .”
In 1983, the KGB tried to undermine Ronald Reagan’s position in the 1984 election. They stopped trying when they became convinced that Reagan was going to win in a landslide no matter what they did.

Russian Meddling Today: New Technology, Same Activity

Service A’s active measures to influence US politics and undermine the US role in the world lasted until the end of the Soviet Regime. However, the collapse initiated no real change. The KGB and the GRU were never dissolved, merely renamed. The KGB’s main components became the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). The GRU continued to function under its old name.

In 1999, when Vladimir Putin became Russian president, the FSB, SVR, and GRU gradually revived their active measures against the United States and its allies. Technology has changed, but not much else. It ‘s become clear that to deter the KGB’s active efforts, Cold War type vigilance and determination is needed. Time will tell whether the US has the political will necessary to persevere.

___________________________________

Sources:

http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/soviet-roots-meddling-us-politics

https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf

https://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/archives/

http://www.ponarseurasia.org/members/mark-kramer

Photo by Sydney Steel Road, IV (Flickr).

S is for Sputnik

April 4, 2018 by Lisa Reynolds Wolfe

On the morning of October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union successfully launched the world’s first artificial satellite named Sputnik (Russian for “travelling companion”). Weighing 184 pounds, the satellite orbited the earth at 18,000 miles per hour. The booster launching demonstrated the skill of Soviet missile science. Americans were extremely disturbed. Strategic air force units were dispersed and placed on alert, short-range Jupiter missiles were installed in Turkey and Italy, money was poured into missile and bomber programs, and achievement “gaps” were discovered in everything from missile production to classroom performance.

Secretary of State Dulles was concerned about the impact the launch would have on world affairs. He felt that “the newly emerging nations could view Russia as a people who in 1917 had been generations behind other industrialized nations but who, through harsh regimentation, had assumed first place in the race for control of outer space. They could also interpret the launching as a dramatic swing in the balance of military power toward Moscow.“

President Eisenhower, however, knew from his intelligence sources that Soviet missile forces posed little threat to the US. The purported Soviet lead in ICBMs was not real. He refused to skew the economy by dramatically increasing military spending.

Photograph by Daniel Arrhakis (Flickr)

The Soviet Challenge

September 19, 2017 by Lisa Reynolds Wolfe

With the death of Stalin in March 1953, the Soviets renewed their long dormant interest in the revolutionary potential of the less developed world.

Khruschev resolutely determined to mobilize the newly emerging and decolonializing nations against the West, intending to exploit the end of colonial empires to promote his own interests.

The issue took on increased significance when the growing militarism of American policy led the Soviets to believe that the Cold War was about to be won or lost in the Third World.

Krushchev re-evaluated the Soviet approach to neutrality and devised a zone-of-peace strategy to pull the neutral nations into the Soviet orbit.

Soviet policy was redesigned to extend military and economic aid programs to selected non communist countries.

Under Stalin, direct military aid had been supplied only in areas contiguous to the boundaries of the USSR. Now the Kremlin was reaching out, hoping to “communize” the developing nations which were neither socialist nor capitalist.

Additionally, the Soviets hoped to disrupt Western markets and block the flow of raw materials to the United States and its allies.

The Soviets also wanted to build a market for their own goods, thereby improving their adverse balance-of-trade position.

Meanwhile, the American Congress passed the Mutual Security Act (1951), legislation which fused US economic, military, and technical assistance programs, allowing the injection of a stronger military emphasis.

As the Soviets moved toward a more active role in world affairs, they abandoned the extreme notions of Zhdanov’s two camp theory which, after all, had been formulated to provide an ideological justification for Soviet isolationism.

Peaceful coexistence, a policy used sporadically by the Soviets from October 1917 on, was re-introduced, supplying the necessary theoretical backing for a program of dynamic engagement in world affairs.

Although this strategy focused on living in peace with states of differing social systems in order to prevent war, it also involved economic competition between the capitalist and socialist systems.

More explicitly, according to Peter Rodman, while the Americans aimed to “guide the underdeveloped regions of the world through a transition to full-fledged participation in the international system,” the Soviets adopted a “doctrine of mortal struggle, of irreconcilable class conflicts.” They saw a military assistance program as an “integral part of contemporary Soviet policy,” a way of breaking through the Western containment arrangement.

By the mid-1950s each superpower believed that the future vitality of its ideological, economic, and strategic systems depended upon ‘winning’ the Third World.

Both the US and the USSR now perceived that the Cold War conflict would be played out in large part among the decolonizing and developing nations who would be forced to choose between Marxist and capitalist theories of economic progress, between totalitarian and democratic models of political organization, and between class struggle and collective security as principles of international order.

Many Third World nations were dismayed at the prospect of serving as pawns in a revised version of The Great Game. This term refers to the intense British-Russian rivalry for influence, concessions, and territorial control which played out in Central Asia and Iran in the 19th century.

According to Rodman (again), the Bandung Conference, a meeting of Aftican and Asian states in April 1955 marked the moment when the Third World tried to come of political age, and to define some room for independent manoeuvre between the two blocks …. Bandung was the moment when this implicit economic rivalry between West and East took on a strategic dimension, as the countries of the developing world ceased to be pawns and spectators in the global rivalry, but began to become players in their own right.

Soon it became apparent to all that many Third World leaders held their own agenda as they expertly played the two superpowers against each other.

Despite a move by some nations toward nonalignment, the Soviets were able to take advantage of the fact that a number of developing countries were anxious to reduce or eliminate Western influence in their regions.

As a result, American military assistance now became part of a strategy designed to pre-empt and offset any arms which the Soviets might supply.

The 1957 Eisenhower Doctrine concretized the new approach by proposing an increase in military and economic assistance, and authorizing the use of US troops to protect nations against aggression for any nation “controlled by international communism.”

To some in the Third World, it seemed that the US was now willing to pay with cash and arms for them to abandon their neutral position.

Free for All in the Ukraine

March 5, 2014 by Lisa Reynolds Wolfe

I rarely post about current events, so I haven’t mentioned the stand-off in the Ukraine. But I thought some factoids might be enlightening. Since I don’t write much about the Ukraine or Russia, I’ve drawn heavily from newspaper articles published in previously “nonaligned” nations. Feel free to post your comments. That said, let’s get started.

The Collapse of the Soviet Union

The collapse of the Soviet Union left the Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia with territorial disputes, ethnic and linguistic clashes, disfunctional economic and trade patterns, and strategic dilemmas.

The Ukraine had a central position in the former USSR. Leading Soviet political figures were Ukrainian, its Donbass region was an industrial hub, and the Slav “big three” that ended the USSR consisted of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus.

After Soviet disintegration, the Ukraine continued economically on Russian lines, dominated by oligarchs:

the oligarchs are Ukrainian
Ukrainian policy is independent
the Ukraine gained World Trade Organization (WTO) membership in 2008
the country is dependent on Russia for energy
Russian gas pipelines to Europe pass through the Ukraine
Russia has few alternative routes to Europe.

Ukrainian Independence

The Ukraine has been independent for 22 years and has worked toward embracing all its regions and citizens:

Ukrainian governments have straddled ethnic and geographic divisions
conflicts between the Russians and Ukrainians who share the country have been rare.

East Ukraine is politically, religiously, linguistically, culturally, and economically close to Russia:

25% of Ukraine’s 45 million population are ethnic Russians
Russian is widely spoken in parts of the east and south
in some ares, including Crimea, Russian is the main language
regions where Russian predominates almost exactly match those that voted for President Yankovich in 2010
the 2010 election was deemed free and fair by the West.

Western Ukraine is agricultural, closer to Poland, and speaks Polish and Ukrainian:

in religion it is a mixture of Orthodox Christianity and Catholocism
the area murdered Poles by the hundreds after World War II when they occupied the area; that is forgotten in Poland’s quest for markets and Kiev’s quest for Europe.

Crisis Begins in the Ukraine

The Ukrainian crisis began in November 2013 when Ukraine’s cabinet announced postponement of a proposed association agreement with the European Union:

Russia feared the move would preclude Ukrainian membership in its own Eurasian Customs Union
Russia threatened to impose higher energy prices
the European Union failed to provide a financial package that would balance Russia’s actions
President Yankovich played for time
anti-government protestors, supporting closer ties with the EU, called for the president’s resignation and occupied Independence Square (Maidan Nezalezhnosti)
the US and the EU backed the protesters
the protest spread across the country
public buildings in the Western Ukraine were occupied
hundreds of people were injured in the violence and about 100 people were killed
in February, the EU brokered an agreement with President Yanukovic that was rejected by the protesters
parliament (the Rada) voted to oust the president and hold new elections in May
since this time, all official policy has been decided in consultation with protesters in the Maidan.

Ukraine’s Interim Government

The interim government projects itself as both pro EU and pro US and it posits itself as anti-Russian. Some of its actions have proved inflammatory:

the interim government disbanded the Berkut paramilitary muscle men and they are now in the employ of anti-Kiev groups in the East and Crimea; in effect, they’ve become a freelance group of mercenaries
the government de-recognized the official status of the Russian language, offending the nation’s Russian speakers
efforts to establish control in Eastern Ukraine backfired, leading to violence, the hoisting of the Russian flag, ripping up of the Ukrainian flag, and burning effigies of the Maidan and its supporters.

Ukraine‘s body politic is deeply divided:

politicians as a whole are discredited and are considered incompetent and corrupt
unknowns are entering the political arena and destabilizing institutions.

Moscow’s Position

Moscow can’t afford to be passive:

the Ukraine is crucial to Russian security and to its project to bring a strong Eurasian Union into being
the number of refugees fleeing to Russia exceeds 150,000
refugee camps are planned in the Rostov region.

The Crimea

The situation in the Crimea makes waiting for a solution until after May elections impossible:

the Crimean peninsula was transferred from Soviet Russia to the Ukraine in 1954 as an autonomous province
this majority Russian speaking region is of prime strategic significance to Russia
Russia’s Black Sea Fleet has had its base for 200 years at Sevastopol
after the break-up of the USSR, a lease agreement valid until 2042 has allowed the Russian fleet to continue operating there in return for Russia supplying discounted natural gas
according to the terms of its lease, Russia can station 161 aircraft, 388 warships, and 25,000 armed men in Crimea
After the Maidan’s success in Kiev, the Crimean Rada (parliament) and the local Russian population have taken the path of independence; a referendum is scheduled to take place this month
forces without official affiliation — Berkut and Russian troops without insignia — have moved to strategic locations
Putin is sending more forces to safeguard Russian base interests and ethnic Russians.

What Does the Future Hold for Ukraine?

Apart from Crimea, there are other pro-Russian strongholds in Eastern Ukraine, like Donets and Kharkiv. What will Putin do? Will he also attempt to protect these areas militarily?

Future economic stability is questionable:

Ukraine’s economy is smaller now than it was in 1992
Russia’s monetary support will be terminated as will Eurasian Union tariff concessions
Ukraine needs $35 million over the next two years to pay public sector salaries, energy bills from Russia, and to avoid default
Ukraine has a current account deficit of 8% of GDP and its currency has already lost considerable value
if the US, EU, and IMF come to Ukraine’s assistance, will they insist on “shock therapy” (stringent conditions including reduction of subsidies for heavy industry and energy? (for more info on proposed EU and US loans, read The New York Times)
Kiev has said it will accept conditions but protesters are saying “Europe wants us as slaves.”

For a brief primer on neoliberalism, check out this You Tube Video.

Cold War Studies is now on FACEBOOK. We’ve only been around for a couple of days, but there’s already some really good content there. I hope you’ll check us out. That’s where we’ll we putting all of our updates on the UKRAINE. Please give us a Like, Share our content, and then Comment.

Cold War Cities: The Soviet City

October 17, 2013 by Lisa Reynolds Wolfe

The Soviet Model

The “ideal type” Soviet model is reportedly characterized by massive government involvement in the economy as well as by the absence of private land ownership and free-market forces. Cities fitting the Soviet model have been identified in China, Eastern Europe, North Korea, Vietnam, and Cuba.

Those who accept the relevance of an “ideal type” model use the following rationale as justification.

The socialist territorial order will not only be against the forms of concentration and division of labour developed by capitalism, but will also oppose any form of regression to the old, agricultural, rural, and pre-capitalist community. It is a totally new order, neither urban nor rural, based on undivided polyvalent productive unities. . . it is possible and necessary for societies in transition to begin to establish counter-trends (at least experimentally). As soon as possible, new polyvalent communities must be created with a high degree of socialist decentralization and development of uninhabited regions . . . industrialization of the countryside should be pursued by means of new small-scale technology, and diffusion of equal levels of services and knowledge.

Proponents also argue that the socialist city reflects specific physical characteristics, observing that:

skyscrapers are absent because no profit motive exists for their construction. Instead, large public squares mark the centers of most cities. These squares are politically significant since they are used for public gatherings and rallies. In addition, they are symbolically important, because they mark the communal heart of the socialist city.

It is interesting to note that some capitalist cities also have large public areas. For example, Taiwan’s memorial to Chiang Kai-shek makes Mao’s tomb in Tiananmen Square in Beijing look miniscule in comparison. It is easily the largest structure in all of Taiwan. The memorial is a good example of the problems associated with labeling cities according to ideal type for it reflects Leninist influences which permeated the Nationalist (KMT) government under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek.

In addition to the absence of skyscrapers and the presence of large public squares, three other characteristics are also said to distinguish the built environment of the socialist city:

a “realism architecture” consisting of massive buildings constructed in “wedding cake” style and decorated with red stars
an old town, the remnant of a more distant, but not necessarily valued, past
greenbelts and parkland separating industrial development from the city center.

There was frequently a need for heavy industry to develop quickly without concern for environmental proprieties. Greenbelts were designed to separate this industrial development as far from the city center as possible. Perhaps the best example of this phenomenon is found in China where thousands of workers are active in agricultural communes in greenbelts surrounding many large cities. Havana is also noted for its green belt.

Interestingly, some argue that “realism architecture” is integral to the fascist city as well.

At any rate, according to Stanley D. Brunn and Jack F. Williams, the combination of these features is said to result in an “ideal type” Soviet model which “has produced distinctly different cities in virtually all aspects of urbanism, including morphology and internal spatial structure.”

Socialist cities are also described as having slow rates of urban growth, contributing to a reduction in their degree of urban primacy. You might remember that Brunn and Williams define the primacy ratio as the ratio of the first to the second largest city in a country, reflecting the degree of population dominance of the largest urban center. This variable is believed to reflect the key role of the state in relation to both the economy and civil society.

As Giddens notes:

. . . a strongly centralist Leninist ideology will sacrifice participation for control with consequent urban effects such as the desire to use cities as an explicit mechanism of surveillance to keep the population in check.

Control not only provides for the penetration of private and social space by the state, but also allows the government to restrict population mobility, including immigration to urban areas. So while many cities throughout the less developed world experienced growth from immigration flows as well as from in-migration, neither type of population flow had much impact on socialist cities which were more likely to be affected by emigration than immigration or even rural-urban migration. Consequently, it should not be surprising that many Marxist urbanists argue that socialist developing countries exhibit ” a slower rate of urban growth, compared to many ‘capitalist’ developing countries.” They go on to say that:

Whilst a slower rate of urban growth is not typical of all socialist developing countries, it is typical of enough — and especially those which have been in existence for a comparatively long period of time — to make this a significant and important phenomenon.

A statistical snapshot of the Cold War period does provide some credence for slow-growth assertions. The socialist developing countries are under represented in a listing of the 40 fastest growing urban agglomerations from 1970-1985. Apart from Zibo and Chengdu in China, only Algiers (Algeria), Rangoon (Myanmar/Burma), and Baghdad (Iraq) are specified.

Needless to say, some non-socialist cities also exhibited slow growth, including Montevideo (Uruguay), Manila (Philippines), and Columbo (Sri Lanka). Taipei, too, is noted for its balanced urban development.

On the other hand, while not the fastest growing, many socialist countries were among the world’s most urbanized at Cold War’s end, including Cuba, Nicaragua, Iraq, Syria, Libya, North Korea, and Mongolia.

In our next post on Cold War Cities, we’ll discuss The Capitalist City.