Given the death of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan, yesterday, it’s safe to say that Pakistan will be in the headlines for days to come. A Cold War timeline gives us a quick picture of Pakistan’s — often stormy —  relationship with the US.

1945: PAKISTAN was an idea, not a state. The original idea of a Pakistani state revolved around creating a homeland for Indian Muslims where they would not be dominated by the Hindu majority in a “one-man-one-vote” democracy. The assumption was that if Pakistan were to become a state, both Pakistan and India would remain dependent on Britain.

1947: Jinnah, the leading figure in the Pakistan movement, and Mohammed Iqbal, a poet-philosopher whose ideas underpinned the Pakistan movement, argued that the Islamic nature of a new Pakistan would enhance the defense of the South Asia subcontinent.

1947: Pakistan became a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations and, thus, a Cold War ally of the United States.

1954: Pakistan and Iraq signed mutual cooperation agreements with Turkey (a NATO) member.

1954: Pakistan signed a Mutual Defense Agreement with the US.

1955: Britain and Iran entered into security arrangements, and the ‘Middle East Defence Organization’, popularly known as the ‘Baghdad Pact’, was formed. It was loosely modeled on NATO. The US never became a full member. (The Baghdad Pact later became known as CENTO).

1955 (February): Pakistan became a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), also called the Manila Pact. Like CENTO, it was designed to be a regional NATO that would block communist advances in Southeast Asia.

1958: The name of the Baghdad Pact was formally changed to the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) after the Iraqi monarchy was overthrown. CENTO had little formal structure but it dd give the US and Britain access to facilities in Pakistan such as an airbase outside of Peshawar from which U-2 intelligence flights over the Soviet Union were launched.

1965: Indo-Pakistani War. The US suspended the arms shipments to Pakistan that the country had received in return for its membership in SEATO and CENTO. The US also suspended arms shipments to India. The embargo remained in place during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 and was not lifted until 1975.

1971 (July): Pakistan facilitated a secret visit by US National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger to Beijing. This visit led to a de facto US-China alignment directed against the Soviet Union. Pakistan took full credit for making this breakthrough possible. Some say that this signaled the beginning of the end of the Cold War because the communist movement was now seen as having a crack. From now on, the US made a distinction between major Communist powers that were friendly (China), and those that were antagonistic (the Soviet Union).

1971: Pakistan descended into civil war after East Pakistan demanded autonomy and, later, independence. India invaded East Pakistan in support of its people after millions of civilians fled to India. At the end of 1971, Pakistan was partitioned and Bangladesh was created out of East Pakistan. The Bangladesh movement received widespread public support in the US, as did India’s military intervention. But the US government supported Pakistan, valuing the alliance over human rights violations by the Pakistani army and good relations with India.

1971: After the war, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto becomes president of Pakistan. He believed that Pakistan had been deceived and betrayed by the US, and embarked on a policy that would lesson Pakistan’s dependence on the US.

• He moved to bolster Pakistan’s Islamic identity, creating new and strong ties with Saudi Arabia, Iran, and other Islamic states.
• Pakistan became a key member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), a group that had been founded in 1969.
• He stressed Pakistan’s non-aligned and ‘developing’ credentials. He called his new policy ‘bilateralism’, implying neutrality in the Cold War.
• He withdrew Pakistan from SEATO and military links with the West declined.
• When CENTO was disbanded following the fall of the Shah of Iran in early 1979, Pakistan became a member of the nonaligned movement.

1974: India conducted a ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’ or weapons test. Pakistan reversed its past policy and initiated a secret nuclear weapons program in response.

1970s (late): Nuclear issues became the sticking point of Pakistan’s relations with its former Western allies, especially the US. Cold War alliances became formally defunct.

1977 (June): SEATO was dissolved.

1979: CENTO is dissolved after the Iranian Revolution. It had never been a militarily effective organization.

[SEATO like CENTO had regional and non-regional members. France, the US, and Britain were members, as were New Zealand and Australia. Regional states included Thailand, the Philippines and Pakistan. SEATO was never formally involved in the Vietnam War, in part because of Pakistan’s objection.]

1979 (December): The Soviets invaded Afghanistan. This revived the close relationship between Pakistan and the US.

1980s (early): Pakistan strategists concluded that with a bomb they could provoke and probe India without fear of escalating to a nuclear conflict or large-scale war.

1981: Ronald Reagan offered to provide $3.2 billion to Pakistan over a period of 6 years, to be equally divided between economic and military assistance.

1985: The US Congress passed the Pressler Amendment which required the president to certify to Congress on an annual basis that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear weapon. Otherwise, assistance to Pakistan would be cut off. For several years, President Reagan and President H.W. Bush provided the certification required for a waiver.

1986: The US announced a second package of assistance of over $4.0 billion. 57% of this amount was for economic assistance.

1989: The US ended assistance to Pakistan. With the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan and the end of the Cold War, the US discovered that it can no longer certify the absence of nuclear weapons.

1989-2001: Pakistan’s nuclear program remains the core issue in its relations with the US.

2001: The 9/11 attacks lead to a revival of the US-Pakistan alliance. The George W. Bush administration very quickly eliminates many sanctions against Pakistan. Washington declares Pakistan to be a ‘major non-NATO ally’, entitling it to buy certain military equipment at reduced prices. Pakistan serves as a support base for the US war against Afghanistan, and as a partner in tracking down al-Queda and Taliban leaders. A massive military and economic assistance program for Pakistan is initiated in return.

2008: The US Congress accuses Pakistan of not pulling its weight in combating radical extremism in Afghanistan and in Pakistan itself.

2011 (May 1): Osama bin Laden, the force behind the attacks on New York’s World Trade Center in September 2001, is killed in Abbotabad, Pakistan, by US Navy SEALS.

If you enjoyed this article about Pakistan during the Cold War, you may want to look at some related posts. Just click on the links below.

SUPERPOWER INTERVENTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

AFGHANISTAN AND AMERICAN POLICY

Timelines:

IRAN TIMELINE: COLD WAR

KOREAN WAR TIMELINE

Today is the 32nd anniversary of the Iranian Revolution. That anniversary is overshadowed, though, by the jubilant celebration in Egypt.

Notably, the Egyptian military played a central role in the successful culmination of 18 days of  mostly peaceful demonstrations by the Egyptian people. Here’s hoping that 32 years from now Egypt has much to be proud of — a flourishing democracy, the political participation of all its citizenry, and a professional military separate and apart from the nation’s governing institutions.

Unfortunately, Iran has not achieved such a stellar record of accomplishment. And the Iranian military, to many, is a large part of the problem. In fact, some analysts have begun to describe Iran as a praetorian state. Whatever the label, it’s certainly not a participatory democracy.

Even though it’s way too early for comparisons,  it’s worth taking a look back at the role that Iran’s military played in their revolution. There are some similarities with Egypt’s military today. Notably, the army served notice that it would not fire on Iranian civilians. The army also said that it would not support a regime that insisted on attacking its citizenry. But unlike Egypt’s military today, Iran’s military did not always speak with a singular voice.

In Iran, problems with the armed forces emerged in the fall of 1978 with the first act of sabotage in the army, the explosion of a helicopter in Isfahan on October 10. Afterwards, insubordination and desertions became more common.

Misagh Parsa states:

A clandestine army report indicated that by December 7 — exactly one month after the military government had been installed — a total of 5,434 army personnel, mostly low-ranking enlisted men, had defected from thirty-one garrisons . . . . Soldiers from the Isfahan artillery unit publicly declared on December 5 that when they accepted their commissions they had sworn to defend the nation and its people, not kill civilians. They announced their refusal to support a regime engaged in massacring its own citizens and pledged instead to support Ayatollah Khomeini. To those still deceived by the Shah, they issued a warning that soon the regime’s associates would be put on trial.

Demonstrating air force cadets were arrested in Isfahan on January 27. They were joined by the homofars who had worked closely with the American community at Khatami Air Base. The culmination of this dissent occurred at the outset of the “three glorious days” of the revolution — February 9, 1979 — when air force cadets and the homofars provoked a

punitive attack by 50 to 200 of the Imperial Guards stationed at Dawshan Tappeh Base in eastern Tehran. Fighting continued around the air force barracks until early Saturday afternoon when the Homafaran seized 2000 rifles and distributed them to the people. By then arms were being distributed in the mosques of Tehran, and special phone numbers for calling to receive arms were posted on placards. Meanwhile, Isfahan had fallen into the hands of Khomeini supporters.

Certainly, the actions of the homofars were unfathomable to the American engineers and technicians who had worked with them in Isfahan. Just as confusing was the extent to which US policy was blamed for the shah’s downfall.

The revolution in Egypt, in contrast, has not been about US policy, the $1.3 billion yearly in US military assistance, or US weapon systems. Intstead, it’s all about the Egyptian people.

Kudos to the very professional Egyptian military, to their refusal to fire on their countrymen, and to their aspirations for a peaceful and successful democratic transition!

The journey ahead will be challenging and full of pitfalls. May the military live up to its promise to lift the Emergency Law, and honor its pledge to shepherd its nation to free and fair elections.

As for the Egyptian people — may the road rise up to meet them, and may the wind be always at their back!

 

Cold War Studies sends its heartfelt congratulations to the Egyptian people!

You have done what many said was impossible.

With grace and dignity — and peaceful protest  — you have brought down a corrupt and authoritarian regime.

Your military also deserves kudos for its restraint under trying circumstances.

More later. But for now:

LET’S CELEBRATE

Here is a link to a New York Times article which introduces the players in Egypt’s Supreme Council of Armed Forces.

Can 250,000 people really speak for a nation of 80 million?

What do people really want from their government? Do they want order and stability so that they can live their everyday lives without the threat of uncertainty? Or do they prefer democracy with its freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and dueling political parties even if their daily life becomes less certain? These questions are central to the events we are currently observing in Egypt and other areas of the Middle East.

Samuel Huntington — a Cold Warrior if there ever was one — wrote a book  (published in 1968) called Political Order in Changing Societies. Named one of the most significant books of the last 75 years by Francis Fukuyama writing in Foreign Affairs, the book came out just when the US war in Vietnam was reaching its apex.

The book — a foundational work on political development — was controversial when it first appeared because it argued that order, itself, was an important goal of developing societies. And it didn’t matter if that order was democratic, authoritarian, socialist, or free-market.

It’s worth looking at this issue 40 years later. How important is order? And how much authoritarianism are people willing to put up with in order to have stability in their everyday lives?

Huntington’s main thesis is that violence and instability result in large part from rapid social change and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics. Since political institutions have not developed at a rapid enough pace they are unable to deal with the surge in political participation.

This is especially true in countries like Egypt where opportunities for political association have been extremely limited.  While, by its constitution, Egypt has a multi-party system, in practice the National Democratic Party (the long-time ruling party) is dominant.  Opposition parties are allowed, but are widely considered to have no real chance of gaining power.

In addition, Law 40 of 1977 regulates the formation of political parties in Egypt. This law prohibits the formation of religious-based political parties, so groups such as the Kefaya movement have lost traction and the Muslim Brotherhood has long been outlawed.

In sum, political organization and institutions have not kept up with social mobilization and the demand for political participation.

In keeping with  Huntington’s argument, the result is political instability and disorder.

As always, though, there is another argument. According to this other perspective, the problem is not really one of order and stability. It’s not about getting to work, or buying food, or making sure that the kids get to school. Instead the problem surrounding political participation — and democratization — in the Arab world is all about what political scientists call “external actors.”

According to this alternate perspective, even though there is a good deal of popular support for democracy in the Arab world, there are also significant pockets of support for authoritarian regimes. This is because citizens perceive that it is absolutely essential that their governments please the United States.

In fact, a recent study suggests that citizens continue to profess support for existing authoritarian regimes even though they hold strong democratic values.

But why? It’s obvious proponents say. After all, Arab countries are highly dependent on the US for military security and for economic aid. So while resentment is high against the US, citizens understand that they need the US  to sustain their nation’s stability.

If this perspective makes sense to you, the level of support for any existing leader in the Arab world is all about how well the leader is doing in maintaining the country’s alliance with the US. In fact, the need to please the US is why residents of Egypt — and elsewhere in the Middle East — remain committed to authoritarian rule.

[If you want to find out more about what the people of the Middle East are thinking take a look at the Arab Barometer project.]

I don’t know where you stand regarding political stability and the need for order. But it’s clear that the Egyptians are mulling over both of the arguments presented above. What do you think will happen?

If  the Egyptian citizenry opts for some semblance of stability and puts up with a corrupt and authoritarian regime in the name of an orderly transition to democracy, will the government hold up its end of the bargain?

And is the United States really so central  to the decision making of ordinary citizens in the Arab world?

By the way, before you think the answer is an easy one, take a look at this recently released news report by Human Rights Watch. Then think about your neighborhood — unprotected and subject to unrest and chaos.

I just read an article claiming that Egypt, Kuwait, and Jordan — even Saudi Arabia and Palestine — are clients of the US. I’m not sure what this means.

In my work on Cold War Cities, I’ve argued that in the Cold War, client cities of either the US or the Soviets had four clearly identifiable characteristics:

• First, they engaged in a patron-client relationship with one of the two superpowers.

This affiliation involved the large-scale transfer of military or defense associated resources from patron to client. The most important resources included: 1) Funds allocated under the US Military Assistance Program (MAP); funds authorized under the US Foreign Assistance Act, but budgeted within the Defense Department; the Soviet counterpart to this funding, especially various forms of subsidies; and 2) military/arms sales and deliveries of excess weapons stocks by either superpower.

• Second, superpower military assets and resources became integrated into the economic, social, and political fabric of each city.
• Third, affected cities experienced visible changes in their built environment and infrastructure which could be traced back to the militaristic influence of their patron.
• Finally, and most importantly, the strategic and geopolitical value of the cities meant that they were critically important to the grand strategy of one or both superpowers.

I  haven’t done the research so I don’t know if Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, or Palestine meet the above criteria.

But I do know that a Congressional Research Service Report dated February 1, 2011, says that  the United States has provided Egypt with an annual average of $2 billion in economic and military foreign assistance since 1979.

For FY2011, the Obama Administration is seeking $1.552 billion in total assistance, the exact same amount as the previous fiscal year. The Administration’s request includes $1.3 billion in military assistance and $250 million in economic aid.

The military financing goes largely to fund the purchase of US military equipment.  Among several large sales in the works (according to the  Congressional Research Service) is a deal worth $1.7 billion to provide Egypt with with 24 advanced F-16 fighter aircraft, one of the largest arms-transfer agreements concluded with a developing nation in 2009.

Deals announced in 2010 include a potential sale of six Ch-47 Chinook helicopters and associated parts, a deal worth up to $308 million, and support and repair of Egypt’s frigates, which has a $210 million price tag.

In a recent interview on National Public Radio, Robert Springborg, a professor at the US Naval Postgraduate School, argued that one reason for the Egyptian military’s peaceful response to the recent turmoil was

the unique role it plays in the Egyptian economy. The military owns virtually every industry in the country.

Here’s a list of military involvement that he “rattled off the top of his head.”

. . . car assembly, we’re talking of clothing, we’re talking of construction of roads, highways, bridges. We’re talking of pots and pans, we’re talking of kitchen appliances. You know, if you buy an appliance there’s a good chance that it’s manufactured by the military. If you . . . don’t have natural gas piped into your house and you have to have a gas bottle, the gas bottle will have been manufactured by the military. Some of the foodstuffs that you will be eating will have been grown and/or processed by the military.

According to Springborg, when the peace treaty with Israel was signed, the military transformed itself from a fighting force to a hiring force. He goes on to say:

No one knows for sure how many resort hotels or other businesses in Egypt are run by the military, which controls somewhere between 5 and 40 percent of the nation’s economy . . . .

So, do these Arab countries, particularly Egypt show the characteristics required to be a client of the US? I haven’t done enough reading to know for sure. But it looks like Egypt — Cairo particularly —  has a running start. What do you think?

 

A major residual of Egypt’s Cold War history is the country’s Emergency Law.

Emergency Law No. 162 of 1958 sharply circumscribes any non-governmental political activity. As seen in the video above, it was extended for two more years on May 11, 2010.  It is one of the major grievances of the January 2011 protestors. (If you can’t see the video above, click on Egypt’s Emergency Law.)

The decades-old regulations were put in place after the assasination of Anwar Sadat, the former Egyptian president almost 30 years ago.

Now the government has decided to lift some of the original restrictions, and says that the law would only apply to terror and drug cases.

Analysts argue, though, that the latest step is a legal ploy that masks the law’s violation of basic human rights.

The law has remained in effect since 1967, except for an 18-month break in 1980. The emergency was imposed during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and reimposed following the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 1981.

The Emergency Law has been continuously extended every three years since. In 2006, President Hosni Mubarak promised reforms including repealing the Emergency Law, and replacing it with other measures. Instead, the law was renewed.

Key provisions of the law include:

Article 1: The government may declare a state of emergency across Egypt or in a specified region, whenever there is a danger to security or public order, including war, disturbances, disaster, or epidemic.

Article 2: State of emergency be announced and decided by the President of Egypt, and include the reason, region covered, and date enacted.

Article 3: When declared, the president can include the following measures:

1. Restrictions on freedom of people to gather
2. Restrict movement of people
3. Arrest suspects or people who pose a danger
4. Arrest and search people and places without restrictions
5. Require any person to perform any act
6. Control communications, newspapers, publications, and all means of expression prior to publications, and seize and shut down places of printing
7. Seize any property and impose security on companies and institutions, and postpone debts and obligations for what is seized or imposed by the government
8. Decommission weapons and ammunitions
9. Evacuate regions or cut-off transportation between areas

The law has remained in effect since 1967, except for an 18-month break in 1980. The emergency was imposed during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and reimposed following the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 1981.

The Emergency Law has been continuously extended every three years since. In 2006, President Hosni Mubarak promised reforms including repealing the Emergency Law, and replacing it with other measures. Instead, the law was renewed.

A Cold War Timeline of events in Egypt presents insight into happenings that authorities use to support the continuation of the Emergency Law.

September 1947: Andrei Zhdanov, Stalin’s Politburo colleague, makes a     speech that assesses the post World War II global situation.

Zhdanov argues that the world is divided into two camps, an “imperialist and anti-democratic camp” and an “anti-imperialist and democratic camp.”

The principal driving force of the imperialist camp was the United States. Egypt, while located in a region of vital strategic importance to the West, was thought to be sympathetic to the anti-imperialist cause.

July 23, 1952: The Egyptian Revolution of 1952 (also known as the July 23 Revolution and the Officers’ Revolution) begins with a military coup d’etat by a group of young nationalist army officers known as the Free Officers Movement. The highly corrupt Egyptian king, King Farouk is deposed. Support coalesces behind a young officer, Gamal Abdel Nasser.

September 27, 1955: President Nasser announces that Egypt will be buying advanced weapons from Czechoslovakia. His decision was spurred by clashes with Israel as well as by the West’s unwillingness to sell him weapons.

July 26, 1956: Nasser announced the seizure of all the assets and facilities of the Suez Canal Company.

October 29, 1956: With French and British backing, the Israelis invade the Sinai, seizing strategic positions and posing an ostensible threat to the recently nationalized Suez Canal. For details see our post Egypt, Suez, and the Dynamics of Superpower Intervention in the Middle East.

The crisis saw the beginning of an era when the Middle East region was increasingly buffeted by Cold War geopolitics and leftist radicalism.

The Suez Crisis was “the first case of a Third World radical taking Soviet arms and playing the anti-Western card.” Nasser becomes a major world figure and a leader of the nonaligned movement.

January 1957: In an address to Congress, President Eisenhower announces the “Eisenhower Doctrine,” a policy of American support for Middle Eastern states threatened by aggression from “International Communism.”

November 1966: Egypt and Syria sign a mutual defense treaty which proves fatal to Egypt when the Syrians are blamed for stepped up terrorist attacks on Israel.

Spring of 1967: Moscow warns Egypt that an Israeli attack on Syria is imminent. Nasser expels UN peacekeeping forces from the Sinai and reoccupies it with Egyptian troops. Syria and Israel mobilized. Egypt blockades the Strait of Tiran.

Early June 1967: Israel retaliates, and defeats Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in six days and occupying large sections of Arab territory.

The war turns the Arab-Israeli confrontation into a direct superpower confrontation.

1967: Nasser gives the Soviets virtual control over seven air bases and preferential access to four harbors in the Mediterranean and one in the Red Sea.

The Soviets rebuild the Egyptian and Syrian military forces.

November 22, 1967: The United Nations unanimously adopts Resolution 242.

The resolution speaks of the “inadmissability of the acquistion of territory by war” and calls for “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict.” The resolution is deliberately ambiguous about the extent of Israeli withdrawal required.

September 28, 1970: Nasser dies.

October 15, 1970: Anwar Sadat, a senior member of the Free Officers Group, succeeds Nasser as president.

July 18, 1972: Sadat terminates the mission of 15,000 Soviet military personnel in Egypt and reclaims all Soviet military installations and equipment set up in Egypt since 1967. He gives the Soviets a week to leave the country.

Oct0ber 6-23, 1973: Sadat takes military action to gain American notice. He instigates the 1973 Yom Kippur War to create an international crisis that the US would have to respond to.

November 7, 1973: President Sadat and US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger meet for the first time. Sadat tells Kissinger that he is ready to end Egypt’s conflict with Israel. Learn more about Sadat and the US in our previous post Egypt Transfers Loyalty From the USSR to the US in the Middle of the Cold War.

1975: Sadat formally reopens the Suez Canal. A US aircraft carrier leads the first ceremonial convoy of ships through the waterway.

March 1975: Egyptian-Israeli negotiations break down over the disengagement of forces in the Sinai.

September 1, 1975: Egypt and Israel conclude a second agreement – the second Sinai accord. They pledge not to go to war and to negotiate toward a final peace. There was a more significant Israeli withdrawal in the Sinai and permission was granted for Israeli civilian cargoes to use the Suez canal.

November 1977: Sadat visits Jerusalem for the first face-to-face contact ever between Egyptian and Israeli leaders. This paves the way for the Camp David negotiations.

September 5-17, 1978: Negotiations at Camp David produce the outline of a peace treaty, a total Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian territory, and the framework for a transitional period of autonomy for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.

October 6, 1981: President Sadat is assassinated by Islamic fundamentalists.

October 14, 1981: Vice President Hosni Mubarak assumes the presidency.

November 1986: Seeking better relations with Egypt, the Soviet Union reschedules a large amount of Egypt’s debt.

1989: Egypt is readmitted as a full member of the Arab League, and the League’s headquarters are relocated to their original location in Cairo.

Interestingly, this past Sunday, January 30, 2011, Amr Moussa, the head of the Arab League, says he wants to see a multi-party democracy emerge in Egypt but could not say how soon that might happen.

At the same time that America’s strong friendship with its former client, Iran, was disintegrating, the Soviet Union was becoming mired in Afghanistan.

On December 27, 1979, the Soviets invaded, killing the Marxist head of state, installing a puppet regime, and eventually committing almost 100,000 troops to fight the Muslim “guerillas.” The US saw Moscow’s military intervention as a culmination of its 1970s expansionary course in the Third World.

The Soviets, on the other hand, felt that they were directly protecting their nation’s national security interests. It had become apparent to them that the Marxist government could not survive for long without direct Soviet armed forces support. Furthermore, it was apparent that the most effective and militant opponents of the regime were Islamic religiopolitical leaders, some of whom clearly fit the mold of Islamic political resurgence.

Because of Soviet concern that the instability in Afghanistan might spread across the 1,200 mile border that the Afghans shared with the Muslim Central Asian Republics of the Soviet Union, Moscow needed to ensure that Afghanistan would remain a buffer state. Thus, the Soviets saw their actions as defensive measures, designed to preserve — not upset — the existing geopolitical balance.

Conversely, the US saw the Soviet use of armed force as a serious violation of international law, posing a sharp challenge to US policy as well as to its oil interests and vital sea lanes.

As a result, in January 1980, the US along with Egypt and Pakistan — aided by financial support from Saudi Arabia — began to provide covert military and other assistance to the Afghan insurgents. In return, the Soviets became convinced that the US was opposing a reasonable Soviet policy stance in Afghanistan as a pretext to dismantle detente, gear up the arms race, build American positions of strength in the Persian Gulf, and mount a general anti – Soviet offensive.

Iran also became engaged in the struggle, supporting Shi’a mujahedin factions exclusively and demanding a Soviet evacuation.

In what many have called an overreaction, Carter withdrew the unratified SALT II treaty from the Senate, ordered embargoes on shipments of grain and technology to the USSR, endorsed a new program of draft registration, asked for an increase in American defense spending including the creation of a ‘rapid-deployment’ force capable of reacting quickly to Third World crises, and even demanded a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics. He went on to denounce the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as the most serious threat to peace since World War II.

As the insurgency grew, there was a mass population exodus with approximately three million refugees fleeing to Iran and Pakistan.

The Afghan Army was plagued by desertions and defections, requiring that the Soviets assume an ever larger military effort.

The war lasted almost ten years before the withdrawal of all forces in 1988-1989, depleting and demoralizing the Soviets just as Vietnam had drained the United States.

American foreign policy in the 1980s focused above all on hostages — those held in Iran and, later, in Lebanon — and on mobilizing a counter reaction to Afghanistan.

In the wake of the Soviet occupation, negotiations with the Kremlin on the demilitarization of the Indian Ocean and on restraining conventional arms sales to the Third World were superseded by a massive buildup of American naval capability in the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf region.

American defense manufacturers were eager to increase their supply of arms to the area when Pakistan and Saudi Arabia replaced Iran as American bastions. Meanwhile, the quest continued for naval and air bases, as well as for the use of existing facilities in Oman, Kenya, and Somalia.

Enunciation of the Carter Doctrine (1979) reversed the long-standing policy that countries, in the first instance, would be required to defend their own security. Accordingly, the Gulf was considered a zone of vital interest to the US in which no challenge to the West’s influence would be permitted.

Nonetheless, uncertainty surrounding the Americans held captive in Iran overshadowed all other aspects of international affairs. The problem was compounded when, with the hostage crisis in full swing, Saddam Hussein invaded Iran.

After the debacle in Egypt, and unsettled by what it considered its greatest foreign policy error since World War II, Washington shifted more and more of its energies to fighting the Cold War in the Third World.

In the Soviet Union Khruschev brought about changes that allowed his government to exploit opportunities with the newly emerging nations.

For both nations the Middle East was the top priority.

From 1955 through 1968, the Soviet Union provided nearly $3 billion in military aid to the region.

Moscow had several objectives, including a need to access warm water ports on the open sea, a desire to limit Western access to the region’s oil resources, and a determination to eliminate Western influence by destroying alliances, particularly the Baghdad Pact of 1955, the CENTO Pact of 1956, and the more loosely aligned Islamic Alliance of 1966.

As a first step, the Soviets increased their appeal to Arab nationalism, portraying Israel as an instrument of Western imperialism and the United States as a neocolonialist power.

La Feber says that Moscow also “fanned local arms races … between revolutionary and moderate Arab, and between Algeria and Morocco, thereby undermining American efforts.”

The United States provided roughly the same level of assistance as did the Soviets, representing itself as a guardian of stability in the region despite the fact that it was chiefly concerned with protecting Western interests against Soviet overtures.

Western interests were important since, at that time, the Middle East provided 80 percent of Western Europe’s oil supply and contained more than three-fifths of the world’s proven oil reserves, in addition to its proximity to NATO’s southern flank.

As arms flowed into the Middle East, Iran’s concern over issues relating to regional security intensified.

In Iran, the shah’s perception of threat was also exacerbated by the magnitude of Soviet aid to neighboring Afghanistan who, for nearly nine years (1946 – 1955), had unsuccessfully sought American aid and support.

When the United States ultimately made clear its commitment to Pakistan and its unwillingness to commit itself comparably to Afghanistan, the country became the first Cold War recipient of Soviet economic credits.

By 1964 the buffer state received the highest per capita assistance of any nation under the Kremlin’s economic umbrella. This knowledge propelled a defense build-up in Iran and Pakistan.