At the end of World War II, Havana, the capital of Cuba, was a perfect example of what is known as a primate city. This condition develops when one city becomes so dominant that it prohibits cities in other parts of the country from developing.

In contrast, Taipei was also a capital, but not strictly speaking a primate. Still, as the largest city in Taiwan,  it exhibited many primate characteristics.

On the other hand, Isfahan was not a capital. While the governments of both Taiwan and Cuba were preoccupied with devising strategies to divert population growth from Taipei and Havana, the Iranian government was targeting Isfahan for expansion.

The second largest city in Iran, Isfahan was selected to be the center of Iran’s process of military-led industrialization in order to shift urban pressure from Iran’s primate city, Tehran.

Also, in contrast to Taipei and Havana, Isfahan received support from both superpowers (sometimes concurrently) until the Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979.

Soviet support was logical given Iran’s historically close relationship with the Soviet Union, analogous to Cuba’s close relationship with the United States. American support evolved from the Allied occupation of the country in World War II.

Isfahan presents a good example of a Soviet turnkey operation in its Russian steel mill located on the outskirts of town, and is perhaps the prime example of urban transformation due to major weapons import from the West in the Third World.

Isfahan, located in the center of one of America’s forward defense areas, was important not only for its geographical location, but also because of Iran’s large oil reserves. Facilitated during the 1970s by ever-growing oil revenues and by the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine, the shah of Iran began to purchase a range of weapons and support systems that he expected would meet both regional contingencies and maintain US military objectives.

Ultimately, Iran spent more on American arms and associated services than any other non-European country.

Concurrent with escalating arms purchases, the shah embarked on a program of military-led industrialization which expanded Isfahan’s economic and  urban base. The city’s central position contributed to its selection as an industrial hub, and its numerous military facilities greatly benefited from the shah’s defense expenditures.

A viable arms industry was declared to be a precondition to successful industrialization, and since the arms sector was traditionally subject to state control, the expansion of arms production in Isfahan offered advantages for both Iranian capital and American enterprises.

The purchase of the F-14 Tomcat, the latest Western jet fighter, along with helicopter and training purchases from Bell Helicopter, disproportionately modified Isfahan’s urban identity as large numbers of Americans and their families flowed into the city to provide expertise and training.

By 1970, Bell Helicopter had 1,800 employees (plus dependents) in Isfahan. The function of these employees, in addition to supplying maintenance training and skills, was to supply tactical training to Iranian pilots involved in the creation of a helicopter-borne strike force. Grumman had approximately 2,000 employees and dependents in Isfahan in 1976, with the number expected to grow to more than 10,000 by 1980. These foreign arrivals were supplemented by large numbers of Iranian technicians and military personnel arriving from other areas of the country.

During the first years of the Iran-Iraq War both superpowers attempted to keep some distance from the conflict.  Both the United States and the Soviet Union abandoned neutrality, however, when they deduced that the war was uniting Iranians behind the Khomeini government and that a victory for Iran was possible.

The Soviets resumed arms shipments in 1982, and after Iran declared the Tudeh Party illegal, arresting a thousand of its leaders and members and expelling eighteen Soviet diplomats, the flow of Soviet arms to Iraq became a flood.

The US also changed its position, restoring diplomatic missions with Iraq, extending almost $2 billion in commodity credits, and allowing the country the use of American intelligence sources. American interests became even more explicit when Iran threatened to close the Straits of Hormuz.

Subsequently, the Iran-Iraq War “floated” on the price of a barrel of oil.

A “tanker war” began in 1984 with both nations attacking oil installations and commercial tankers, including a missile attack on the USS Stark which killed thirty-seven Americans.

Eventually both superpowers and five European navies engaged in the regional dispute.

At the same time, Iraq began a “War of the Cities,” launching missile attacks against Iranian towns and cities, eventually focusing on industrial targets in important urban areas. Civilian casualties were steep.

In January 1987, Iran reported that the number of Iranians hurt in Iraqi air raids was more than 1,800 killed and 6,200 wounded, with as many as 202 killed and 644 wounded on a given day.

In a two week period in February 1988, a total of more than one hundred missiles were fired at Tehran, Qom, and Isfahan, along with bombing raids on another thirty-seven cities, Iran retaliated with bombings and missile attacks on Iraqi cities.

Meanwhile, Israel entered the fray. That government justified its resolution to sell arms to Iran, arguing that such activity would increase Iraqi casualties and extend a war that ultimately served the interests of the US, primarily by preventing Sadam Hussein from establishing hegemony over the Arab side of the Persian Gulf.

Israel’s decision had enormous impact when, in conjunction with a small group of American National Security Council (NSC) officials, the Israelis became key players in a plan to sell Iran arms and spare parts in the hope that it would expedite the release of American hostages held in Lebanon. The Americans had been seized in 1984 by Middle East terrorists supported by Iran.

The plan soon broadened with the suggestion that the funds raised from the sale of arms to Iran be channeled to assist the Contras in Nicaragua.

President Reagan’s humanitarian interest in the hostage situation was strengthened by several other factors: a growing fear that the Iranians were “exporting revolution” to oil rich Saudi Arabia; concern over the impact of the falling price of oil on America’s domestic oil industry; and continued obsession with the Soviet threat.

The associated scandal undermined the credibility of the Reagan administration and eventually evolved into a constitutional crisis.

According to James Bill, the episode was pointless.

The Iranian initiative succeeded only in replacing three American hostages with another three, arming Iran with 2,004 TOWs and more than 200 vital spare parts for HAWK missile batteries, improperly generating funds for the Contras and other covert activities …. undermining US credibility in the eyes of the world, damaging relations between the Executive and Congress, and engulfing the President in one of the worst credibility crises of any Administration in US history.

While the President clearly supported the arms for hostage strategy with great enthusiasm, controversy continues over his knowledge of the Contra funding. The President had, however, authorized the CIA to spend millions to equip and train the contras in clear violation of US neutrality laws. The CIA trained the Contras in the southern United States, then shipped them to Nicaragua through Honduras.

If you enjoyed this article about Iran during the Cold War, you may want to look at some related posts. Just click on the links below.

COLD WAR: THE REAGAN PERIOD

THE NIXON APPROACH: IRAN AND IRAQ

 US COVERT STRATEGY IN IRAN

COLD WAR: EARLY US MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO IRAN

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While arguments and analysis continue regarding the causes of the Iranian Revolution and the contribution of external forces to its development, American foreign policy decisions during the 1977 – 1979 time period show no direct causal relationship.

In other words, Carter’s human rights policy and the confusions of US policy making  were not the determinant factors. However, it would be simplistic to assume that external forces were without influence.

Tensions were created as a result of Iran’s ongoing socioeconomic transformation.

The revenues of Iran’s oil industry rose from $45 million in 1950 to $20.5 billion in 1976. Concurrently, the United States embarked on a program of arms sales, with the Nixon Doctrine supplying the rationale — an extension of diplomacy that allowed the equipping of reliable allies, along with a quick and easy way to use oil money to redress the US trade balance. (For more click here)

In a one year period the Pentagon more than doubled their foreign arms sales from$3.9 billion in 1973 to $8.3 billion in 1974. Almost half of this total went to one buyer, the shah of Iran.

This recycling of petrodollars for US – supplied weaponry meant that the political and military buildup of the shah’s regime was, in the end, contingent on American  foreign policy decision making.

Opponents of the shah were able to combine the regime’s obsession with weapons spending and neglect of human capital, the ramifications of Kennedy’s intervention in Iran’s affairs in 1960 (especially land reform), and America’s covert activities in the Mossadegh era to create a climate where identification with the West — or with the Soviet Union for that matter — was clearly undesirable.

In the end, the Ayatollah Khomeini succeeded in steering his nation away from overt dependence on (or support of) either superpower, an accomplishment that most other Third World leaders had failed to achieve.

After expelling American influence, Khomeini purged the pro – Soviet Tudeh party and offered assistance to anti – Soviet rebels in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the US remained concerned that perceived American weakness in the region would benefit Moscow by providing opportunities for it to extend its influence.

By 1969 the United States was looking for assistance in carrying out its military commitments in the Third World based, primarily, on Britain’s decision to withdraw military forces from all ports east of the Suez Canal, including the Persian Gulf. (Formal confirmation of the withdrawal occurred on March 1, 1971.)

Washington believed that Britain’s departure would leave a dangerous strategic vacuum in the region and, therefore, expanded allied responsibility, announcing that the US would send arms rather than troops to critical areas.

The Nixon Doctrine, announced in 1969, provided supporters with a new justification to buy arms that would be used in the Western interest, a policy which would also allow American defense contractors to extract huge profits.

Given a green light by the Americans, the shah of Iran began to purchase a range of weapons and support systems that he expected would meet both regional contingencies and support US military objectives.

The shah was basically given military carte blanche based on the perceived American need to have a trusted local power protect US interests in the Persian Gulf. Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger believed that as America’s foreign surrogate, Iran deserved to receive whatever military goods it deemed necessary to carry out its new responsibilities.

Nixon and Kissinger thought that American and Iranian interests overlapped. In Kissinger’s words:

On all major international issues, the policies of the United States and the policies of Iran have been parallel and therefore mutually reinforcing.

From Kissinger’s perspective the shah was

… that rarest of leaders, an unconditional ally, and one whose understanding of the world situation enhance our own.

Facilitated in the 1970s by ever growing oil revenues, the Iranian government spent more money on US weapons and military support than any other non-European country.

Iran did, however, insist on a quid pro quo, insisting that the US provide covert military assistance to Kurdish rebels. The Kurds were used as proxies, serving Iranian, American, and Israeli interests until 1975 when Iran and Iraq reached an agreement favorable to Iran, moving Iraq’s border from the Iranian shore of the Shatt-al-Arab waterway to the  middle of the deepest shipping channel. Iran then cut off aid to the Kurds who were subsequently overwhelmed.

Despite this occurrence, the Iran-Iraq agreement did serve to stabilize the region by encouraging Iraq to move to a more non-aligned position and increasing American opportunities to reestablish influence in the country.

It’s raining in New York today, and Iran is all over the news. The Cold War’s legacy is strong, even overpowering. So many experts, so many opinions. But where — can anyone tell me — do they get all the inside knowledge? I don’t know whether Iran is evil, contentious, pragmatic, or delusional. But I do remember better times — Cold War times. And while I’m being more than a little nostalgic and self-indulgent, I’d like to share my personal memories with anyone who cares to read further.

I arrived in Iran on a bright spring day in late April 1976, and left in the gray of cold December two and a half years later. In that short period of time, I watched Isfahan, the city I called home, become a chameleon. First, the Pearl of Persia, battered by an influx of foreign workers, domestic technicians, and military personnel became (what I call) a Cold War City, unintentionally shaped and molded by Cold War inputs and influences. Later, before I left, it was well on its way to becoming a revolutionary bastion.

Today, in the spring of 2010, the Cold War remains a phantom presence. Cold War residuals continue to influence not only Isfahan and Iran, but the international politics of the United States of America. Especially in this Congressional election year, it is hard to deny that the past determines and shapes the present. It is also hard to deny that the past shapes my present, especially when I remember my life and the tours I led all over Iran.

Giant snowflakes on Abbasabad Avenue near the Anglican church and English bookstore. Wiener schnitzel and curried chicken at the Iran Tour hotel nearby. Afternoon tea in the rose garden at the Shah Abbas. Shopping for copper in the old bazaar. My memories are as opaque as drizzly, fog-filled October nights in New York’s West Village.

I wish I had kept a diary, a journal, but I didn’t. Only later, when my dreams fell flat and I lost my inner compass, did I begin to write.

I thought it would be easy to reconstruct the most meaningful events of my past, that the sights and smells and noises of my life would be at my beck and call. Now I spend hours looking at faded photographs, piecing the years together like some kind of crazy quilt, teasing my memories from their hiding places in the same way that a quilter patiently wriggles her needle and thread through resistant fabrics.

I tug at the fragments, willing images of remembering to skit across my consciousness like fluffy cirrus clouds on the loveliest of spring days.

I spend a lot of time recalling my long walks through the neighborhoods of Isfahan, reconstructing the trips and tours I led all over Iran.

Did I really ride a camel backward to liven up a lackluster group? Did I really barge into a tentful of Qashgais and ask if they would mind if our group took a look, saw how they lived? Did I really experience Natanz in spring?

The trips that I planned and led in Iran formed the core of my life there, at least for the first eighteen months or so, before the nation’s internal political situation became so troubling. These were the good times, the magical times.

After, there were other trips. More somber. To Qom, to Sanandaj. But, mainly, there were long, long stays close to home.

Now, I spend my time resurrecting memories: Shah Reza, Kashan, Soh, Najafabad, Shiraz, Susa, and so many others.

But more and more – because it’s in the news, I guess – I dwell on Natanz. Beautiful, beautiful Natanz. Oh how I long for Natanz in spring.

Were they cherry or were they apricot? It doesn’t matter. What I remember are blossoms floating from the sky like pale pink snowflakes, picnics of chelo kebab and chai, and visits to the aging potter Ustad Abady. Because I was the group leader, I was always the first to enter the narrow hallway leading to the workshop. I lusted after his pottery, refused to have anything less than first dibbs. The piece I liked best was an oval vase, white with rabbits outlined in black, punctuated by sprigs of rose, blue, and green. When we left the country, I had to entrust the piece to a friend for safekeeping. I never saw it again. And I will never have another.

It sounds as if the Natanz trips were only for me and maybe they were. I know that my last trip was. It was in fall, rather than spring, and revolutionary fires were raging. Some friends and I hired a car and driver and had one last picnic.

I have pictures of that crisp, sunny day, and I vividly remember asking God for one more spring. Perhaps it is yet to be. But much has changed since that visit.

Today Natanz is not noted for its history, its beauty, or its hundred year old Chinese pottery tradition. Instead, it is central to Iran’s nuclear debate, and home to a purported underground facility identified by the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security as a probable gas centrifuge uranium-enrichment facility.

The Iranians argue that Natanz will process natural uranium to produce fuel for Iran’s civilian nuclear power program. In fact, an IISS report on Iran’s nuclear ambitions states that “depending on the configuration and operation of the facility, Natanz could produce either low-enriched uranium for light water nuclear power fuel or highly-enriched uranium for several nuclear weapons a year.”

In any event, Natanz has lost its innocence, even though my memories of times past have not. Every spring they become vibrant again, and I pay homage to places loved and friends misplaced.

It’s really not very hard because there’s a cherry tree in Central Park, near my home, that reminds me so much of Natanz in springtime. I guide my springer spaniel Berkeley to a spot under the pale pink blossoms and we let them rain down on us. Then I take long, deep breaths and savor the memories, pretending that I am safe, that nothing can hurt us. I am in Natanz and it is spring.

The Eisenhower administration’s covert strategy was first applied in Iran where the stability of the shah’s regime was deemed essential from the American national security perspective.

Because Eisenhower’s new emphasis on covert action proved capable of resolving potential revolutions in America’s favor, the strategy came to dominate much of America’s activity in the Third World during the remainder of the Cold War.

Shortly after CIA intervention resolved Iran’s domestic leadership crisis to the shah’s advantage, the Americans, fearful of Soviet ambitions, entered into an agreement, making Iran the nominal owner of its own oil.

But — the agreement also gave six US companies a lucrative 40 percent share of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) consortium.

The agreement did allow Iran, though, to accrue much higher oil revenues, a condition that enabled the country to finance the arms expenditures and military build-up which occurred in the 1970s.

At this early point in the Cold War, issues of national security clearly meshed in America’s political consciousness with interests which later took on overriding economic importance.

It was not until the 1960s that the multinational corporation became a mechanism for the achievement of Cold War strategies and objectives.

And — not until the 1970s did exorbitant oil revenues combine with the goals of Third World governments and the multinational corporation to create almost unlimited opportunity for the international defense industry in the Third World.

Although Stalin appeared to be resolute in his determination to protect Soviet oil revenues, in reality, he was much more concerned with dominance and prestige. As the Soviet scholar Georgiy Mirsky argues: “Oil was not so terribly vital to the interests of the Soviet Union … The USSR had plenty of it to begin with.”

Stalin’s refusal to withdraw his troops from Iran had most to do — not with oil — but with his concern over Iran’s position vis-a-vis the postwar balance of power. His recalcitrance regarding troop withdrawal  led to a debate in the Security Council of the United Nations, the first test for the infant organization.

During the Security Council debate, the United States provided support and leadership, at the same time becoming inextricably embroiled in Iran’s domestic politics.

The Soviets finally promised to withdraw their troops.

The USSR left the region in May 1946 after the Iranians promised them an oil concession.  There was a caveat: the concession was subject to approval by the Iranian Majles.

In December 1946, Stalin suffered a diplomatic defeat when the Majles refused to approve the concession.

Iran’s situation remained precarious. Riots occurred throughout the country.

Iran’s largest tribe, the Qasha’i, revolted in the south in opposition to government policy regarding Iran’s communist leaning party, the Tudeh Party. Meanwhile, the Tudeh held daily demonstrations in most of Iran’s large cities.

In order to show its support for the shah’s government, the United States decided “that a limited amount of armaments not to exceed $10 million in value would be sold to Iran. The United States would also give favorable consideration to the credits necessary to furnish such arms.”

Based on the American showing of support, the Iranian government sent security forces into Azerbaijan, finally suppressing a Soviet-sponsored revolt.

In addition to the $10 million in armaments mentioned above, in 1947, the United States provided Iran with a $51 million credit for the purchase of weaponry and associated expenditures. Subsequently, American resources poured into the country, enabling a build-up of Iran’s armed forces.

Over the next three years, Iran rapidly evolved into a state consumed by issues of national security. The shah embraced American assistance as a means of eliminating the Soviet presence in his country, preserving the integrity of Iran’s borders, and solidifying support for his policies internally.

The Iranian air force increased its fighting force fivefold, the army was modernized, and the navy was expanded.

Meanwhile, the United States, moving into the great power position that Britain could no longer maintain, had survived its introduction to realpolitik in the developing world.

The concept of balance of power and the strategy of containment took on increased meaning as paradigms for success in dealing with the Soviet Union — especially in the Third World.

The take-away: precedent was established in Iran regarding the importance of economic and military support for Third World countries allying themselves with the Western security system.