Iran Archives - Page 2 of 9

COLD WAR IRAN IN THE 1980s: A HIERARCHY OF CITIES

January 18, 2016 by Lisa Reynolds Wolfe

Post-revolutionary urban development reflects important shifts in the urban hierarchy of Iranian cities with new elements shaping their formation.

During the Cold War, Isfahan’s central location contributed to its growth as an industrial center, and the city’s military facilities were prime beneficiaries of the shah’s defense expenditures.

In the post-revolutionary period, despite early protestations, militarization remained pervasive, though changed.

As the war with Iraq was winding down, just when it might seem appropriate to return to the early rhetoric of the revolution, the Ayatollah Khomeini stated:

I hope that no one thinks that with the ceasefire and the impending peace negotiations we do not need to strengthen our defense and expand our capacity for further military production. In fact, the development and expansion of our arms production industries should be a foremost goal of the Islamic Republic’s reconstruction policy. We must be vigilant at all times against aggression towards our Revolution by the superpowers or their minions.

Military-industrial production changed, however, and was now centered not on the American defense corporation but on the production of small arms and ammunition.

By the end of 1987, Iran had become self-sufficient in many categories with small armaments plants in Tehran and Shiraz.

The northeastern city of Mashhad gained from its proximity to the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, taking over Isfahan’s position as the nation’s second largest city. Wealth from the Shrine of the Eighth Imam, Reza, located in the city contributed to its new standing.

During the Cold War, Isfahan’s growth was dependent on factors unrelated to those affecting urbanization in Iran’s other cities. While the focus of urbanization in the Pahlavi period was on rural-urban migration, Isfahan, in addition, attracted a large foreign community along with Iranians more educated than the usual migrant. Later, while other cities attracted large-scale immigration resulting from the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the two Gulf Wars, Isfahan was less impacted.

A US Department of State publication estimated the number of Afghan refugees in Iran at 1.9 million in 1988. The bulk of the new arrivals settled in Khorasan, Sistan/Baluchistan, Kerman, Fars, Yazd, and Tehran. The Iran-Iraq War was also a dislocating force with over 2.5 million individuals losing their jobs and homes.

Along with the rest of Iran, Isfahan was faced with the large-scale task of postwar reconstruction. Public debate has centered on the immediate need to rebuild war devastated areas and to provide for the families of war martyrs. The issue of social justice as regards the poor has lost its prominent place on the list of immediate priorities.

Rural-urban migration has continued to flourish despite growing unemployment and insufficient economic opportunity.

Housing shortages persist.

Efforts by the Islamic Republic to resolve its problems face nearly insurmountable domestic and international challenges. Indeed, some say that “the roots of the country’s badly fractured politics must be sought in its obsolete political culture.” They call for an Iranian “perestroika,” citing the need for a better image and perhaps even a new sense of identity.

Photography by Casey Hugelfink: Isfahan’s Ali Qapu Palace 1984

SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR IN COLD WAR IRAN

October 7, 2015 by Lisa Reynolds Wolfe

Revolutionary leadership convinced many Iranians that their demands for democracy, national independence, and social justice would be realized with the adoption of a new Islamic form of government. This became difficult as the struggle for independence from the American superpower played out in the context of the war against Iraq.

The impact of the Iraq War on urban areas made earlier promises for social justice difficult to accomplish.

Rural-urban migration was greatly exacerbated due to war displacement as refugees from war areas — officially estimated at 2 million — combined with an influx of over 1.5 million Afghan refugees to flood the streets of Iran’s urban areas.

In his book Winners and Losers of the Iranian Revolution: A Study in Income Distribution, Sohrab Behdad reports that many of the unemployed — primarily young males seeking unskilled jobs — became street vendors in the thriving open black market. While this group benefited from growing shortages, many more of the displaced were angered by the unfair distribution of what was available.

In order to defuse the tension, the government implemented a food rationing system for meat, rice, and dairy products. Despite this effort, rumors of corruption and inequity provided reason for increasing discontent, and protest demonstrations were reported.

Unable to provide a ‘quick-fix’ for the continuing deprivation, Khomeini called for cuts in consumerism as an “essential part of the Islamic faith.” He appealed for patience in accepting economic shortcomings.

Despite the fact that enthusiasm and vocal support for the war effort persisted, Khomeini could no longer deny evidence pointing to increased bitterness. As Behdad notes, the narrowing income inequality reported for the two years immediately following the revolution was unarguably reversed. Using “expenditures of urban households” as an index of well-being, “the share of expenditures for the poorest 10% dropped to their 1977 level by 1982, and by 1983 was only 76% of the 1977 level.” Meanwhile, population growth continued.

In an attempt to address seemingly insurmountable problems, Khomeini named 1983-1984 “the year of the mostazafin.” He spoke of the gulf separating the ‘shanty-dwellers’ from the ‘palace-dwellers’ and asserted that the betterment of the mostazafin condition was their “right” — a right they had earned by their contribution to the revolution and their sacrifices in the war.

Rhetoric proved insufficient, however, since the elements of the nationalized sector which were designated to assist the poor migrants were inefficient and operated at a loss.

In 1984, the Foundation for the Disinherited estimated real earnings equivalent to around $2 billion and expenses of $4 billion a year.

The ensuing debate over the distribution of wealth and measures to improve the lot of the poor gathered steam in the winter of 1983-1984.

Ultimately, the issue of the relationship between the private and the public sectors, and the question of how to achieve social justice remained unresolved. In fact, the controversy increasingly revolved around the nuances of Islamic law, culminating in a dispute over whether the government or the private sector should control the economy. This debate culminated in a crystallization of Khomeini’s evolutionary thinking about the mostazafin.

Ervand Abrahamian says that at the time of the revolution, Khomeini’s portrayal of society revolved around the “two warring classes” mentioned above — the upper class (oppressors or palace dwellers) and the low class (the oppressed, the exploited, the shanty-dwellers).

Beginning around 1982, class divisions acquired a different caste. Three separate classes emerged, an upper class formed of remnants of the wealthy and Western-educated families that had supported the old regime; a middle class formed of clerics, shopkeepers, civil servants, intellectuals, tradesmen, and bazaar merchants; and a lower class formed of workers, peasants, and shanty town dwellers.

As the previous imagery of two antagonistic classes became less powerful, the “mostazafin label” changed in definition. No longer did it carry its earlier connotation of “deprived masses.” Instead, it became a political label for all supporters of the new regime, including wealthy merchants. As might be expected, this had far reaching effects so far as the commitment to social justice was concerned. Now the interests of the migrant poor no longer required the abrogation of private property; the prime concern was the continuing fight against oppression and exploiters.

Certainly the unemployment situation in Iran’s urban centers worsened during the post revolutionary period. In his book, Revolution and Economic Transition: The Iranian Experience, Hooshang Amirahmadi says that, on average, 302,000 newcomers entered the job market each year, while only 224,000 jobs were created. He estimates that rural-urban migration was responsible for about 20% of all new entrants in urban areas, and that about 64% of the total unemployed lived in cities. Much of the new employment that has been created is to be found in the low-paying informal sector and in the pursuit of illicit activities.

Low job growth, the increasing population burden, and low productivity have combined to effect a 47% decline of gross domestic product between 1979 and 1987. This decrease has had a disproportionate impact on the poorer sections of society. Not only did the poor have less money to spend, but their numbers are expanding.

Absolute poverty increased 43% over the 1979-1985 time period with over 65% of the population falling beneath the poverty line. Even more telling, wealth disparity greatly increased, with the number of billionaires expanding from about 100 families in the revolutionary years to over 900 families in the post revolutionary period.

Photograph by Kamyar Adl

IRAN-IRAQ WAR, OIL, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

September 9, 2015 by Lisa Reynolds Wolfe

The Pasdaran Gain Control Over Iran’s Military Operations

During the first half of the Cold War, the shah of Iran was determined to employ military-led industrialization as his country’s development strategy. All changed, though, after the revolution when the Pasdaran — the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution — gained control over Iran’s military operations, rejecting any sort of relationship with the United States.

With the onset of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran’s regular armed forces became even more powerless to oppose the Pasdaran who, along with poorly trained volunteers called basij

enhanced their image in Iran through human-wave assaults on Iraqi positions and other suicidal exploits. Their heroic self-sacrifice and battle experience probably led some of the leaders of the Pasdaran to envisage slowly absorbing the regular Iranian armed forces into their own ranks and command structure.

As opposed to militarization under the shah, the willingness of the general public to sacrifice young lives for an ideological position touched every family in every locale in Iran.

Iran’s War Casualties

Out of a 1986 population of 50.6 million, there were approximately 300,000 casualties, including 61.000 missing in action. At least another 500,000 were disabled or maimed. Over 2.5 million lost their homes and jobs or were “displaced, in various refugee camps, makeshift shacks, and temporary shelters in major urban centers.”

Civilian industry was impacted since “millions of energetic and productive working people . . . served in the war in varying capacities as military personnel, paramilitary and irregular forces, technical experts, and volunteers.”

The impact of the war on Iran’s human settlements was also disruptive. While 52 cities in five ‘war provinces’ were damaged, major cities in other parts of the country, including Isfahan, were hit by missiles and bombs on numerous occasions, sustaining substantial damage. Direct economic costs included:

damage to major buildings and public establishments, machinery and equipment (belonging to the three main economic sectors of agriculture, industry, and services, and those sent to the war front, except military equipment), material goods, infrastructures, war-related wages (excluding those paid to military personnel), and welfare payments to the war inflicted population. Indirect economic costs, on the other hand, include opportunity costs including lost potential GNP and lost potential earnings from oil, reduction in capacities, and delay in operations.

At the same time, Iraq’s invasion of Iran had provided a temporary solution to the regime’s early crisis. Eric Hoogland asserts that the government was able to “capitalize upon the image of Iran as a victim of aggression” and, in the process, broaden support for the theocracy.

High Unemployment

Hoogland argues that the high levels of unemployment experienced by urban workers in the 1979-1981 time period were alleviated, in part, by manpower requirements surrounding the war effort. One hundred eighty-five thousand men served in the professional military; about 250,000 more were in the Revolutionary Guards; and at least 100,000 rotating volunteers were “kept at combat readiness in the Basij-e Mostazafin (Mobilization of the Oppressed).” He goes on to estimate that 900,000 youths were removed from the labor force temporarily or permanently due to the war. In this context, it’s appropriate to examine the new regime’s economic and oil policy.

In early 1979. there was talk of eliminating Iran’s dependency on oil and establishing a more balanced development of the economy. According to Cyrus Bina, oil workers, themselves, made the following demands:

redistribution of oil income
an end to foreign domination of the oil industry
workers’ control including veto privileges over management appointees
an increase in oil prices over the OPEC determined level.

The workers also proposed:

conservation of oil resources
diversification of exports
elimination of enhanced recovery systems
elimination of transnational oil companies.

Almost immediately, 18,000 foreign technicians left the country.

Continuing Importance of Oil

While the workers were nominally supported by the new regime, with the outbreak of war, both international and domestic considerations emerged. The Islamic government began selling oil below OPEC prices in order to maximize its income. The additional revenue was absolutely required to support the war economy, and the government had no choice but to capitalize on Iran’s rentier capacities. In fact, throughout the 1980s, the value of oil exports remained well above 90 percent of total export values.

When the price of oil dropped in 1986, the regime was forced to export more oil to cope with a drain on foreign exchange reserves, mounting budget deficits, and immense expenditures associated with the war effort.

While the regime was not able to compensate for the 40 percent decline in capacity which followed the removal of the shah, Bina states that

the Shah’s oil policies and those of the Islamic government are hardly distinct from one another. In the former case the oil revenues were spent on military build-up in the anticipation of war, whereas in the later they were spent on conducting the war, without anticipation of its aftermath.

In the postwar (post-Khomeini) era, the Islamic Republic has been faced with the task of reconstruction of its war-damaged economy. Again, the government must rely on oil revenues. Thus, the Iranian economy remains subject to the vagaries of the international oil market. In fact Bina says:

. . . the economy is more intwined with global economy today than during the Shah’s regime. The oil policy rests on the idea of mortgaging the country’s future in order to prolong the life of the regime. This policy is one shared by both regimes, old as well as new. The post-war political reconstruction of the Islamic Republic is also intwined with the crisis of legitimacy and the crisis of governance, both of which are root causes of the antagonism between the government and the opposition and a source of internal factional conflict within the government itself.

Reliance on oil and the resolution of the war with Iraq did not end Iran’s economic problems. Nor did the regime’s emphasis on the

. . . preservation of private property and capitalism without the old social and economic ties to the USA. The new policy was in fact a demand for a change in Iran’s economic partners in the world economy. However, apart from a series of minor reforms, the Islamic Republic was not able to alter the socio-economic structure and alleviate the crisis that it had inherited. Economically, the Islamic Republic was only able to change the geographic distribution of Iran’s foreign trade . . . . The structural relation between Iran and the West, and Iran’s long-term position in the international division of labor remained unchanged under the Islamic Republic in the 1980s.

A slowdown and decline in output, high unemployment, chronic inflation, severe shortages of basic necessities, and underutilization of industrial capacity continued.

The agricultural sector also showed steady decline throughout the 1980s.

The Iran-Iraq War provided a convenient mechanism for the regime to evade responsibility for the worsening economy and facilitated a postponement of political crisis related to economic issues. It also meant that the revolution’s call for social justice was largely ignored.

Photo by Cordelia Persen

IRAN: REGIONAL WARFARE OR COLD WAR PAWN?

June 1, 2015 by Lisa Reynolds Wolfe

Iran’s constitution, foreign policy, and armed forces changed in the first year after the revolution. The country’s traditional view of warfare changed in the wake of the Iraq invasion.

Rather than the high technology deterrence that the shah’s arms procurement program had been geared toward providing, Iraq’s invasion of Iran called for other tactics.

The war coincided with the new realities created by revolutionary foreign policy and rhetoric. Not only was Iran faced with the practical contingencies of war, but with a need to emerge from the conflict in a manner that would solidify the goals of the revolution.

According to Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, the regime had

insisted on the proposition that all the ills of the world — inequality, an unjust international system, exploitation, oppression, the bullying of the weak by the strong — emanated from the ‘arrogant superpowers’ or their agents. In this view, the superpowers were in collusion and were equally guilty. Khomeini saw Iran’s position in particular as the result of a conspiracy between the Shah and the West, to make Iran culturally and politically dependent.

In this view, it isn’t surprising that, in Iran’s view, Iraq’s invasion could only be explained by US complicity and encouragement.

During the first years of the war, low priority was placed on the requirements of the military. Instead, the emphasis was on securing the revolution.

At this time, Iran had a large store of spare parts, and the regime sabotaged its acquisition of arms already paid for but held up by the hostage dispute. Soon, however, because of the almost total reliance on American weapons, Iran found it necessary to look for other suppliers. Still, the country was willing to accept heavy casualties in lieu of superpower assistance.

The Pasdaran controlled military operatios, continuing to reject any sort of relationship with the United States.

At the same time, Iran began to support radical groups like the Islamic Amal, Hezbollah, and Islamic Jihad. These activities were meant to attest to Iran’s regional importance and the continuing outreach of the revolution. Of course, this meant a clash with the United States over terrorism which, in turn, influenced US willingness to resupply arms.

The US tightened its own leakages and blocked third party supplies in an action known as ‘Operation Stuanch’. This position hardened after the bombing of US marine barracks in Beirut.

By 1985, Iran’s situation in the war had deteriorated. An ‘arms for hostages’ deal with the US became public and the US determined to become directly involved in the Gulf by establishing a US naval presence.

By October 1987, Iran had reframed the conflict to depict American involvement:

If we had won the war last year, everyone would have said that a 50 million strong country was victorious over a 14 million strong country. But if we win this year, everyone will know that we are victorious over the United States.

At the same time, Iran reported that half a million volunteers were prepared for ‘martyrdom-seeking operations’ to resist the American presence in the Gulf. The continued willingness to sacrifice Iran’s human resource potential in battle was quite different from the shah’s determination to employ military-led industrialization as Iran’s development strategy.

Photograph by Alan: Martyrs Memorial at the Mausoleum of Khawje Rabie.

POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN: REDISTRIBUTION AND MILITARISM

March 18, 2015 by Lisa Reynolds Wolfe

As might be expected, Isfahan changed rapidly as the Americans withdrew and skilled workers migrated to other sections of the country. The many Iranians who had been employed as support staff — drivers, gardeners, housekeepers, guards — saw their economic prospects diminish. In addition, many Isfahanis also left Iran.

Brain Drain and Redistribution

The loss of specialized manpower was so severe that the government mounted an early appeal for those living abroad to return home. The affirmative response was minimal and the number of emigrants continued to grow throughout the 1980s.

At the same time, the Provisional Government began to implement redistributive policies to effect immediate (but relative) changes in the distribution of wealth.

The Khomeini regime expected that redistribution would occur in two ways.

First, policies were designed to ensure that resources would be more equally divided among the various provinces in Iran. Since Isfahan was one of the most developed metropolitan areas at the beginning of 1979, it was to be expected that some of its resources would be diverted to less advantaged provinces with less large industry and employment, lower literacy rates, inadequate health services, and less housing.

Next, disparities among socoeconomic groups within the province were expected to be addressed through the equalization of income.

The Reform Process

The new government worked quickly to begin the reform process and, in the first year following the revolution, many assets were expropriated by nationalization decrees of the Provisional Revolutionary Government. Firms affected included banks, auto industries, and basic metal (steel, copper, and aluminum) concerns.

The assets of the largest industrialists and their immediate families were confiscated.

Additional properties were seized by Islamic Revolutionary Courts and placed under the ownership of the Foundation of the Oppressed (FFO), a religious trust. This organization was given a mandate to build housing for the most deprived sections of the population.

Because initially the urban poor were thought to be the most reliable base of power for the new Republic, this action was important to establishing the credibility of the regime with its constituency. As in Havana in 1959, there was strong momentum to invade and occupy the vacant buildings left behind when wealthy and middle-class property holders fled the country.

Encouraged by the FFO, the poor seized empty houses, luxury hotels, and unoccupied private buildings.

The euphoria created by the housing takeovers was short-lived. It was soon discovered that these activities led to uncertainty in the private housing market and in the construction sector. The Revolutionary Council was forced to take action limiting the perceived excesses of the foundation, and the housing seizures were halted. Some of the new tenants were actually evicted.

Iraq Invades Iran

Hopes that Iran would be able to concentrate on domestic issues by switching its emphasis from guns to butter dissipated when on September 22, 1980, the Iraqi army invaded Iran, penetrating as deep as 80 kilometers into Iranian territory in some places. Within several weeks over 14,000 square kilometers of Iran were occupied. Once again the nation was caught up in a frenzy of militarism.

This time, though, there was no strong patron to call on. Just as Iran’s foreign policy had changed in the wake of revolution, so had its military.

For more on “guns and butter” click here.

Photo by David Stanley.

COLD WAR IRAN: FOREIGN POLICY

December 2, 2014 by Lisa Reynolds Wolfe

Former American Embassy in Tehran

Throughout the 1970s, Iran was concerned with dangers that emanated from both the region and the Soviet Union.

Engaged in a strategic, economic, and political alliance with the West, Iran was trapped in its image as a US surrogate. This impression served to thwart Iran’s championship of Third World goals and objectives. At the same time, there was growing criticism in the United States of the shah’s military build-up and human rights abuses. Overall:

by the time of the revolution, Iran’s foreign policy orientation and its over-activism were resented at home and created serious tensions in its relationship with both its allies and its enemies.

The Islamic revolution changed this situation. The spread of revolutionary Islam became the stated goal of Iran’s foreign policy. This entailed focusing on the interests of the Islamic community rather than nationalistic concerns. From the outset this led to disagreement.

Two groups emerged.

One group, influenced by a Third World variant of socialist ideas was intensely anti-Western, especially anti-American. it wanted better ties with the Soviet Union, the Eastern bloc, and Third World countries and favored the export of revolution.
A second group was more concerned about the Soviet/communist threat. This faction wanted to maintain some relationship with the West to preclude Soviet aggression. It favored the export of revolution by example rather than force.

Both factions believed that the export of revolution would ensure Iran’s security through a process of surrounding the territory by a cohort of like minded states.

These themes were played out in the transitional government of Prime Minister Bazargan when the competition was among three principal forces: Islamic nationalists, secular nationalists, and a variety of leftist groups.

After the consolidation of Islamic rule, these conflicts occurred within the Islamic leadership itself. While Bazargan, himself, pursued a nonaligned policy based on avoiding dependence on any one great power and maintaining good relations with neighboring states, after the occupation of the US embassy and the hostage taking, it became impossible to maintain reasonable relations with the United States.

From the November 4, 1979, hostage taking until the September 1980 outbreak of the war with Iraq, Iran’s foreign policy was dominated by three issues:

the hostage taking
the internal power struggle
and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

The hostage crisis dictated that

foreign policy consisted of extreme anti-Americanism and an all-out call for Islamic revolution on the Iranian model throughout the Muslim world.

While mainly driven by rhetoric and rarely by action, it was clear that Iran’s geopolitical position could no longer be useful to the United States.

The period of cliency had ended.

Photo by Orlygur Hnefill

COLD WAR IRAN: THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

June 4, 2014 by Lisa Reynolds Wolfe

Iran and the US Split: Americans and Iranians Leave Isfahan and Other Iranian Cities

As strikes, protests, and demonstrations became more frenzied, Isfahan began to change. Most Americans left the city by November 1978, and an estimated $2 billion in scheduled military servicing and production contracts left with them. The Western corporate presence and the American consumer — groups which had increasingly fed the local economy — vanished.

Many Iranian professionals — physicians, lawyers, engineers, and university professors — fled the country also, taking their financial capital with them.

Within a year, after the capture of American hostages in Tehran on November 4, 1979, rapprochement between the American government and the new Iranian regime became impossible. The former opportunity structure was radically altered. No longer was it possible for the Iranian government to purchase weapons or receive monetary assistance — loans or guarantees — from the US government.

The break with the United States makes it possible to evaluate alternative approaches to urban development in Iran. Although America’s liberal grand strategy did not become explicit worldwide until shortly after the Iranian revolution, its ideals were certainly implicit in the US presence in Iran from the 1940s through the 1970s. As Thomas Ricks noted:

. . . many of the Shah’s critics found every aspect of the aid mission to have political consequences, such as land reform, police training, agricultural research, and the rural medical service implying “a commitment to free market economy and frequently a linkage to Western institutions . . .”

The institutional change which occurred throughout 1979 was a clear break with this past policy, facilitating new choices and restricting opportunities. Domestically, different approaches to Iran’s foreign and domestic policies, along with the imposition of external sanctions, dictated that modified factors would influence the country’s urban environment as well.

Institutional Change

Consolidation of the revolution under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini resulted in almost immediate institutional change.

On February 5, 1979, a Provisional Government was appointed, to be headed by Mehdi Bazargan, a politician from the Mossadegh era. While a Cabinet was put in place, composed chiefly of technocrats and western educated religious liberals, Khomeini retained real political power. A Revolutionary Council and Islamic Komitehs emerged, dominated by the fundamentalist faction of the clerical establishment. Meanwhile, Khomeini requested a plebiscite to legitimate power and establish an Islamic Republic.

The opposition — secular forces and moderate religious elements — countered that a choice must be offered between an Islamic Republic and an Islamic Democratic Republic. However, since Khomeini believed that democracy was a non-Islamic and western concept, this idea was rejected. Consequently, most secular groups boycotted the election, and the plebiscite was approved by approximately 98.2 percent of the voters.

On April 1, 1979 — just two months after his return to Iran — Khomeini proclaimed the formal establishment of the republic.

A Republic is Born

The next task, involving the adoption of a new constitution, followed. The objective of the principal institutions — the office of chief spiritual-political guide (faqih), the presidency, and the assembly (majles) — was to assure continued control of the government by the Shi’a Muslim clergy. This structure was consistent with Khomeini’s instruction that “the constitution and other laws in this Republic, must be based one hundred percent on Islam.” The new document was approved in the middle of November and ratified by a referendum on December 2-3, 1979. Thus, in a remarkably short period of time, the institutional structure of Iran had been altered and reoriented. As Shireen Hunter describes in her book Iran After Khomeini:

The preamble to Iran’s Islamic constitution states that ‘the basic character of the [Islamic] Revolution, which distinguishes it from other movements that have taken place in Iran during the past hundred years, is its ideological and Islamic nature.’ The preamble also states that the constitution is the culmination of a century-old Iranian “anti-despotic” and “anti-imperialist” struggle and that the Iranians recognized the failure of previous movements such as the constitutional revolution and Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh’s movement to be the lack of a proper ideological and Islamic foundation. Moreover, the preamble states that the “mission of the constitution is to give objective existence to the credal bases of the [Islamic] movement and to create conditions under which may be nurtured the noble and universal values of Islam.”

Hunter goes on to list several important consequences for the nature of Iran’s leadership, its political institutions, and the cultural foundation of the society.

First, in contrast with the 1906 constitution in which the “will of the nation” was the source of legitimacy and authority, the basis of political legitimacy and authority in the new constitution is “God” and the divine law as given in the Holy Qur’an. Hunter notes, however, that if the 1906 constitution’s provisions had been applied faithfully, no legislation contrary to Islamic law could have passed even if the overwhelming majority of Iranians had approved of it.”
Second, since “Islam is to be the sole point of reference for all aspects of life, people running the country must be well versed in Islamic law and be morally unreproachable.” Based on this concept, the new constitution established what many perceive to be a theocracy whereby “the function of ultimate spiritual and political leadership will be discharged by the supreme religious leader on the basis of the concept of the Velayat-e-Faqih or the guardianship of the supreme religious leader.” Hunter goes on to note that “the Ayatollah Khomeini himself was not against the monarchy as a political system, rather, he opposed what he believed to be the Pahlavis’ anti-Islamic policies. He began to develop his concept of an Islamic theocracy after he became convinced that the Pahlavis were beyond redemption and that their rule mortally endangered Islam and the Shi’a establishment in Iran.”
Third, the Islamic regime dropped any reference to Iran as a nation, choosing instead to focus on the Umat-al-Islam (the community of Muslims). Thus, it is Islamic notions of nation, state, race, and ethnicity that are predominant. In this context, the new government also targeted nationalist tendencies and attempted to ban all vestiges of Iran’s pre-Islamic culture.

In sum, the new constitution had implications for all facets of political, social, and economic life. Purposeful changes in the direction of the country’s foreign policy became particularly important.

Photograph by Matt Werner

COLD WAR IRAN: US PERCEPTIONS OF IRAN’S SECURITY NEEDS

May 6, 2014 by Lisa Reynolds Wolfe

There was a general recognition in the US that the shah’s perception of threat was real and diverse. The monarch’s interpretation of Iran’s security issues coincided with those concerns which the United States understood to be critical in the Cold War environment. As the staff report concluded :

It is . . . not difficult for the Shah to make a rational case for high levels of investment in US equipment, and the Executive branch to respond positively, if the threat analysis is regarded as the primary determinant of procurement policy. In short, it is difficult to criticize Iran’s perception that it needs a modern military force. What is more debatable . . . is the suitability of and problems with the particular defense programs in which Iran has chosen to invest its resources . . . .

Shahram Cubin, on the other hand, justifies the shah’s weapons purchases, arguing:

It should be emphasized that Iran’s search for security, its arms procurement programs, and its diplomacy cannot be separated from its perception of international politics. Iran was invaded in two world wars; was the object of a de facto partition between two great powers in 1907; was subjected to constant intervention and dictation throughout this century; was the target of externally abetted separatist movements in the 1940s; was threatened and penetrated in the 1950s; was vulnerable to Arab nationalist shoestring imperialism in the 1960s; and is vulnerable to proxy-wars today. Its armaments buildup in the 1970s, therefore, can scarcely be considered anomalous or anachronistic except when viewed from a comfortable distance.

Like Kemp, Chubin predicates the defense buildup on several assumptions: the sensitive and strategic nature of the Persian Gulf region; a power vacuum in the Indian Ocean; the tenuous nature of bilateral alliances; the “lightening quick” nature of modern wars which requires a “high level of preparedness and substantial indigenous resources;” the need for deterrence forces vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

All in all, Chubin contends that — given Iran’s perception of threat — its pattern of weapons acquisition is understandable. He then goes on to discuss the suitability of the weapons selected for Iran’s defense needs, addressing particulary the shah’s demand “to adopt tomorrow’s system, not today’s.” In this regard he concludes:

In short, Iran’s procurement policy has been to buy advanced weapons for the airforce chiefly from a single source, and to diversify its weapons for other services, while not ignoring the advantages of new technologies. The acquisition of advanced technologies is undoubtedly advantageous: it postpones obsolescence, enhances prestige, and probably has deterrent value. The increased expense of buying early (when higher unit costs often include R&D expenses) has to be balanced against the mounting expense of the system (given inflation) if bought later.

Regarding the shah’s purchase of the F-14, Chubin agrees that the decision was the correct one, especially in light of the Soviet overflights of Iran’s territory discussed earlier.

Assuming that the above evaluation is accurate, why were the shah’s procurement decisions so controversial? Did the monarch maximize the opportunity structure available to him? If so, did he consider the internal consequences of his decisions? Or did unforeseen spillover lead to unpredicted outcomes? In order to answer these questions, it is first necessary to look at whether the shah did indeed maximize the opportunities available to him

Opportunity Structure

Any assessment of whether or not the shah maximized his opportunities must, at most, be mixed. It is clear that, in the Cold War environment (and given Iran’s history), an alliance with the United States was preferable to one with the Soviet Union. It is also obvious that the shah believed that he could have both guns and butter. In fact, he believed that militarization was a precondition for social and economic development. Moreover, because of Iran’s oil reserves and its strategic geographic locale, he initially expected that American loans and grants would finance his project. That was not to be the case.