Last month on February 11, Iran celebrated the 40th anniversary of the day the Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile to herald the new Islamic Republic of Iran. Aljeerza reports that Iranians poured into the streets across the country,  “renewing their allegiance to the country’s Islamic principles at a time of rising economic and political pressure amid the resumption of punishing US sanctions.”

As I looked at the photos from the celebration, my mind took me back in time to a different kind of observance, a week long spectacle in October 1971 celebrating 2,500 years of Persian monarchy. The bash, thrown by the then Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, was opulent.

While the Iranian news agency, Tasnim, reports that “hundreds of foreign guests, including scientific, political, and influential figures travelled to Iran” for the more recent event, their stay was not steeped in luxury and ostentation. And, while hundreds of cameramen and journalists covered the massive rallies in Tehran and other cities, the event did not attract the in-depth international exposure of the shah’s famous party.

The 1971 setting, the ceremonial city of Persepolis, near Shiraz, was magisterial, a magnificent reminder of grandeur past.  However, the shah wasn’t really there to celebrate the glories of days gone by. He was there to announce his own mission, his personal rendezvous with history, his desire to link his monarchy directly to that of Cyrus the Great, the founder of the Empire. Of course any connection with Cyrus was a bit presumptuous. The shah’s achievements, however stellar, did not match those of a ruler most famous for freeing the slaves of Babylon, and declaring the world’s first charter of human rights.

Attended by five hundred guests — including twenty kings or shaykhs, five queens, twenty-one princes and princesses, sixteen presidents, three premiers, four vice-presidents, and two foreign ministers — the festivities were politically pretentious. Comfortably settled in air-conditioned tents furnished with Baccarat crystal, Limoges china, and Porthault linens, few attendees were aware of the barrage of criticism surrounding their gathering. Acrimony and disapproval were coming from all quarters.

As soldiers blocked roads to keep ordinary Iranians at bay, dignitaries from around the world were downing quail eggs stuffed with caviar, crayfish mousse, roast lamb with truffles, roast peacock stuffed with foie gras, and over 25,000 bottles of wine. This at the same time that a serious famine was occurring in Fars Province, the region of Iran where Persepolis is located.

The Ayatollah Khomeini condemned the event from exile in Iraq, inciting protest and asserting:

It is the duty of the Muslim people of Iran to refrain from participation in this illegitimate festival, to engage in passive struggle against it, to remain indoors during the days of the festival, and to express by any means possible their disgust and aversion for anyone who contributed to the organization and celebration of the festival. Let the festival organizers know that they are despised by the Islamic community and by all alert peoples throughout the world, that they are hated by all lovers of freedom, and that Islam and the Muslims are repelled by the very notion of monarchy.

While the Shah wanted the celebrations to improve his country’s image abroad, accusations of excessive spending were common in the Western press. In the wake of news stories about human rights abuses, massive disparities in wealth, and student protesters who were arrested and beaten, the shah was indignant.

“So what are people complaining about?” he asked. “That we are giving a couple of banquets for some fifty heads of state? We can hardly offer them bread and radishes, can we?”

Today a reminder of that controversial celebration lives on in the public’s national consciousness, in Iran’s own memory palace — an imaginary bastion filled with collective whisperings of foreign conspiracy, tales of great power domination, and stories of Cold War subterfuge.

These spaces have other chambers also, areas harboring resentment over American CIA intervention, anger over the expenditure of vast oil revenues on a misguided strategy of military-led development and, always, outrage over the arrogance of a detested shah. Bitterness and resentment, though, continue to focus, especially, on Reza’s  October 1971 extravaganza.

1953: Eisenhower delivers his Atoms for Peace speech to the UN General Assembly in New York City on December 8. Atoms for Peace is an initiative designed to provide countries with peaceful civilian nuclear technologies. The intent is that this will prevent the pursuit of military nuclear programs. Beneficiaries include Israel, India, Pakistan, and Iran.

1957: The US begins working with Iran to launch its nuclear program.

1959: President Eisenhower visits Iran’s Shah Reza Pahlavi in Tehran.

1967: The US builds a nuclear reactor on the campus of Tehran University and provides Iran with fuel for the reactor — weapons-grade enriched uranium.

1970s: As a consequence of the oil boom, Iran’s nuclear program morphs into a full-fledged civilian nuclear program.

Mid 1970s: The shah’s government pays for dozens of Iranian students to attend Massachusetts Institute of Technology to study nuclear engineering. The majority of these students return to Iran and start running the nuclear program. The MIT trainees have been central to Iran’s nuclear program ever since.

1970s: US diplomats begin negotiating to limit Iran’s nuclear program; Iran under the shah insists it has the same right to nuclear power as any nation.

Iran buys nuclear plants from West Germany and France. The research reactor at Tehran University keeps working.

1979: The shah is overthrown and a new Islamist government led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini takes power. The clerics in power do not initially embrace the country’s existing nuclear infrastructure. To them, “Iran’s nuclear program encapsulates Iran’s struggle with modernity.” After the revolution, the program “came to symbolize the kind of rapid modernization that was riddled with corruption and ‘West-toxification.’”

“Ayatollah Khomeini famously said the unfinished nuclear power plants in Bushehr should be used as silos to store wheat . . . they were abandoned as a costly Western imposition on an oil-rich nation.”

(Ali Vaez. NPR: Born in The USA: How America Created Iran’s Nuclear Program. September 18, 2015.)

1980s: As part of the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam Hussein’s forces repeatedly bomb the Bushehr nuclear facility which is not operational at the time.

1980-1988: The Iran-Iraq War creates severe power shortages in Iran. Iran’s leaders decide to revive the nuclear program. Their motivation is unclear.

Early 2000s: Iran offers to discuss the future of its nuclear program, even reaching a deal with European powers. The US under Bush does not sign on. Efforts to reach a deal fall apart, and Iran begins building thousands of centrifuges that can be used to enrich uranium.

Iran under Khomeini had rejected the program as a symbol of the corrupt West. Now, more than a decade after his death, the nuclear program is becoming a symbol of Iran’s defiance of the West. A new sense of nationalism is created.

2001: Israel has been warning that Iran is making dangerous nuclear progress. American concerns intensify in the years following September 11, 2001.

2007: American President George W. Bush says: “The message to the Iranian people is that your government is going to cause you deprivation. . . . If your government continues to insist upon a nuclear weapon there will be lost opportunity for the Iranian people. They won’t be able to realize their full potential.”

2005: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad becomes Iran’s president. He’s a populist leader who questions the Holocaust and defies President Bush.

2008: In an interview with NPR, Ahmadinejad insists that Iran has a right to a nuclear program.

2009: Ahmadinejad is re-elected in a disputed vote. Protests erupt. The economy is in steep decline.

President Obama’s administration tries to negotiate a nuclear deal. When talks fall apart, the US and other powers intensify sanctions.

2013: Amid growing unrest, Hassan Rouhani is elected president. He pledges to improve relations with world powers. Meanwhile, Iranian diplomats are already quietly meeting with the US.

Economic problems intensify. Iran’s oil exports have dropped by 50%. The value of Iran’s currency has also dropped by 50%.

Iran’s new foreign minister, Javad Zarif, argues that a deal is possible if Iran is allowed some level of enriching uranium. He says: “If you say that Iran should abandon its enrichment program, you cannot abandon science. You cannot abandon technology. We have learned this. So the best way is to make sure that this technology is used in a transparent fashion for a peaceful program.”

2015: The Obama administration eventually accepts this argument. The emerging deal ensures that Iran’s nuclear activity will be limited, inspections will verify, and economic sanctions will be lifted.

Photograph by Karl-Ludwig Poggemann (Flickr)

Isfahan was clearly influenced by Cold War forces, particularly during the years 1960 – 1978. As a close ally of the United States, the city’s post World War II urban development transpired in the Cold War context. Most decisions regarding the urban environment were independent ones. However, American involvement in two specific events — covert action in 1953 and the White Revolution of the early 1960s — combined with domestic and historic factors to create spillover effects which greatly affected the city’s urban fabric. Isfahan’s on-going transformation was then intensified by repercussions from a third event, the enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine.

American CIA intervention in the oil nationalization crisis of 1953 contributed to the downfall of Mosaddegh, bringing an end to Iran’s democratic interlude. De facto constitutional change altered Iran’s political reality, ensuring executive primacy over the legislature and assisting the shah in the consolidation of his authority. The action filtered down to politically active communities like many in Isfahan. It solidified the historical Iranian perception that the country’s political life was shaped by outsiders, and cemented the partnership between the shah and successive American administrations.

In 1960, US pressure was one of several factors that convinced the monarch to embark on a program of change known as the White Revolution. At this time, the extension of further support (which the shah desperately needed for survival) became conditional on political and economic reform. The program, basically following US dictates, contributed to the social and economic aspects of Isfahan’s transformation. Land reform, for example, proved to be an impetus to rural-urban migration, and many new industrialists emerged in its wake.

Urban change in Isfahan intensified for the rest of the 1960s. In addition, Soviet influences surfaced. In the context of the Soviet-American competition for influence, the shah asserted his autonomy by purchasing weapons from the USSR, and entering into an agreement for a turnkey steel complex, which included the construction of a ‘new town’ called Aryashahr on the outskirts of the city.

The relationship with the Soviets soon weakened, however, and, as the decade came to a close, American influence regained its primacy. The 1968 Nixon Doctrine set the stage for the coming decade and the years of most intrusive US influence by securing the shah’s position as regional policeman and facilitating his weapons procurement program.

By 1978 and the onset of the revolution, Isfahan had undergone a demographic transition as a consequence of US stimulated land reform and  later weapons purchases. American defense manufacturers had established a  physical presence in the city, and qualified Iranian workers had been diverted from the civilian to the military sector. Many had relocated from other cities in Iran to meet associated labor requirements. The city’s neighborhoods and consumer offerings had been modified to meet the needs of foreign workers and their families, and infrastructure construction was driven by the needs of Isfahan’s military-industrial complex.

The shah was perceived to be a pawn of the foreign establishment.

Public space and collective life were presumed to be shaped by outsiders as more Isfahanis sensed a loss of control over all aspects of their urban environment. While many foreigners believed that the shah had maximized his opportunities, his inability to integrate Iran more favorably into the global economy while, at the same time, satisfying Iran’s development requirements meant the downfall of his monarchy. It also signaled a failure of American grand strategy for, just as the USSR was establishing a presence in neighboring Afghanistan, the US lost its most staunch ally in the region. However, the new Islamic regime adopted a policy of nonalignment, mitigating the loss.

So far as Iran’s cities were concerned, the purported switch to a more “south – south” model of development resulted in mostly superficial change. Economists argue that the urban challenges that faced the shah’s regime have, if anything, become more serious and more problematic under the Islamic Republic.

Leading the list of these critical problems are controlling the recent demographic explosion; reversing the troubling rural migration; creating enough productive work for new entrants into the job market; reducing the acute shortage of urban housing and curbing real estate speculation; winning the race between the rising number of students and the number of new classrooms and teachers at all levels of education; and, finally, redressing the steady decline in the standard of living.

Importantly, though, conversations about the overbearing and insensitive foreign presence have been replaced years later by appreciation for the city’s refurbished parks and landscaping, a new beltway, and a recently constructed power-generating facility. While there are continuing anxieties over chronic unemployment and inflation, the city’s struggle with global and militaristic flows has been replaced by more domestic concerns. And as The New York Times reported

After 12 years of neglect since the Islamic revolution, Isfahan, Iran, a former Persian capital, has reclaimed its status as one of the Middle East’s most beautiful places.

Still, happenings since 1991 when the Times piece was published have not all been positive. The city is now at the center of the debate over Iran’s nuclear capabilities. While the US and Iran have entered into an agreement that resolves some of the major issues, we will have to wait and see if the agreement holds. Has Isfahan lost its innocence? Or will Americans be flooding its streets again, this time to wonder at the city’s marvelous Islamic heritage? It’s trite to say, but “only time will tell.”

Photograph by Ninara (Flickr)

Demands for democratization inherent in some aspects of the revolutionary process have, until recently, gone largely unaddressed. The formation of political parties was not precluded by Iran’s 1979 constitution which in Article 26 provides that

the formation of parties, societies, political or professional associations, as well as religious societies, whether Islamic or pertaining to one of the recognized religious minorities, is permitted provided they do not violate the principles of independence, freedom, national unity, the criteria of Islam, or the basis of the Islamic Republic.

The understanding was further restricted, however, by a political parties law which was passed in September 1981. This law restricted the emergence of parties by making party formation dependent on obtaining a permit from the Ministry of the Interior.

Article 10 of the law established a commission of the ministry comprising two Majlis deputies, two representatives from the Judiciary, and one from the interior ministry to issue the permits. The commission was also supposed to supervise the activities of the parties and organizations it approved, and order the dissolution of parties engaged in activities contrary to the law. Offenses included activities that could undermine the foundations of the Islamic Republic or Iran’s independence, or intensify conflicts within the Iranian nation.

Thus, the over 100 political organizations which suddenly “sprang into being” in the initial turmoil after the revolution were almost immediately suppressed. The Iran-Iraq War pushed them further into the background, and Iran became, in effect, a one party state under the ruling Islamic Republican Party (IRP). The IRP was the only functioning political party from 1979-1986 when it was “voluntarily” dissolved.

With the war’s conclusion, concerns about the economy and demands for broader mass participation once again emerged. Still, while several groups served as quasi-parties, as of the 1997 presidential election, authentic parties were not a reality. Nevertheless, many new voters — especially women and young people — were drawn into the political arena by debates over social and cultural freedoms as well as by calls for political pluralism and the establishment of parties.

The election of Mohammad Khatami paid more than lip service to such demands. On several occasions, Khatami said that

if properly formed — that is, not imposed from above or planted from outside — parties were important. A ‘self-sufficient and advanced society’, he said, ‘cannot last without civil societies, which include political parties’. Khatami’s impressive election victory, noted one Tehran daily, created an atmosphere of ‘great expectations’ in which people were ‘assuming that the system [would] permit the re-establishment of political parties and application of democratic politics’.

Since Khatami’s election, though, Iran has witnessed its most violent clashes since the revolution. In July 1999, reform minded youth confronted religious hardliners in the streets of Tehran leaving unresolved the prospects for — or timing of — an Iranian transition to democracy. Many of those who voted for President Khatami beaome increasingly dissatisfied with the slow pace of reform. While the first local council elections in Iran were held in February 1999, some argue that they had no real significance.

An Iranian businessman quoted in The Financial Times says they were

just another bone thrown to the people to keep them quiet. What authority are these councils going to have beyond ruling over garbage disposal?

Indeed, President Khatami hoped that the new councils would have fiscal and political authority to manage schools, housing, roads, and small development projects without having to consult the central government in Tehran.

As with the Poder Popular in Cuba,  some saw this move toward local control as democracy in action. Others, however, were more cynical, noting that so long as the central bureaucracy retained authority over budgetary allocations, empowerment at the local or grassroots level could only be token, nothing more than a pressure valve. Moreover, concern over the nation’s economy raised questions about whether it would be possible for a democratic movement to take hold.

Reportedly, most Iranians were forced to work more than one job, manufacturing was operating at barely 30% of capacity, inflation was running more than double the official rate of 18%, and the majority of the population was living below the poverty level.

Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi argue, however, that this situation need not be determinative. Democracy is not linked to economic growth they say, and, thus,

the vision of the relation between development that dominated the intellectual mood and served to orient U.S. foreign policy during the cold war years appears strangely convoluted.

Obviously, we will have to wait sometime before it is possible to make an authoritative assessment of Iran’s possibilities. What is clear, however, is that the US presence in Iran during the Cold War years did nothing to facilitate democracy. Rather, American actions, particularly the CIA intervention in 1953, subverted the constitution, minimizing the opportunity for democratic institutions and processes to take hold.

Photograph by Beshef (Flickr)

____________________

Readers interested in this topic may want to consult the following sources:

Stephen C. Fairbanks, “Theocracy Versus Democracy: Iran Considers Political Parties.” The Middle East Journal Volume 52 Number 1 (Winter 1998).

Adam Przeworksi and Fernando Limongi, “Modernization: Theories and Facts,” World Politics 49:2 (1997).

Post-revolutionary urban development reflects important shifts in the urban hierarchy of Iranian cities with new elements shaping their formation.

During the Cold War, Isfahan’s central location contributed to its growth as an industrial center, and the city’s military facilities were prime beneficiaries of the shah’s defense expenditures.

In the post-revolutionary period, despite early protestations, militarization remained pervasive, though changed.

As the war with Iraq was winding down, just when it might seem appropriate to return to the early rhetoric of the revolution, the Ayatollah Khomeini stated:

I hope that no one thinks that with the ceasefire and the impending peace negotiations we do not need to strengthen our defense and expand our capacity for further military production. In fact, the development and expansion of our arms production industries should be a foremost goal of the Islamic Republic’s reconstruction policy. We must be vigilant at all times against aggression towards our Revolution by the superpowers or their minions.

Military-industrial production changed, however, and was now centered not on the American defense corporation but on the production of small arms and ammunition.

By the end of 1987, Iran had become self-sufficient in many categories with small armaments plants in Tehran and Shiraz.

The northeastern city of Mashhad gained from its proximity to the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, taking over Isfahan’s position as the nation’s second largest city. Wealth from the Shrine of the Eighth Imam, Reza, located in the city contributed to its new standing.

During the Cold War, Isfahan’s growth was dependent on factors unrelated to those affecting urbanization in Iran’s other cities. While the focus of urbanization in the Pahlavi period was on rural-urban migration, Isfahan, in addition, attracted a large foreign community along with Iranians more educated than the usual migrant. Later, while other cities attracted large-scale immigration resulting from the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the two Gulf Wars, Isfahan was less impacted.

A US Department of State publication estimated the number of Afghan refugees in Iran at 1.9 million in 1988. The bulk of the new arrivals settled in Khorasan, Sistan/Baluchistan, Kerman, Fars, Yazd, and Tehran. The Iran-Iraq War was also a dislocating force with over 2.5 million individuals losing their jobs and homes.

Along with the rest of Iran, Isfahan was faced with the large-scale task of postwar reconstruction. Public debate has centered on the immediate need to rebuild war devastated areas and to provide for the families of war martyrs. The issue of social justice as regards the poor has lost its prominent place on the list of immediate priorities.

Rural-urban migration has continued to flourish despite growing unemployment and insufficient economic opportunity.

Housing shortages persist.

Efforts by the Islamic Republic to resolve its problems face nearly insurmountable domestic and international challenges. Indeed, some say that “the roots of the country’s badly fractured politics must be sought in its obsolete political culture.” They call for an Iranian “perestroika,” citing the need for a better image and perhaps even a new sense of identity.

Photography by Casey Hugelfink: Isfahan’s Ali Qapu Palace 1984

Revolutionary  leadership convinced many Iranians that their demands for democracy, national independence, and social justice would be realized with the adoption of a new Islamic form of government. This became difficult as the struggle for independence from the American superpower played out in the context of the war against Iraq.

The impact of the Iraq War on urban areas made earlier promises for social justice difficult to accomplish.

Rural-urban migration was greatly exacerbated due to war displacement as refugees from war areas — officially estimated at 2 million — combined with an influx of over 1.5 million Afghan refugees to flood the streets of Iran’s urban areas.

In his book Winners and Losers of the Iranian Revolution: A Study in Income Distribution, Sohrab Behdad reports that many of the unemployed — primarily young males seeking unskilled jobs — became street vendors in the thriving open black market. While this group benefited from growing shortages, many more of the displaced were angered by the unfair distribution of what was available.

In order to defuse the tension, the government implemented a food rationing system for meat, rice, and dairy products. Despite this effort, rumors of corruption and inequity provided reason for increasing discontent, and protest demonstrations were reported.

Unable to provide a ‘quick-fix’ for the continuing deprivation, Khomeini called for cuts in consumerism as an “essential part of the Islamic faith.” He appealed for patience in accepting economic shortcomings.

Despite the fact that enthusiasm and vocal support for the war effort persisted, Khomeini could no longer deny evidence pointing to increased bitterness. As Behdad notes, the narrowing income inequality reported for the two years immediately following the revolution was unarguably reversed. Using “expenditures of urban households” as an index of well-being, “the share of expenditures for the poorest 10% dropped to their 1977 level by 1982, and by 1983 was only 76% of the 1977 level.” Meanwhile, population growth continued.

In an attempt to address seemingly insurmountable problems, Khomeini named 1983-1984 “the year of the mostazafin.” He spoke of the gulf separating the ‘shanty-dwellers’ from the ‘palace-dwellers’ and asserted that the betterment of the mostazafin condition was their “right” — a right they had earned by their contribution to the revolution and their sacrifices in the war.

Rhetoric proved insufficient, however, since the elements of the nationalized sector which were designated to assist the poor migrants were inefficient and operated at a loss.

In 1984, the Foundation for the Disinherited estimated real earnings equivalent to around $2 billion and expenses of $4 billion a year.

The ensuing debate over the distribution of wealth and measures to improve the lot of the poor gathered steam in the winter of 1983-1984.

Ultimately, the issue of the relationship between the private and the public sectors, and the question of how to achieve social justice remained unresolved. In fact, the controversy increasingly revolved around the nuances of Islamic law, culminating in a dispute over whether the government or the private sector should control the economy. This debate culminated in a crystallization of Khomeini’s evolutionary thinking about the mostazafin.

Ervand Abrahamian says that at the time of the revolution, Khomeini’s portrayal of society revolved around the “two warring classes” mentioned above — the upper class (oppressors or palace dwellers) and the low class (the oppressed, the exploited, the shanty-dwellers).

Beginning around 1982, class divisions acquired a different caste. Three separate classes emerged, an upper class formed of remnants of the wealthy and Western-educated families that had supported the old regime; a middle class formed of clerics, shopkeepers, civil servants, intellectuals, tradesmen, and bazaar merchants; and a lower class formed of workers, peasants, and shanty town dwellers.

As the previous imagery of two antagonistic classes became less powerful, the “mostazafin label” changed in definition. No longer did it carry its earlier connotation of “deprived masses.” Instead, it became a political label for all supporters of the new regime, including wealthy merchants. As might be expected, this had far reaching effects so far as the commitment to social justice was concerned. Now the interests of the migrant poor no longer required the abrogation of private property; the prime concern was the continuing fight against oppression and exploiters.

Certainly the unemployment situation in Iran’s urban centers worsened during the post revolutionary period. In his book, Revolution and Economic Transition: The Iranian Experience, Hooshang Amirahmadi says that, on average, 302,000 newcomers entered the job market each year, while only 224,000 jobs were created. He estimates that rural-urban migration was responsible for about 20% of all new entrants in urban areas, and that about 64% of the total unemployed lived in cities. Much of the new employment that has been created is to be found in the low-paying informal sector and in the pursuit of illicit activities.

Low job growth, the increasing population burden, and low productivity have combined to effect a 47% decline of gross domestic product between 1979 and 1987. This decrease has had a disproportionate impact on the poorer sections of society. Not only did the poor have less money to spend, but their numbers are expanding.

Absolute poverty increased 43% over the 1979-1985 time period with over 65% of the population falling beneath the poverty line. Even more telling, wealth disparity greatly increased, with the number of billionaires expanding from about 100 families in the revolutionary years to over 900 families in the post revolutionary period.

Photograph by Kamyar Adl

Iran’s constitution, foreign policy, and armed forces changed in the first year after the revolution. The country’s traditional view of warfare changed in the wake of the Iraq invasion.

Rather than the high technology deterrence that the shah’s arms procurement program had been geared toward providing, Iraq’s invasion of Iran called for other tactics.

The war coincided with the new realities created by revolutionary foreign policy and rhetoric. Not only was Iran faced with the practical contingencies of war, but with a need to emerge from the conflict in a manner that would solidify the goals of the revolution.

According to Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, the regime had

insisted on the proposition that all the ills of the world — inequality, an unjust international system, exploitation, oppression, the bullying of the weak by the strong — emanated from the ‘arrogant superpowers’ or their agents. In this view, the superpowers were in collusion and were equally guilty. Khomeini saw Iran’s position in particular as the result of a conspiracy between the Shah and the West, to make Iran culturally and politically dependent.

In this view, it isn’t surprising that, in Iran’s view, Iraq’s invasion could only be explained by US complicity and encouragement.

During the first years of the war, low priority was placed on the requirements of the military. Instead, the emphasis was on securing the revolution.

At this time, Iran had a large store of spare parts, and the regime sabotaged its acquisition of arms already paid for but held up by the hostage dispute. Soon, however, because of the almost total reliance on American weapons, Iran found it necessary to look for other suppliers. Still, the country was willing to accept heavy casualties in lieu of superpower assistance.

The Pasdaran controlled military operatios, continuing to reject any sort of relationship with the United States.

At the same time, Iran began to support radical groups like the Islamic Amal, Hezbollah, and Islamic Jihad. These activities were meant to attest to Iran’s regional importance and the continuing outreach of the revolution. Of course, this meant a clash with the United States over terrorism which, in turn, influenced US willingness to resupply arms.

The US tightened its own leakages and blocked third party supplies in an action known as ‘Operation Stuanch’. This position hardened after the bombing of US marine barracks in Beirut.

By 1985, Iran’s situation in the war had deteriorated. An ‘arms for hostages’ deal with the US became public and the US determined to become directly involved in the Gulf by establishing a US naval presence.

By October 1987, Iran had reframed the conflict to depict American involvement:

If we had won the war last year, everyone would have said that a 50 million strong country was victorious over a 14 million strong country. But if we win this year, everyone will know that we are victorious over the United States.

At the same time, Iran reported that half a million volunteers were prepared for ‘martyrdom-seeking operations’ to resist the American presence in the Gulf. The continued willingness to sacrifice Iran’s human resource potential in battle was quite different from the shah’s determination to employ military-led industrialization as Iran’s development strategy.

Photograph by Alan: Martyrs Memorial at the Mausoleum of Khawje Rabie.