The Special Period (of War) in Time of Peace began in Cuba with the end of the Cold War in 1990. At that time, the nation was abandoned by the Soviet Union. Dire economic circumstances were further complicated by a tightening of US sanctions against the island nation.

In the absence of the Cold War and its sponsors, Havana was forced to look for ways to solve its social and economic challenges without external assistance.

Cuba was not totally unprepared, however. As early as 1986, Cubans were rejecting Soviet models of economic and social planning and were insisting on a return to the core Revolutionary project that spurred social development in the 1960s. You can read more about this period of time here.

While corrections were seen as a necessity and new programs were soon underway, the Period of Rectification (1986-1990) came to an abrupt end with the introduction of glasnost and perestroika in the Soviet Union and the democratization of Eastern Europe.

Because Cuba’s economy was so intertwined with that of the Soviet Union, the impact of change could not be gradual. Rather, it was a shock that permeated every city block and household in Havana.

At the same time, the US tightened sanctions against the island as a whole through first the Helms-Burton Act and later through the Torricelli Act.

The end of the Cold War meant the near total collapse of Cuba’s principal trade agreements with the Soviet Bloc.

As early as the late 1980s, Gorbachev was unwilling and (eventually) unable to fulfill his trade obligations with Cuba.

The economic shock that resulted affected every aspect of Havana’s urban environment.

The absence of imports, especially, threatened the viability of the city’s industrial, transportation, and agricultural infrastructures because, under agreements with the former Soviet Union, Havana had been an oil driven city, insensitive to energy conservation or efficiency.

According to Richard A. Dello Buono

Cuba imported approximately $7.2 billion of goods from the Soviet Union in 1988, mostly oil, machinery, wood, metals, and fertilizer. The Soviet Union, in turn, received some $6.5 billion of Cuban goods, mostly sugar, with nickel and fruit providing the bulk of the remainder. In mid-1990, the Soviet ambassador to Cuba ‘declared that Russia and Cuba are interdependent, indicating that 30% of the Soviet Union’s sugar and 50% of its citrus fruit was coming from Cuba as well as significant amounts of nickel and cobalt, and increasingly, medical services’.

In fact, 98% of all Cuba’s petroleum had come from the Soviet bloc.

In 1988, for example, 12-13 million tons of Soviet oil were imported and, of this total, the Cubans were able to re-export two million tons onto the world market.

In 1989, Cuba was forced to cut the re-exports in half, significantly impacting the country’s ability to generate hard currency and, by 1990, Havana was forced to cut oil re-exports entirely since only 10 of the 13 million tons promised by the Soviets were received.

By the end of 1991, oil imports had fallen still more. Cuba received only 6 million of a promised 13 million tons and, by this time, the shortfall in oil and associated factors began to severely impact the city’s economy.

While oil was critical, other losses were also important since 85% of all exchanges had been with the Soviets.

In terms of exports, 66% of all Cuba’s sugar, 73% of the island’s nickel, and 98% of the country’s citrus fruits had been exported to the Soviet Bloc.

Aside from oil, 66% of the country’s food, 86% of all raw material, and 80% of machinery and spare parts came from Soviet dominated trading partners.

Consequently, when the support was withdrawn, factory closures became common, food scarcity was widespread, and the (already inadequate) technology base began eroding.

Photograph by Lisa Reynolds Wolfe.

As we saw in our post on Havana’s Urban Slum Areas, substandard housing and shantytowns were of great concern to the Cuban government.

Budgets for maintenance and repair of housing and community facilities increased dramatically as a result of complaints expressed in meeting help periodically between local People’s Power delegates and their constituents, challenging the argument of some that new institutions were not responsive to public demands.

Between 1977 and 1983, local agencies increased their maintenance and repair budgets fivefold. During the same period, the value of materials sold directly to consumers for maintenance, repairs, and to some extent new construction increased tenfold. This was in sharp contrast to the early 1970s when

conserving the existing housing stock help low priority which resulted in a qualitative, functional, and visual deterioration of the central parts of Havana.

The rapid decay and imminent collapse of older sections of the city led to a continued focus on urban development.

In the late 1970s there was a move to protect historic districts. Old Havana became very fashionable as a result of visits by Fidel Castro and foreign gentry. The area was declared a national landmark and greater resources were allocated to its restoration. In fact, as many as six agencies and national commissions emerged to preserve Havana’s built heritage. Thus, the indiscriminate demolition required to implement the Soviet model of urban development did not extend to areas of the city involved in historic preservation. Here, even though officials have encouraged a unique socialist model of rehabilitation, the facade of the historic city remains unchanged.

UNESCO granted Old Havana “world cultural status” in late 1982, further ensuring the protection of Old Havana’s hundreds of landmark buildings. Thousands of other structures in the historic district have subsequently fallen under this protective umbrella.

By the mid 1980s, investment required for rehabilitation Havana was estimated at between $10 and $14 billion, a staggering amount since most of Havana lacks revenue-generating mechanisms. Instead the city receives

its budget and material resources from the national budget which is usually approved, with very few changes, at the end of the year by the National Assembly. The city also receives a corresponding amount of revenue from its 15 municipalities. Revenue cannot be readjusted nor directed to other areas except when it is explicitly stated by the national government . . . . Fixed budgets designated for city and municipal governments in Cuba have always fallen well below the needs of those entities.

One exception is the restoration project of the historic center of Habana Vieja (Old Havana), under the management of the Office of the City Historian. That office has a special company, Habanaguex, that turns profits on several businesses that operate in Habana Vieja.

For a short time in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Old Havana reactivated its functional role as the historic and artistic center of the capital.

The memorable ‘Saturdays in the plaza’ entailed the authorized selling of artwork and handicrafts by talented artists in two improvised markets located in the Plaza de Armas and Plaza de la Catedral. Within a short time, however, the craft fair was abruptly shut down by the government because of ‘illicit enrichment’ on the part of the artisans and craftpersons.

Unfortunately, the curtailment of activity in the old city had further ramifications. It meant a gradual loss of the old building trades which were responsible for high levels of craftsmanship.

Not only did masons, stone cutters, carpenters, blacksmiths, and bricklayers disappear, but a whole generation of young apprentices was interrupted, creating a huge gap in the transfer of traditional building techniques.

The attention of Havana’s planners in the  early 1970s turned to urban slum areas.

The inner city had suffered considerable decay in the 1960s and much of Havana’s housing stock was in substandard condition.

One such area was Cayo Hueso, a neighborhood bordering the downtown commercial area of Centro Havana where Cuba’s first major urban development project took place. This area was composed of old rundown buildings that lacked the historic value of those of Old Havana.

The project was ambitious. The first buildings were five story walk-ups, but later twelve to sixteen story towers were erected when high-rise construction was deemed necessary to allow decent sized  units for each family as well as provide additional open space and needed community facilities.

In all areas of the city, housing deterioration often resulted in displacement, especially in cases of emergency removal from hazardous buildings. Since families had to be relocated before demolition and rebuilding could begin, progress was slow.

As the 1970s progressed, “the number of families living in shelters for such reasons reached crisis proportions.” Fewer and fewer relocation units were available as emigration slowed markedly throughout the decade.

When the outflow picked up again in 1980, vacated dwellings were allocated (with local CDR approval) to people living in shelters.

After 1976, a sizable share of construction went to Havana where land scarcity discouraged extensive private building and the government assumed major responsibility for providing housing to promote high densities.

Subsequently the role of the microbrigades was called into question when housing analysts observed that the majority of new units were still privately built.

At about the same time, the establishment of local units of People’s Power, poder popular,  came into existence.

When these units were assigned the task of distributing construction materials allowed by the central government, public involvement in housing decisions became more widespread.

Despite concerted effort, however, by 1985, 61 shantytowns remained in Havana and a substantial number of people lived in substandard buildings threatened by collapse.