The Federation of Cuban Women (FMC) led the revolution’s attack on domestic service and on prostitution.

After 1959, domestic service was viewed as degrading and exploitative. Maids began to be described as slaves who were exploited by long hours of work, abusive treatment and low pay. In this context, Castro’s stated objective was to get those maids away from the bourgeoisie and capture them for the revolution.

Schools were set up for domestics and, within just a few years, 30,000 maids were attending these training centers.

Graduates were given the jobs of bank and telephone workers who had gone into exile. Others became day care and health workers, technicians and bureaucrats.

The schools were closed in 1968.

The war on prostitution was an effort to improve women’s lives and, at the same time, gain loyalty for the revolution. In fact:

The revolution portrayed prostitution as a shameful legacy of Cuba’s colonial and neocolonial past. By claiming that North American visitors were the principal exploiters of Cuban women, the revolution avoided any serious analysis of sexuality and power. In truth the principal clientele of Cuba’s sex industry was Cubans themselves. Indeed the euphoria of the revolutionary triumph of 1959 reportedly brought a boom in business for Cuba’s thirty to forty thousand prostitutes.

At first, prostitutes were viewed as victims of the capitalist system and sent to rehabilitation schools concentrating on ideological and vocational training. Pimps were sent to work farms.

Later, those who refused rehabilitation were imprisoned.

In order to reach women at the grassroots, the FMC initiated a series of study groups at the neighborhood level.

By 1964, women were studying the transition from capitalism to socialism. The study groups did not address the issues of feminism though, especially the power relations that were attracting worldwide attention at the time. In fact, the FMC leadership sometimes

denounced feminism for misleading women into blaming men, not capitalism, for their woes.

In short, the dual objectives of the FMC were to eliminate sexual discrimination and win women’s support for the revolution through political education and action as an arm of social vigilance for the Castro regime.

In contrast to feminist groups in other nations of Latin America, the goal was not to empower women or facilitate their entry into positions of leadership. The FMC’s principal task . . . was to defend a revolution whose interests were defined by a male elite.”

If you enjoyed this post you might like a post on Cold War Studies called Defending  the Revolution.

Photograph by Lisa Reynolds Wolfe

Havana’s pre-revolutionary militarization occurred with the installation of Batista as dictator.  It intensified throughout the ensuing struggle of resistance because “the guerilla struggles which overthrew the Batista regime were above all military or paramilitary in nature.”

However, the city’s form and organization did not mirror the forces of Cold War militarism so obvious in other areas of the Third World during this period. This despite the reality that

the power of the United States is an ever present element in Cuba.  The naval base at Guantanamo Bay, and the frequent visits of naval vessels to Cuban ports give concrete evidence of this power.

Even though the US Department of Defense provided sophisticated military equipment and arms to the Batista government, Havana’s relationship with the United States was noted for its dependent economic — rather than its militaristic aspects.

Nevertheless, the American military assistance provided was not inconsequential.

Military equipment and arms transfers were valued at more than $16 million, and organized practical training programs were provided for 500 Cuban officers at service institutions in the Panama Canal Zone or at military bases in the United States.

It has been observed, however, that

the North American model of civil-military relations probably influenced them much less than the technical aspects of their education and their contact with official United States anti-communism.

While “United States military influence served to strengthen the power and morale of precisely those elements in the Cuban army who were the strongest supporters of Batista,” the military did not implement American processes or procedures. In fact:

The Cuban army can be best understood as an essentially mercenary sect, recruited from among unemployed urban and rural workers and led by an officer corps of middle and low social origins which became a privileged caste.

Che Guevara also describes the pre-revolutionary Cuban military:

The army of Batista, with all its enormous defects, was an army structured in such a way that all, from the lowest soldier to the highest general, were accomplices in the exploitation of the people.  They were completely mercenaries, and this gave a certain cohesiveness to the repressive apparatus.

While these views are, perhaps, controversial, they emphasize the wide gap between Batista’s military and the professionalism of the American military.

The US government instituted an embargo on military materials and all forms of combat arms to the Batista regime in March 1958.  Nevertheless, even after the embargo was established, the Defense Department continued to maintain its various armed forces’ missions in Havana.

Pentagon officials continued to maintain ‘liaisons’ through the operations of their army, naval, and air force missions, and shipments of non-combat equipment — communications materials, for example — continued.

The partial nature of the rupture allowed American military officials to contribute important logistical and tactical supports to their peripheral counterparts up until the moment of the nationalist victory.  The Havana Embassy also maintained lines of communication to Batista’s military command.

The arms embargo decision had important repercussions within the US business community in Cuba, forcing American investors located in Havana to reassess their dismissal of the guerilla threat. Subsequently, this segment became the most active capitalist class supporters of political confrontation with the Castro movement.

The business community was important because, with respect to direct investment flows and undistributed earnings during the 10 year period 1950-1959, Cuba had received well over twice as much per capita as the average for other Latin American countries.

By autumn of 1958, Washington was determined to see Batista out of office. However, the real  problem for the US was not getting rid of Batista, but frustrating the Cuban insurrection.

Batista or a military junta could now be maintained only through direct military intervention on the part of the US. The regular army of Cuba was incapable of resisting and, in fact, was reaching out to the rebels.

While the US continued its efforts to ease Batista out of office, government reversals spurred spontaneous uprisings all over Cuba.

Vast quantities of arms and equipment fell under the control of civilians — artillery, tanks, and small weapons of every type.

It is important to note, however, that most of the weapons on record as having been supplied to the Batista regime were not of a type that could be easily used against the population.

Major weapons supplies were limited in contrast with those supplied to other client states during this timeframe, and many related solely to the transport of cargo.

On the other hand, small arms are less easily traced and many observers state that such weapons were smuggled from Miami to the rebels. It is possible that they contributed substantially to Batista’s effort.

At the same time, the US arms suspension and other military setbacks provided some benefit for rebel forces, despite the activities of US military advisers who continued to assist the Cuban Air Force in bombing Castro’s forces in the countryside.

In fact, it was quite clear that Batista’s military was weakening.

By December, no fewer than half a dozen conspiracies were brewing in the armed forces, and the army, especially, was becoming a focal point of political intrigue in the cities.

On New Year’s Eve 1958, Camp Columbia in Havana became a center of the intrigue.

The capital seemed quiet, although the night before the urban underground had destroyed a large munition depot at Cojimar, blowing up some of the army’s last rockets as well as air force bombs received from England shortly before.

On this evening, in what amounted to a betrayal of the military, Batista decided to leave the country.

The “March 10″ Tank Division was ordered to the airport to protect his escape.  Subsequently, the army disintegrated.

Batista’s ‘escape’ surprised the urban underground in Havana. It had been assumed that he would put up a last-minute struggle, and the protestors were unprepared to keep law and order in a victorious situation. Nevertheless, before the end of the first day of 1959, the underground had established control of the capital’s streets, police precincts, and all official buildings.  Patrols had been posted near Navy headquarters in Old Havana; snipers had been placed in the tallest buildings around the university and arms were gathered at various underground headquarters.

Batista mounted a 1958 summer offensive which eventually ended in failure. Perceiving that the president was unable to control the situation, many members of the upper class withdrew their support from the government and tried to establish contact with the insurrectionists.  Substantial donations of money also appeared.

The attitude of ordinary workers began to change and they became more willing to cooperate with the various underground cells in the working centers. For example, in early 1958 there was only one militant in the DR (Directorio Revolucionario) underground in the Goodyear Tire Company located on the outskirts of Havana.  By mid-October the factory was a main source of tires, spare parts, and other services for the opposition movement.

The urban underground also succeeded in organizing cells in various associations such as the Association of Press Reporters and several landlord’s associations.

Cells were formed in Havana’s hotels to check on visitors from foreign countries and to maintain vigilance over people invited to visit Cuba by the government. The Copacabana Hotel, the Chateau-Miramar, Colina, Lido, Rosito de Hornedo, Capri, and Havana Riviera were mostly under the control of the DR and the opposition as were the Havana Hilton, St. John’s, Flamingo and Emperador Hotels.

There were also DR cells among the workers in the Bay of Havana.

Political conditions played havoc with the economy and made renewed economic growth impossible.

Tourism declined.

Dairy, vegetable, and meat products no longer flowed from the countryside to the city.  Prices of basic staples soared and many products disappeared altogether.

Sabotage and the destruction of property led to a drop in sugar production.

Shortages of gasoline and oil brought railroads, trucking, and sugar mills to a standstill.

Telephone and telegraph service across the island was paralyzed.

Bridges were out of service, and transportation between Havana and the three eastern provinces was all but destroyed.

Manufacturers’ inventories began to pile up at plants.

The city was approaching a full-blown revolutionary situation.

During November 1958, 12 new cells were added to the underground in Marianao. Most of the newcomers were easy victims of the police because of their inexperience. Still, there were approximately 32 guerrilla operations during November, mainly shootings at police precincts in Havana.

Public utilities were constantly attacked; there were seven such attacks on the night of November 25.

During the first 15 days of December 1958, 45 guerillas were shot to death in Marianao and about the same number in Guanabacoa.

From November 1 to December 31, 1958, about 300 bombs exploded in the Havana metropolitan area.

Bombs exploded every night, and on the evening of December 7 over 100 bombs exploded in the capital.

Havana was clearly in crisis.

Havana is deceptively calm in the 1950s video above.  Urban opposition to Batista was growing. I mentioned this in an  earlier post.  Soon everyday life in the city would be disrupted on an everyday basis.  The idea of a general strike preceded by direct action from the masses was a central tenet of the urban underground.

The main objective of what was to be a countrywide action was to create the kind of general confusion and chaos which would result in public violence.

While work stoppages and street fighting were going on throughout the cities of Cuba, Castro and his guerillas would move into the valleys, engage the regular troops, and occupy populated areas in the countryside.  Once this was accomplished, a general uprising would be assured.

In order to assure maximum success, Havana was to be divided into various operational zones: Centro Havana; Regla; Guanabacoa; Vedado; and Miramar.

Miramar  was to serve as the general headquarters for the insurgents.

Other bases were set up in Vedado, the middle-class neighborhood close to the center of Havana’s business section where many US backed hotels were located.  In addition, the underground had use of 40 to 50 houses for communications, arms depots, and hideaways.

Religious institutions and leaders also had critical input in the strike preparations as they made plans to care for and hide militants as necessary.  In fact, the pastor of Havana’s First Presbyterian Church was already active in the urban underground resistance. At the Dispensario Clinico of his church, bombs were manufactured, manifestos written, and enormous quantities of medicine were made available to urban cells and later to guerillas.

Two acts of sabotage were to take place: the first was to blow up the electric company in Havana.  Second, since there were no arms on hand, the Youth Brigade was to attack an armory in Old Havana where weapons were stocked in unknown amounts.  Some of these acquisitions would be given to the cadres, and the rest would be distributed at prearranged points throughout the capital.

The strike began on April 9. However, nothing went as planned.

Government forces were waiting and the urban underground was largely dismantled.

In the aftermath of the event, the few remaining urban cadres agreed to launch an all-out united offensive against the regime.  The objective was to demoralize the authorities through psychological warfare.

“Operation Rescue” was the first action.  It called for “rescuing” as many arms as possible from the hands of the authorities.

Policemen were ambushed in lonely alleys, disarmed, undressed and then turned loose.

When the police began to patrol the streets in groups of two or three, “Operation Pep-Rallies” was initiated. Underground agitators would attack the government in public places for a few minutes.  Their retreat was then covered by other underground fighters who would divert the attention of the authorities by throwing Molotov cocktails or a handful of revolutionary leaflets.

The government countered these campaigns by increasing its secret police forces.  Eventually the streets of the city were filled with blind beggars who were not blind, street vendors with no merchandise and a whole array of clumsy government spies.

When it was no longer possible to conduct these campaigns, the urban fighters reached people by radio.  Radio stations were taken over, brief manifestos read to the nation, and news about the progress of the insurrection circulated before the police had a chance to arrive.

Cuban urban guerillas followed the maxims applied in Palestine during the 1940s and Algeria during the 1950s which purported that in cities guerillas must attack daily to create a climate in which government forces are kept off balance. Lacking expertise in urban counterinsurgency, the regime’s techniques were mostly crude demonstrations of terror.

In addition to the arms transfers and training assistance that we alluded to in our post on US Military Involvement in Cold War Cuba, Washington maintained military, naval, and air force missions.

A military assistance and advisory group (MAAG) was stationed on the island for the professed purpose of equipping and training Cuba’s defense forces to meet their ‘hemispheric defense’ responsibilities.

Also, the Central Intelligence Agency sought to develop a network of reliable assets within the Cuban state and society. They considered Cuba a “safe precinct.”

The bulk of US military assistance grants to the Batista regime were authorized between 1954 and 1958, coinciding with the expansion and intensification of the nationalist (revolutionary) struggle. While executive branch officials continually rationalized the provision of this type of aid on the grounds of regional defense commitment, as early as December 1957, a Senate Foreign Relations Committee report had reached a far different conclusion as regards its primary use:

We have a military mission in Cuba and the Batista government from time to time requests that we sell Cuba arms to supply the Government forces. These arms are, of course, used by the interlocking Army and police to maintain the Government’s power.

By March 1958, it was conceded that ‘the Cuban Government is certainly using the military equipment which it has at its disposal to beat back armed insurrection…’

In practice, therefore, the provision of American military assistance served two essentially overlapping purposes: it bolstered anti-communist ‘hemispheric defense’ requirements at the same time that it provided crucial support for the Batista government in its efforts to maintain itself in power.

It is important to note, that most of the weapons on record as having been supplied to the Batista regime were not of a type that could be easily used against the population.  Major weapons supplies were limited in contrast with those supplied to other client states during this time frame, and many related solely to the transport of cargo.

On the other hand, since small arms are less easily traced and many observers state that such weapons were smuggled from Miami to the rebels, they may have made a substantial contribution to Batista’s effort.

It was the arms embargo debate inside the administration during early 1958 that led to a major reassessment of the most crucial issues bearing on US support of the military dictatorship.

In the debate leading up to the decision to place an arms embargo on Cuba, the central bureaucratic antagonists were located in the Departments of State and Defense.  The Defense Department argued against the application of an arms embargo on both ideological and strategic grounds:

The [Cuban] Government has traditionally supported the United States…in the United Nations against the onslaughts of responsibilities which we have, and which Cuba shares with us, of course, under the Rio Treaty.

State Department officials viewed the continuation of the arms program, in association with Batista’s refusal to accede to US government requests to reduce the level of political repression and state corruption, as the forerunner of a widened conflict. These concerns were not new.

For quite some time, American policymakers had expressed concern over the scope and persistence of corruption within the peripheral state apparatus noting:

Every government activity was milked–the lottery, the school lunch program, drivers’ licenses, parking meters, teachers’ certificates.  The police routinely extorted millions in protection money from Havana merchants.

Officials of the US Department of the Treasury were especially critical of the regime’s fiscal and monetary policies, its inability to control inflation due to administrative disorganization, the lack of an effective tax system, and the failure of Batista sufficiently to assert his dictatorial powers in ‘resisting more firmly most of the demands of labor for continuous wage and other benefits.’

In practice, however, the differences were enveloped and marginalized within the larger political-economic framework that accommodated US interests in Cuba.  Even the inter agency conflict surrounding the arms embargo was anchored within a unified commitment to maintain a secure environment for capital accumulation in Cuba.

The US government instituted an embargo on military materials and all forms of combat arms to the Batista regime in March 1958.  Nevertheless, even after the embargo was established, the Defense Department continued to maintain its various armed forces’ missions in Havana.

Pentagon officials continued to maintain ‘liaisons’ through the operations of their army, naval, and air force missions, and shipments of non-combat equipment–communications materials, for example–continued.

The partial nature of the rupture allowed American military officials to contribute important logistical and tactical supports to their peripheral counterparts up until the moment of the nationalist victory.  The Havana Embassy also maintained lines of communication to Batista’s military command.

The arms embargo decision had important repercussions within the US business community in Cuba, forcing American investors located in Havana to reassess their dismissal of the guerilla threat. Subsequently, this segment became the most active capitalist class supporters of political confrontation with the Castro movement.

The business community was important because, with respect to direct investment flows and undistributed earnings during the 10 year period 1950-1959, Cuba had received well over twice as much per capita as the average for other Latin American countries.

Direct investment flow is loosely defined to include the flow of equity and loan investments from US residents to foreign firms controlled by US interests.

The book value of direct investment enterprises includes the US ownership of equity capital, loan capital, branch accounts, and inter company accounts in foreign firms controlled by US interests.

By 1957 American direct investment totaled $850 million, and portfolio investments amounted to $210.9 million.  These were the only foreign investments of any importance in Havana.  British holdings were practically eliminated after 1945, and Canadian investments were placed at only $9.4 million.

While Havana was the site of extensive capitalist investment from the United States, the city’s population was growing increasingly displeased with Batista, the so-called “American man in Havana.”

The growing defections of the bourgeois (and petty bourgeois) elements from the class alliance that supported Batista…and the appearance of a large-scale nationalist movement with a substantial urban working-class component under the leadership of rural insurgents raised new serious problems for Washington.

By early 1958, the increasing social polarization and expanding nationalist opposition to Batista forced executive branch officials to question the continued viability of the military government and its capacity to safeguard US politco-economic interests over the long term.

When Batista’s major military offensive against the guerillas collapsed in June and July of 1958, Washington interpreted the growing fragmentation and disintegration of the Cuban armed forces as a primary threat to the collective interests of the capitalist class in Cuba. However, finally there was a decision to support the Batista government to the extent of complying with our commitments and contractual agreements.

The US would not give moral support to the revolutionary opposition.

By the late 1950s, the US was ambivalent in its support for Batista.

The governments of Cuba and the US had signed a military assistance pact 72 hours before Batista’s coup on March 10, 1952. Article 2 of the pact stated that the US would supply the Cuban government with arms for the purpose of “implementing defense plans under which the two governments will participate in missions important to the defense of the Western Hemisphere.” However, the pact provisions clearly stated that such military assistance was not to be used for “purposes other than those for which it was furnished” without prior consent of the US government.

It was now obvious that military equipment received under the military assistance pact was being used to fight what had become a civil war.

Applying this framework, US support of the Batista regime was clearly implied.

Arguing for the imposition of an arms embargo, many Cubans and Americans contended that the Batista regime was using American-made arms to counter the activities of those Cubans who wanted “to restore freedom and justice in their own country.” Once the Batista regime had been overthrown, they argued, the people of Cuba would feel that the US had been Batista’s partner in the murder of thousands of Cuba’s young people.

This group concentrated on finding ways to influence US public opinion against all arms shipments to Cuba, and on mobilizing influential members of Congress to take the message to the White House.

Eventually, after supporters of the embargo provided photocopies of documents proving that US arms were being shipped to Cuba, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced that Washington’s guidelines in supplying arms would be

the need of a country to have defense against possible aggression from without [and the need for] a normal police force….We don’t like to have a large shipment of arms, particularly of a large caliber…go where the purpose is to conduct a civil war.

As a result, in March 1958, an arms embargo was finally enacted.

To Batista the arms embargo meant that the US had assumed a “neutral position” vis-a-vis the Cuban conflict. And within the Cuban political context, such “neutrality” was equivalent to US withdrawal of support for Batista.

Actually, aside from an order for 1,950  Garand rifles from the US which was confiscated, arms seem to have continued arriving aboard unmarked planes.

Nevertheless, the arms embargo had great psychological impact in favor of the insurrection, and it came less than a month before the urban underground attempted a general strike on April 9, 1958.

Along with the social disparity we talked about in Havana 1958: The Economy Nears Collapse, problems associated with government spending continued to surface. Deficit spending depleted the reserves accumulated during the 1940s.

By 1958, Cuba had amassed a 400-million-peso deficit with the United States and monetary reserves had dwindled to 100 million pesos from 571 million in 1952.

Public works expenditures alone added up to more than 1 billion pesos.  Less than 50 percent of projects covered their actual costs; the rest went for commissions and profit margins. Nevertheless, the issue of corruption was not addressed.

The new development banks granted Batista supporters generous loans and declined modest requests from nonpartisans. Hacendados and colonos who condemned the new levels of corruption suffered reduced quotas and fewer business opportunities. As one observer notes, “the military regime subordinated the incipient development infrastructure to the logic of corruption.”

Opportunism was visible in the most mundane activities of daily life and permeated all strata of the society.

Most officers in the national police (regardless of level) had become involved in a system of corruption known as the forrajeo. This was an instrument of extortion that was managed by police officers throughout the country. It was especially predominant in the municipal zones of Greater Havana–Regla, Guanabacoa, and Marianao–where most small stores and medium and large business centers were located.  Through the forrajeo every business, regardless of its size, had to contribute daily to the police precinct in each locality.  Thus, payoffs permeated every corner of Havana’s daily economy and were easily observed since all transactions were carried out openly.

Citizens witnessed corruption as they went about their everyday household chores.

For example, approximately 3,400 bodegas (small grocery stores usually owned by a single family) were located in Greater Havana, and each bodega had to pay a “tax” of one to two pesos daily, in addition to whatever consumer goods the police demanded from the owner.  This “tax” was collected by the local patrol car every afternoon.

Havana’s 180 bakeries and all snack bars supplied the police with their products, plus paying three pesos daily to the foot patrol.

Nearly 400 service stations paid one peso daily, and serviced free of charge all police officers’ private cars.

Some 940 butcher shops had to contribute two to three pounds of meat every day, plus one peso to the local patrol officer.

Beer trucks were “taxed” for two pesos daily.

Two hundred cigar delivery trucks paid one peso daily, plus products on demand.

Milkmen were assigned a quota of two liters per day, or two pesos in cash.

Even street vendors were required to make a contribution.

Activities that were offensive to all decent citizens–prostitution and drug trafficking–were also common.  However, gambling was the most profitable  business for the police and many habaneros were themselves addicted.

Six banks controlled gambling, each contributing an estimated $400 a day to various high-ranking police officers. (One bank–owned by a consortium of government officials– was exempt.  Another bank paid $1,000 per day in order to be permitted to expand into new areas of the city.) In total, the banks’ share to the forrajeo system and other “taxes” amounted to approximately $1 million a year paid to high-ranking officers.

Around 2,000 small vidrieras ( gambling booths) were scattered throughout the capital where numbers were played every hour on the hour. The vidrieras were taxed on a daily basis and income was distributed to the bureau of investigation, the district police commander, and the captain of the local precinct.  Also, the vidrieras had to allow each local police officer $2 daily for his personal gambling. All told, the vidrieras represented an income to the police of about $3.8 million a year, which was divided up from the rank of majors, through captains, to regular patrolmen.

Prostitution was also an important income opportunity for the police. Each of Havana’s approximately 2,000 houses of prostitution paid an amount calculated by local patrolmen who figured out the number of clients per night and the fees charged each one.  Very humble casas would pay from $50 to $70 per night, while the richest contributed from $3,000 to $5,000 nightly.  The transaction occurred in front of any clients who happened to be present. Moreover, police officers sometimes served as pimps with prostitutes often peddling drugs supplied by the police.

Drug traffic mostly supplied the rich and American tourists. However, not all police officers, even those with high rank, participated in the drug trade.  This business was controlled by organized crime from the United States.  Nevertheless, a substantial percentage of the profits reached the highest governmental circles.