By the mid 1960s, Cubans realized that the strategies of the early 1960s had failed to meet even their most modest objectives. Instead, efforts at import substitution and industrialization had resulted in widespread social distress and economic dislocation.

New strategies after 1968 involved increased emphasis on all aspects of agricultural production, with a renewed  prominence on sugar production, but including dairy products, beef, citrus fruits, tropical agricultural products, coffee, and tobacco. This was to be  a means of generating foreign exchange and a way of increasing imports of machinery and equipment, which in turn would increase production of agriculture and agricultural commodities. Industrial planning shifted to the development of those sectors that utilized Cuban natural resources most efficiently, with special attention to those industries that supported agricultural production.

The renewed emphasis on sugar offered an obvious and relatively cost effective method of reversing a mounting balance of trade deficit by mobilizing efforts around a sector in which Cuba possessed adequate personnel and sufficient experience to achieve success. The rise of the world price of sugar in 1963, moreover, served to confirm the wisdom and timeliness of once again promoting the expansion of sugar production.

After the mid 1960s, sugar production once again received preference and priority. Output was expected to increase steadily, and was to climax in 1970 with the production of a 10 million ton sugar crop.

The objective became an obsession. Virtually all national resources and collective resolve were diverted to the task. The campaign implied more than a commitment to forming a new economy. It also involved forging a ‘new consciousness.’

Consciencia

Emphasis was given to consciencia, the creation of a fresh mindfulness that would lead to a unique revolutionary ethic.

Cubans announed their intention to use moral — rather than material — incentives to create wealth. The revolutionary leadership repudiated the prolonged use of material incentives in the form of wage differentials, administrative bonuses, and salary scales. Payment for overtime was also eliminated.

In essence, material incentives were proclaimed incompatible with the goals of the revolution, and wages were divorced from productivity and the quality of output. Production achievements were acknowledged in a non monetary way with badges, medallions, scrolls, and awards, frequently distributed by Castro himself. Exemplary workers were recognized and celebrated at rallies, parades, and mass meetings. Of course, the fact that there were comparatively few material goods available to distribute undoubtedly influenced the decision to emphasize moral rewards. Nevertheless, the goal was the making of a new man (hombre nuevo). motivated not by expectation of personal gain but by prospects of collective advancement.

The hombre nuevo was disciplined, highly motivated, and hardworking. Work was an end unto itself, the means by which to purge persisting bourgeois vices and complete the transformation into the hombre nuevo . . . . The development of the hombre nuevo  and the attainment of economic growth were proclaimed to be one and the same process.

The appeal to consciousness, with emphasis on sacrifice and solidarity, was critical to the regime’s effort to raise lagging levels of production.

The first test of the ‘new man’ was associated with the drive to produce the 10 million ton sugar harvest whereby citizens — especially those in Havana — learned to willingly defer their consumption expectations in consideration of the future goals of national development.

Cuba’s new revolutionary government had been able to obtain outside support because of its internal strength. It had demonstrated its capacity for mass mobilization, and it had stood up to US authority and seized North American property.

The Cuban revolution’s domestic opponents were in disarray, and its actions had created strong incentives for Soviet involvement.

Efforts to Consolidate the Cuban Revolution

Cuba’s conversion from capitalism to communism after 1961 brought many changes.

Throughout the 1960s, the intense militarization of  Havana — the island’s capital city — was shaped by forces working to consolidate the revolution, not by forces reflecting the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Much of Havana’s transformation focused on a militarized paradigm of development which, at first, was concentrated on the diversification of agriculture. This strategy, while bearing some similarity to models employed in communist China, was not based on Soviet methodology.

While emphasizing a strong need for planning, Cuba’s focus was on decentralization and provincial self-sufficiency in agricultural production.

Most importantly, to overcome conditions of underdevelopment, during the early 1960s, the central focus was on the reduction of the historic dependence on sugar exports.

Cuban Agriculture and Diversification

Sugar symbolized the source of old repression — slavery in the colony, subservience to foreigners in the republic, and uncertainty in the context of volatile market conditions.

Lessened dependence on sugar was to be achieved in two ways: industrialization and agricultural diversification.

However, efforts to reduce dependency on sugar did not signify a total abandonment of sugar production, but rather an attempt to pursue lower production at stable and predictable levels of output.

At the same time, emphasis was given to non-sugar exports. Cuban planners also hoped to achieve self-sufficiency in food production.

These strategies were expected to reduce Cuba’s susceptibility to the vagaries of the world sugar market, reduce the need for foreign imports (through internal production), improve the Cuban balance of trade, and create new employment opportunities.

The Cuban Revolution: Industrial Objectives

Industrial objectives included the development of new import substitution industries, specifically, metallurgy, chemicals, heavy machinery, and transportation equipment.

Hopes ran high that the discovery of large new reserves of petroleum would assist with the balance of payments and boost industrial expansion.

The investment component of this strategy, Cuba expected would originate from credits from socialist countries and would allow the organization of new industrial and manufacturing units.

Consumption was curtailed to divert instruments into  industrialization and rapid economic growth.

The Cuban Revolution Runs Into Problems

Almost immediately, Cuba ran into problems and, within 4 years, the government’s approach to industrialization and diversification were abandoned.

Failures were apparent everywhere.

Agricultural yield declined, especially in the output of sugar, with production dropping from 6.7 million tons in 1961 to 4.8 million tons in 1962 and then to 3.8 million tons in 1963. Not in 20 years had Cuban sugar harvests been so low. The effects reverberated across all sectors of the economy.

Foreign earnings declined and in some sectors disappeared altogether.

Domestic shortages increased.

Food supplies dwindled, and basic consumer goods of all kinds grew scarce..

By early 1962, shortages spread and became more severe. In March, the government responded to increasing scarcity by imposing a general food rationing that soon came to include consumer goods of all types.

Cuban dependence on foreign imports actually increased, as did Cuban reliance on sugar exports.

As a proportion of total exports, sugar increased from 78% to 86%.  The balance of trade deficit increased from $14 million in 1961 to $238 million in 1962 to $323 million in 1963, almost all of which was incurred with the socialist bloc nations, $297 million with the Soviet Union alone.

Photograph by Lisa Reynolds Wolfe

The Federation of Cuban Women (FMC) led the revolution’s attack on domestic service and on prostitution.

After 1959, domestic service was viewed as degrading and exploitative. Maids began to be described as slaves who were exploited by long hours of work, abusive treatment and low pay. In this context, Castro’s stated objective was to get those maids away from the bourgeoisie and capture them for the revolution.

Schools were set up for domestics and, within just a few years, 30,000 maids were attending these training centers.

Graduates were given the jobs of bank and telephone workers who had gone into exile. Others became day care and health workers, technicians and bureaucrats.

The schools were closed in 1968.

The war on prostitution was an effort to improve women’s lives and, at the same time, gain loyalty for the revolution. In fact:

The revolution portrayed prostitution as a shameful legacy of Cuba’s colonial and neocolonial past. By claiming that North American visitors were the principal exploiters of Cuban women, the revolution avoided any serious analysis of sexuality and power. In truth the principal clientele of Cuba’s sex industry was Cubans themselves. Indeed the euphoria of the revolutionary triumph of 1959 reportedly brought a boom in business for Cuba’s thirty to forty thousand prostitutes.

At first, prostitutes were viewed as victims of the capitalist system and sent to rehabilitation schools concentrating on ideological and vocational training. Pimps were sent to work farms.

Later, those who refused rehabilitation were imprisoned.

In order to reach women at the grassroots, the FMC initiated a series of study groups at the neighborhood level.

By 1964, women were studying the transition from capitalism to socialism. The study groups did not address the issues of feminism though, especially the power relations that were attracting worldwide attention at the time. In fact, the FMC leadership sometimes

denounced feminism for misleading women into blaming men, not capitalism, for their woes.

In short, the dual objectives of the FMC were to eliminate sexual discrimination and win women’s support for the revolution through political education and action as an arm of social vigilance for the Castro regime.

In contrast to feminist groups in other nations of Latin America, the goal was not to empower women or facilitate their entry into positions of leadership. The FMC’s principal task . . . was to defend a revolution whose interests were defined by a male elite.”

If you enjoyed this post you might like a post on Cold War Studies called Defending  the Revolution.

Photograph by Lisa Reynolds Wolfe

Havana’s pre-revolutionary militarization occurred with the installation of Batista as dictator.  It intensified throughout the ensuing struggle of resistance because “the guerilla struggles which overthrew the Batista regime were above all military or paramilitary in nature.”

However, the city’s form and organization did not mirror the forces of Cold War militarism so obvious in other areas of the Third World during this period. This despite the reality that

the power of the United States is an ever present element in Cuba.  The naval base at Guantanamo Bay, and the frequent visits of naval vessels to Cuban ports give concrete evidence of this power.

Even though the US Department of Defense provided sophisticated military equipment and arms to the Batista government, Havana’s relationship with the United States was noted for its dependent economic — rather than its militaristic aspects.

Nevertheless, the American military assistance provided was not inconsequential.

Military equipment and arms transfers were valued at more than $16 million, and organized practical training programs were provided for 500 Cuban officers at service institutions in the Panama Canal Zone or at military bases in the United States.

It has been observed, however, that

the North American model of civil-military relations probably influenced them much less than the technical aspects of their education and their contact with official United States anti-communism.

While “United States military influence served to strengthen the power and morale of precisely those elements in the Cuban army who were the strongest supporters of Batista,” the military did not implement American processes or procedures. In fact:

The Cuban army can be best understood as an essentially mercenary sect, recruited from among unemployed urban and rural workers and led by an officer corps of middle and low social origins which became a privileged caste.

Che Guevara also describes the pre-revolutionary Cuban military:

The army of Batista, with all its enormous defects, was an army structured in such a way that all, from the lowest soldier to the highest general, were accomplices in the exploitation of the people.  They were completely mercenaries, and this gave a certain cohesiveness to the repressive apparatus.

While these views are, perhaps, controversial, they emphasize the wide gap between Batista’s military and the professionalism of the American military.

The US government instituted an embargo on military materials and all forms of combat arms to the Batista regime in March 1958.  Nevertheless, even after the embargo was established, the Defense Department continued to maintain its various armed forces’ missions in Havana.

Pentagon officials continued to maintain ‘liaisons’ through the operations of their army, naval, and air force missions, and shipments of non-combat equipment — communications materials, for example — continued.

The partial nature of the rupture allowed American military officials to contribute important logistical and tactical supports to their peripheral counterparts up until the moment of the nationalist victory.  The Havana Embassy also maintained lines of communication to Batista’s military command.

The arms embargo decision had important repercussions within the US business community in Cuba, forcing American investors located in Havana to reassess their dismissal of the guerilla threat. Subsequently, this segment became the most active capitalist class supporters of political confrontation with the Castro movement.

The business community was important because, with respect to direct investment flows and undistributed earnings during the 10 year period 1950-1959, Cuba had received well over twice as much per capita as the average for other Latin American countries.

By autumn of 1958, Washington was determined to see Batista out of office. However, the real  problem for the US was not getting rid of Batista, but frustrating the Cuban insurrection.

Batista or a military junta could now be maintained only through direct military intervention on the part of the US. The regular army of Cuba was incapable of resisting and, in fact, was reaching out to the rebels.

While the US continued its efforts to ease Batista out of office, government reversals spurred spontaneous uprisings all over Cuba.

Vast quantities of arms and equipment fell under the control of civilians — artillery, tanks, and small weapons of every type.

It is important to note, however, that most of the weapons on record as having been supplied to the Batista regime were not of a type that could be easily used against the population.

Major weapons supplies were limited in contrast with those supplied to other client states during this timeframe, and many related solely to the transport of cargo.

On the other hand, small arms are less easily traced and many observers state that such weapons were smuggled from Miami to the rebels. It is possible that they contributed substantially to Batista’s effort.

At the same time, the US arms suspension and other military setbacks provided some benefit for rebel forces, despite the activities of US military advisers who continued to assist the Cuban Air Force in bombing Castro’s forces in the countryside.

In fact, it was quite clear that Batista’s military was weakening.

By December, no fewer than half a dozen conspiracies were brewing in the armed forces, and the army, especially, was becoming a focal point of political intrigue in the cities.

On New Year’s Eve 1958, Camp Columbia in Havana became a center of the intrigue.

The capital seemed quiet, although the night before the urban underground had destroyed a large munition depot at Cojimar, blowing up some of the army’s last rockets as well as air force bombs received from England shortly before.

On this evening, in what amounted to a betrayal of the military, Batista decided to leave the country.

The “March 10″ Tank Division was ordered to the airport to protect his escape.  Subsequently, the army disintegrated.

Batista’s ‘escape’ surprised the urban underground in Havana. It had been assumed that he would put up a last-minute struggle, and the protestors were unprepared to keep law and order in a victorious situation. Nevertheless, before the end of the first day of 1959, the underground had established control of the capital’s streets, police precincts, and all official buildings.  Patrols had been posted near Navy headquarters in Old Havana; snipers had been placed in the tallest buildings around the university and arms were gathered at various underground headquarters.

Batista mounted a 1958 summer offensive which eventually ended in failure. Perceiving that the president was unable to control the situation, many members of the upper class withdrew their support from the government and tried to establish contact with the insurrectionists.  Substantial donations of money also appeared.

The attitude of ordinary workers began to change and they became more willing to cooperate with the various underground cells in the working centers. For example, in early 1958 there was only one militant in the DR (Directorio Revolucionario) underground in the Goodyear Tire Company located on the outskirts of Havana.  By mid-October the factory was a main source of tires, spare parts, and other services for the opposition movement.

The urban underground also succeeded in organizing cells in various associations such as the Association of Press Reporters and several landlord’s associations.

Cells were formed in Havana’s hotels to check on visitors from foreign countries and to maintain vigilance over people invited to visit Cuba by the government. The Copacabana Hotel, the Chateau-Miramar, Colina, Lido, Rosito de Hornedo, Capri, and Havana Riviera were mostly under the control of the DR and the opposition as were the Havana Hilton, St. John’s, Flamingo and Emperador Hotels.

There were also DR cells among the workers in the Bay of Havana.

Political conditions played havoc with the economy and made renewed economic growth impossible.

Tourism declined.

Dairy, vegetable, and meat products no longer flowed from the countryside to the city.  Prices of basic staples soared and many products disappeared altogether.

Sabotage and the destruction of property led to a drop in sugar production.

Shortages of gasoline and oil brought railroads, trucking, and sugar mills to a standstill.

Telephone and telegraph service across the island was paralyzed.

Bridges were out of service, and transportation between Havana and the three eastern provinces was all but destroyed.

Manufacturers’ inventories began to pile up at plants.

The city was approaching a full-blown revolutionary situation.

During November 1958, 12 new cells were added to the underground in Marianao. Most of the newcomers were easy victims of the police because of their inexperience. Still, there were approximately 32 guerrilla operations during November, mainly shootings at police precincts in Havana.

Public utilities were constantly attacked; there were seven such attacks on the night of November 25.

During the first 15 days of December 1958, 45 guerillas were shot to death in Marianao and about the same number in Guanabacoa.

From November 1 to December 31, 1958, about 300 bombs exploded in the Havana metropolitan area.

Bombs exploded every night, and on the evening of December 7 over 100 bombs exploded in the capital.

Havana was clearly in crisis.

Havana is deceptively calm in the 1950s video above.  Urban opposition to Batista was growing. I mentioned this in an  earlier post.  Soon everyday life in the city would be disrupted on an everyday basis.  The idea of a general strike preceded by direct action from the masses was a central tenet of the urban underground.

The main objective of what was to be a countrywide action was to create the kind of general confusion and chaos which would result in public violence.

While work stoppages and street fighting were going on throughout the cities of Cuba, Castro and his guerillas would move into the valleys, engage the regular troops, and occupy populated areas in the countryside.  Once this was accomplished, a general uprising would be assured.

In order to assure maximum success, Havana was to be divided into various operational zones: Centro Havana; Regla; Guanabacoa; Vedado; and Miramar.

Miramar  was to serve as the general headquarters for the insurgents.

Other bases were set up in Vedado, the middle-class neighborhood close to the center of Havana’s business section where many US backed hotels were located.  In addition, the underground had use of 40 to 50 houses for communications, arms depots, and hideaways.

Religious institutions and leaders also had critical input in the strike preparations as they made plans to care for and hide militants as necessary.  In fact, the pastor of Havana’s First Presbyterian Church was already active in the urban underground resistance. At the Dispensario Clinico of his church, bombs were manufactured, manifestos written, and enormous quantities of medicine were made available to urban cells and later to guerillas.

Two acts of sabotage were to take place: the first was to blow up the electric company in Havana.  Second, since there were no arms on hand, the Youth Brigade was to attack an armory in Old Havana where weapons were stocked in unknown amounts.  Some of these acquisitions would be given to the cadres, and the rest would be distributed at prearranged points throughout the capital.

The strike began on April 9. However, nothing went as planned.

Government forces were waiting and the urban underground was largely dismantled.

In the aftermath of the event, the few remaining urban cadres agreed to launch an all-out united offensive against the regime.  The objective was to demoralize the authorities through psychological warfare.

“Operation Rescue” was the first action.  It called for “rescuing” as many arms as possible from the hands of the authorities.

Policemen were ambushed in lonely alleys, disarmed, undressed and then turned loose.

When the police began to patrol the streets in groups of two or three, “Operation Pep-Rallies” was initiated. Underground agitators would attack the government in public places for a few minutes.  Their retreat was then covered by other underground fighters who would divert the attention of the authorities by throwing Molotov cocktails or a handful of revolutionary leaflets.

The government countered these campaigns by increasing its secret police forces.  Eventually the streets of the city were filled with blind beggars who were not blind, street vendors with no merchandise and a whole array of clumsy government spies.

When it was no longer possible to conduct these campaigns, the urban fighters reached people by radio.  Radio stations were taken over, brief manifestos read to the nation, and news about the progress of the insurrection circulated before the police had a chance to arrive.

Cuban urban guerillas followed the maxims applied in Palestine during the 1940s and Algeria during the 1950s which purported that in cities guerillas must attack daily to create a climate in which government forces are kept off balance. Lacking expertise in urban counterinsurgency, the regime’s techniques were mostly crude demonstrations of terror.

In addition to the arms transfers and training assistance that we alluded to in our post on US Military Involvement in Cold War Cuba, Washington maintained military, naval, and air force missions.

A military assistance and advisory group (MAAG) was stationed on the island for the professed purpose of equipping and training Cuba’s defense forces to meet their ‘hemispheric defense’ responsibilities.

Also, the Central Intelligence Agency sought to develop a network of reliable assets within the Cuban state and society. They considered Cuba a “safe precinct.”

The bulk of US military assistance grants to the Batista regime were authorized between 1954 and 1958, coinciding with the expansion and intensification of the nationalist (revolutionary) struggle. While executive branch officials continually rationalized the provision of this type of aid on the grounds of regional defense commitment, as early as December 1957, a Senate Foreign Relations Committee report had reached a far different conclusion as regards its primary use:

We have a military mission in Cuba and the Batista government from time to time requests that we sell Cuba arms to supply the Government forces. These arms are, of course, used by the interlocking Army and police to maintain the Government’s power.

By March 1958, it was conceded that ‘the Cuban Government is certainly using the military equipment which it has at its disposal to beat back armed insurrection…’

In practice, therefore, the provision of American military assistance served two essentially overlapping purposes: it bolstered anti-communist ‘hemispheric defense’ requirements at the same time that it provided crucial support for the Batista government in its efforts to maintain itself in power.

It is important to note, that most of the weapons on record as having been supplied to the Batista regime were not of a type that could be easily used against the population.  Major weapons supplies were limited in contrast with those supplied to other client states during this time frame, and many related solely to the transport of cargo.

On the other hand, since small arms are less easily traced and many observers state that such weapons were smuggled from Miami to the rebels, they may have made a substantial contribution to Batista’s effort.

It was the arms embargo debate inside the administration during early 1958 that led to a major reassessment of the most crucial issues bearing on US support of the military dictatorship.

In the debate leading up to the decision to place an arms embargo on Cuba, the central bureaucratic antagonists were located in the Departments of State and Defense.  The Defense Department argued against the application of an arms embargo on both ideological and strategic grounds:

The [Cuban] Government has traditionally supported the United States…in the United Nations against the onslaughts of responsibilities which we have, and which Cuba shares with us, of course, under the Rio Treaty.

State Department officials viewed the continuation of the arms program, in association with Batista’s refusal to accede to US government requests to reduce the level of political repression and state corruption, as the forerunner of a widened conflict. These concerns were not new.

For quite some time, American policymakers had expressed concern over the scope and persistence of corruption within the peripheral state apparatus noting:

Every government activity was milked–the lottery, the school lunch program, drivers’ licenses, parking meters, teachers’ certificates.  The police routinely extorted millions in protection money from Havana merchants.

Officials of the US Department of the Treasury were especially critical of the regime’s fiscal and monetary policies, its inability to control inflation due to administrative disorganization, the lack of an effective tax system, and the failure of Batista sufficiently to assert his dictatorial powers in ‘resisting more firmly most of the demands of labor for continuous wage and other benefits.’

In practice, however, the differences were enveloped and marginalized within the larger political-economic framework that accommodated US interests in Cuba.  Even the inter agency conflict surrounding the arms embargo was anchored within a unified commitment to maintain a secure environment for capital accumulation in Cuba.

The US government instituted an embargo on military materials and all forms of combat arms to the Batista regime in March 1958.  Nevertheless, even after the embargo was established, the Defense Department continued to maintain its various armed forces’ missions in Havana.

Pentagon officials continued to maintain ‘liaisons’ through the operations of their army, naval, and air force missions, and shipments of non-combat equipment–communications materials, for example–continued.

The partial nature of the rupture allowed American military officials to contribute important logistical and tactical supports to their peripheral counterparts up until the moment of the nationalist victory.  The Havana Embassy also maintained lines of communication to Batista’s military command.

The arms embargo decision had important repercussions within the US business community in Cuba, forcing American investors located in Havana to reassess their dismissal of the guerilla threat. Subsequently, this segment became the most active capitalist class supporters of political confrontation with the Castro movement.

The business community was important because, with respect to direct investment flows and undistributed earnings during the 10 year period 1950-1959, Cuba had received well over twice as much per capita as the average for other Latin American countries.

Direct investment flow is loosely defined to include the flow of equity and loan investments from US residents to foreign firms controlled by US interests.

The book value of direct investment enterprises includes the US ownership of equity capital, loan capital, branch accounts, and inter company accounts in foreign firms controlled by US interests.

By 1957 American direct investment totaled $850 million, and portfolio investments amounted to $210.9 million.  These were the only foreign investments of any importance in Havana.  British holdings were practically eliminated after 1945, and Canadian investments were placed at only $9.4 million.

While Havana was the site of extensive capitalist investment from the United States, the city’s population was growing increasingly displeased with Batista, the so-called “American man in Havana.”

The growing defections of the bourgeois (and petty bourgeois) elements from the class alliance that supported Batista…and the appearance of a large-scale nationalist movement with a substantial urban working-class component under the leadership of rural insurgents raised new serious problems for Washington.

By early 1958, the increasing social polarization and expanding nationalist opposition to Batista forced executive branch officials to question the continued viability of the military government and its capacity to safeguard US politco-economic interests over the long term.

When Batista’s major military offensive against the guerillas collapsed in June and July of 1958, Washington interpreted the growing fragmentation and disintegration of the Cuban armed forces as a primary threat to the collective interests of the capitalist class in Cuba. However, finally there was a decision to support the Batista government to the extent of complying with our commitments and contractual agreements.

The US would not give moral support to the revolutionary opposition.