During the 1970s, Cuba expanded its involvement overseas, initially volunteering, but soon selling its military and civilian services to other nations of the Third World.

Some argue that Cuba was merely a puppet with the Soviet Union pulling the strings. However, many believe that Cuba had its own reasons for international opportunism. In fact, as can be deduced from discussions on housing and consumer goods, it is certainly plausible for Cuba to have adopted its 1970s outreach policy largely because of domestic economic considerations.

As a consequence of Soviet trade bloc deficiencies, the Cubans continued to approach capitalist countries for needed items, and this activity, in turn, resulted in a cumulative deficit with Western industrial countries totaling $2.6 billion for the years 1975-1978. At the same time, the regime began providing both military and civilian assistance worldwide. These commitments expanded over time and Cuba was eventually paid on a contract by contract basis.

By 1977, Cuba had about 5,400 workers in Africa. By 1978, there were close to 39,000 military advisors and troops in Africa, and by 1980 the government was involved in civilian assistance programs in thirty-seven countries. These outreach efforts served as a pressure valve for the urban labor market and provided a variety of material perks for participants. Benefits included a 20 percent raise in salary, special pension benefits, priority access to housing and other scarce consumer goods, prestige, and access to party membership.

Construction was the principal component of the civilian aid program and, by the late 1970s, about three percent of Cuba’s construction workers were involved in overseas projects. They built hospitals, highways, hotels, poultry complexes, milking barns, airports, and schools in a variety of locations such as Peru, North Vietnam, Laos, Guinea, and Tanzania.

The number of construction workers overseas rose from 4,500 in 1978 to 7,900 a year later, and it was estimated that 25,000 would be assigned overseas jobs in the “near future.” Meanwhile, medical and education projects were also common.

In 1979, at least 2,300 Cuban teachers were abroad (about two percent of Cuba’s total), while 9,000 students, mostly African, studied in Cuba.

The medical program involved 700 personnel in 1977, almost 1,200 in 1979, and about 2,000 in 1980. The 1980 program “employed somewhere between seven and thirteen percent of Cuba’s stock of doctors” along with dentists, nurses, and technicians.

Many other specialists also ended up overseas, including experts in such diverse activities as agriculture, sugar cultivation and refining, fishing, transportation, cattle raising, irrigation, industry, economic and physical planning, and management.

Certainly this was a loss for Havana and other places of origin within Cuba. At the the same time, there were clearly economic gains for the workers, as we have seen, as well as benefits and advantages for the society as a whole.

The overseas assistance programs provided a reasonable amount of hard currency, about $50 million in 1977. Two years later only two contracts (those with Libya and Angola) generated 18 percent of the value of Cuba’s hard currency trade. The country also benefited by establishing relationships with potential suppliers for key import needs and by opening up investment opportunities. For example, Cuba was granted permission to operate within Angola’s fishing zones and also received permission to operate fishing vessels off the West African coast, a boon for one of Cuba’s key economic sectors.

Despite their benefits, the aid programs had several negative consequences at home. Since seventy percent of those fighting in Angola were reservists, Havana lost civilian personnel. Many employers became increasingly reluctant to release workers for active duty because overseas programs deleted the domestic labor force of skilled personnel at a time when unskilled laborers were flooding the streets of Havana. Those available for work in the capital lacked the skills required by many of the vacancies. At the same time, the unemployed received 70 percent of their prospective wages while waiting for a job to materialize.

Aid programs were highly dependent on construction workers and, as can be deduced from the state of Havana’s housing, this was the employment sector that the city could least afford to lose.

Construction contracts were highly competitive and the best workers and craftsmen were sent abroad in an effort to avoid losing the projects. Not surprisingly, the number of housing units declined as the number of construction workers sent overseas expanded.

Scarce building supplies were diverted to the export economy. For example, cement, an item always in short supply, was exported in 1975 for foreign exchange. Similarly, opportunity costs could be cited for the loss of teachers and medical personnel.

Despite some drawbacks for society as a whole, workers were quite eager to volunteer for overseas assignments. “When Castro called for volunteers to serve in Nicaragua . . . 29,500 teachers offered to go.” Their willingness can be interpreted in several ways. First, the effort might be seen as a way to serve the revolution. On the other hand, given the scarcity and cost of consumer goods, volunteering might be seen as an opportunity to gain economically.

Whatever the reason, as a variety of overseas opportunities developed, many habaneros, along with other Cubans, made themselves available for the type of overseas work more usually associated with capitalist workers.

 

 

Havana: A Cold War City?

In today’s environment, the fact that Havana was once a Cold War city is important only in terms of the Cold War’s legacy which is quite clear. In the Cuban case, large infusions of Soviet military and economic assistance, weapons, and technology ensured the continuance of the Cuban Revolution of 1959. And, in reality, it was the Revolution and its associated policies which had the most transformative influence on Cuba’s urban environment.

Absent rapprochement with the United States, and without the sustaining resources of the Soviet Union, the goals and objectives of the revolutionary government would clearly have been compromised. Today, it is increasingly unclear as to whether Cuba will be able to hold on to the gains of the Revolution which are its Cold War heritage.

Current Trends

Many trends indicate that Havana is beginning to reflect its pre-revolutionary identity. Two of these trends — the growth in tourism and the impact of internal migration on the city’s neighborhoods, social fabric, and economy —  are particularly important.

Havana continues to face challenges as severe as those of 1959 without the prospect of a strong and willing sponsor, and it is questionable whether there is sufficient domestic will, given a choice, to put up with the continuing hardships necessary to sustain the achievements of the Revolution. Still, the Castros have incorporated  many ‘relief valves’ into everyday life, so there is at least the possibility of success.

External Actors

An important question centers on the policies of external actors like the United States. Will Cuba be able to make its way as a socialist remnant in today’s world capitalist system?  Under the Trump administration, this possibility seems increasingly doubtful.

Cuba reasons that their case is not comparable to that of Eastern Europe. They argue that their grandfathers were capitalists and that they are familiar with — and ready to play by — the rules of the game. They go on to express their understanding that the global environment has changed since 1960 and to assert their recognition that they must now compete within the dominant, capitalist framework. Moreover, they believe that they can function and succeed in a capitalist world if they are granted free entry to markets.

The influence of American domestic politics on United States policy toward Cuba, however, hinders that possibility..

In actuality, despite American statements regarding the importance of economic liberalism, the one remaining superpower is reluctant to allow Cuba equal access to capitalist markets unless and until the country holds free and fair elections resulting in a democratically elected government. Under Raul Castro’s successor, that happening remains unlikely.

Cuban Exceptionalism

The United States does not recognize the exceptionalism with which some Cubans regard their concept of ‘democracy’. And it is not at all clear that Cuba will move toward a multiparty system in the immediate future even with the Raul Castro in a more diminished role.

In fact, American preparations for a democratic Cuba are reminiscent in some ways of US ignorance regarding the possible absence of Cuban ‘on the ground’ support, a factor contributing to the Bay of Pigs fiasco.

While there is certainly a great deal of opposition to the current regime in Cuba, there remains substantial support for the revolutionary objectives which many equate not with Soviet socialism, but with Cuban nationalism.

Recently announced changes in US policy may or may not facilitate change in Cuba, especially in light of the Trump administration’s walk back of Obama era overtures.

A Mixed Economy

The US seems content to reason that a mixed economy may in time liberalize the politics of a country like China while it will not do the same in Cuba.

In the postwar New World Order, therefore, Cuba’s choices continue to be Cold War choices. It seems impossible for Havana to effect a compromise between the Marxist and capitalist theories of economic progress which divided the global landscape over the last half of the twentieth century. Still, In the end, it is probable that capitalism will win out, even if not in the immediate future.

The conflict between capitalism and socialism which is shaping Havana’s future identity  is increasingly reflected in the struggle to preserve the country’s historical heritage.

In present day Havana, the successes of the Revolution are no longer drawing people away from the city toward the possibility of a better life in the countryside financed, in part , by the Soviet Union. Instead, the Cuban legacy from the Cold War — the absence of Soviet patronage and the American embargo — are luring people back from rural areas, small towns, and secondary cities to the capital where migrants hope that they can hold on to some of the redistribution gains of the last half century which they now perceive as their entitlement.

Many wish to benefit from the increasing capitalist presence within Cuba, even though there is also a desire to continue to reap the revolutionary rewards that were largely financed by the Soviet Union.

What About the Cold War?

Importantly,  any continuing revolutionary benefits may be much divorced from the Cold War reality or legacy. It is unlikely that these advances will be financed  by  foreign exchange and joint partnerships which reflect the forces of US investment. In fact, regardingCuba’s neighbor to the north, global investment in Havana is now so widespread that given Trump’s polices, some argue that “U.S. firms should not expect that not much of the economic pie will be left for them five years from now — or even two.”

It is probable that neither of the Cold War superpowers will dominate Havana’s landscape. Instead, the expectation of many habaneros is that the Revolution, Cold War patronage, and Cold War enmity may have been unintentional facilitators for a nationalist, yet capitalist, Cuba. We will just have to wait and see.

As previously stated [see Cold War Cuba: Demographic Change (Part 1)], the policy of full-employment had been maintained at the cost of labor productivity leading to the new emphasis on material incentives (brigade housing units, for example) at the expense of conciencia. Conciencia, as you’ll recall, was the creation of a fresh mindfulness that would lead to a unique revolutionary ethic.

Cuban wages and salaries were quite low with respect to available consumer goods.

Shortages and High Prices

Shortages and high prices were common for “nonessential” goods such as refrigerators and television sets, and many items were only available in an officially established “parallel” market” where products were sold at much higher prices than rationed goods. (Many things were also available on the “black market” at prices which very few average Cubans could afford.)

In 1977-78, for instance, a 17 inch black and white television set cost between 600 and 900 pesos on the parallel market, while a medium-priced refrigerator could be had for between 650 and 800 pesos. By contrast, the average monthly wage in 1978 was 140 pesos This means that the cheapest refrigerator or television set cost about five months salary.

It is important to note that shortages and high prices were not restricted to luxury items. As Diaz-Briquets and Perez show, in pre-revolutionary Cuba, per capita yearly rice consumption was about 50 kilograms. After the revolution, each person was allocated approximately 27 kilograms of rice per year, five of which were provided by ration. Thus, consumers were required to supplement their rations by purchasing rice on the black market for about two pesos per pound.

Mesa-Lago says that on the black market “an entire monthly wage could be spent on one pound of coffee, a pair of shoes, a meter of fabric, and a couple of pounds of beef.”

Post-Revolutionary Gains in Equity

Clearly, in the years of declining fertility, the Cuban economy was unable to satisfy even the most basic of material needs. Nevertheless, it is important to observe that for many Cubans who had been underprivileged before the Revolution, post-revolutionary gains in equity had made an enormous and positive difference in their lives.

As regards the debate on the importance of “modernization,” a lowering of infant mortality rates as well as many other improvements can be clearly linked to Cuba’s advances in healthcare.

Fertility Decline

The debate centering on poor economics versus better healthcare is certainly relevant to the countrywide debate on declining fertility. However, there is another, much simpler explanation for Havana’s fertility decline. Simply put, Havana has had a continuing shortage of men. The. 1981 census reports that Havana is the only region in the country with fewer men than women for each 1,000 inhabitants. In 1990, there were about 10 percent more women than men residing in the city.

Over time, those leaving Havana have increasingly been male, while in-migrants have increasingly been females who are searching for work, particularly in the service industry. Moreover, at times when Old Havana its at its most vibrant, women relocate to the city to sell handicrafts.

A 1997 study found that 55.6 percent of those migrants who arrived in the capital prior to 1995 were women.

Migration

One of Cuba’s principal demographers has stated that women make the migration decisions in Cuba, not men. Thus, even when a male relocates, a woman has been the “behind the scenes” decision maker.

Cuba’s female driven rural-urban migration is quite unique by developing world standards where, most usually, men make the decision to migrate and relocate without their families.

Rural-urban migration, as well as legal and illegal emigration, in conjunction with fertility decline, have assured both the aging and the feminization of Havana’s population. Havana’s growing concern (like the United States) is with the increasing cost of social security and medical care.

Aging

The aging of the capital is evident in statistics garnered from the Cuban census which show that the youngest cohort, the group between 0 and 14 years, has declined from 36.9 percent of the total population in 1970 to 30.3 percent in 1981. From this perspective, Havana’s future vibrancy seems threatened and the city’s current prospects become quite different from the rosy picture painted by urbanists obsessed with such issues as overurbanization and rank-size.

Urban Problems

Havana’s slow growth has not eliminated problems generally associated with urban excess: environmental degradation, substandard housing, and insufficient demand for labor. In the 1970s and 1980s these problems became increasingly severe despite the slow expansion in natural increase, low rates of rural-urban migration, and export of labor flows.

Purposeful government policies adopted to cope with problems in the economy have exacerbated the fertility decline, the aging of the population, and the predominance of unskilled workers in the labor market.

While longterm prospects may portend a smaller population (and more jobs and housing) due to the natural mortality rate, the picture is still of a city struggling to survive, overwhelmed by the inherited problems mentioned above.

Photograph by Lisa Reynolds Wolfe

Cuba’s declining birthrate after 1978 is often portrayed as a gain related to an increasing level of modernization. However, some argue that despite the emphasis on health, educational reform, and changes in women’s roles and status, the ‘modernization’ explanation of Cuban fertility decline is, at best, incomplete. Indeed, Diaz-Briquets and Perez argue that:

The key to Cuba’s very low fertility, in our opinion, lies in the sharply differing prospects of Cuban couples regarding the fulfillment of their material and status expectations during the early 1960s, and in the years since that time. The former period was one of optimism. The latter, reflecting the revolution’s growing inability to meet material expectations, was a period of pessimism. Only in the light of this radical change in outlook can the rapid fertility decline be understood. Had the generation entering reproductive ages in the 1970s been able to fulfill their aspirations, it is unlikely fertility would have declined as fast and to as low a level as it indeed has.

Many of the socioeconomic and political factors impelling emigration also spurred declining fertility. Several are particularly pertinent. These include the housing shortage, low wages, and a poor sense of economic well-being. By 1978, the marriage rate was down and the divorce rate was up. The unavailability of housing was certainly a factor.

A 1973 study cited a sample of Havana’s residents as stating that “the unavailability of housing and the need to share accommodations with relatives” were reasons for the increase in the divorce rate. By 1979, nearly 50 percent of Havana’s households consisted of extended families. Often young couples were required to live with parents for an extended period. As one author argues:

A vicious cycle ensued. The doubling-up of families, and the inevitable overcrowding and loss of privacy, contributed to declining births and rising divorces. Divorce, in turn, broke up households, thereby creating new demands for housing. Not infrequently, divorced people were obliged to continue living with former spouses.

A second study, conducted in 1978 and 1979, polled a group of young men working in the sugar harvest. Eighty-seven percent of the married men in this sample stated that they did not want more children because of housing problems; 80 percent said that they did not want more children because their income was insufficient; and 73 percent said that they did not earn enough to satisfy their families needs. Finally, 96 percent of a sample of emigrants arriving in the United Sates in 1973-1974 stated that “one of the reasons they left Cuba was that they saw a ‘lack of future’ in terms of social and economic aspirations for self and children. Mesa-Lago relates these problems to the implementation of the Soviet model which represented a break with the policy of redistribution.

Under the Soviet-style system, wage subsidies and programs of labor mobilization were curtailed and more sharply differentiated wage-scakes were introduced. Fees were imposed on services which had been provided free of charge — utilities, for example — and the new policies resulted in higher prices for consumer goods, tighter domestic budgets, and some unemployment. In fact, “the income redistribution measures that had played a role in increasing fertility in the 1960s had, by the 1070s, not only run their course, but were deliberately curtailed.

Photographs by Lisa Reynolds Wolfe

________________________________________

Sources:

Sergio Diaz-Briquests and Lisando Perez, “Fertility Decline in Cuba: A Socioeconomic Interpretation,” Population and Development Review, Volume 8, Issue 3 (Sept. 1982): 525; 531.

 

One hundred twenty-five thousand Cubans left the island on a flotilla of privately chartered vessels from May to September 1980. Emigration, which had been quite low since the early 1970s, was spurred by both socioeconomic and political discontent. Certainly the housing crisis was a major contributor since, by 1980, the housing deficit nationwide stood at approximately 1.5 million units.

The housing crisis was most severe in Havana where:

In 1978, the administrator of the city of Havana estimated that 250,000 dwelling units (50 percent of the total) were in need of repair and that, of these, 30,000 were propped up by beams and 40,000 were declared uninhabitable.

Thus in an effort, once again, to export discontent, Castro announced on April 20, 1980, that Cubans wishing to emigrate to the United States were free to leave from the port of Mariel on the outskirts of Havana. As a result, the capital lost more than five percent of its population.

The large outflow of Mariel migrants had some positive affect on the city. It relieved pressure on the labor market since many of the emigrants were quite young with 41 percent under twenty-five years of age. It also disposed of some social undesirables.

Researchers at the Center for the Study of the Americas in Havana reported that 45.25 percent of all persons that abandoned Cuba through the port of Mariel had delinquent backgrounds as follows:

• Crimes against property (theft, etc.)
• Dangerous condition*
• Fraud and falsification
• Crimes against the public administration
• Possession and sale of drugs
• Forbidden games
• Crimes against physical integrity
• Crimes against the normal development of sexual relations
• Crimes against the security of the state
• Violations of the public order
• Others.

*According to the Penal Code of Cuba at the time (Law21, Title 11), dangerous condition is the special likelihood that a person will commit crimes in the future, demonstrated by the conduct he or she observes.

Later survey data confirm that the Mariels had less education, were younger, and were more predominantly male than other Cuban emigrants. It has also been suggested that the Mariels had lower labor force attachment and lower occupational attachment than other Cubans.

Havana’s large out-migration over time was considered by some to be a factor in the city’s favor. Most usually, however, the city lost the best and the brightest. As Segre, Coyula, and Scarpaci note:

The annual net gain from migration to the capital is about 11,000 persons, a figure that is almost laughably small considering the situation in other capitals of large cities [sic] in Latin America. Nonetheless, that figure masks the fact that annually 20,000 people leave Havana, many of them young skilled workers, while about 30,000 migrate to Havana, most of them unskilled.

Moreover, inmigration to the capital, along with natural increase, were not sufficient to compensate for population loss. Over the period from 1970-1980, Havana’s growth trends were the reverse of other cities in Latin America and, indeed, in the Third World as a whole.

While urbanists concerned only with issues of urban balance may look at Havana’s low population growth quite favorably, the declining rate of natural increase was a matter of some concern. Since 1978, fertility in Cuba has been below the level necessary to assure long-term replacement of the population. The estimated fertility rate for 1979 was, in fact, the lowest recorded for any developing country and was “comparable to or lower than that characterizing fertility in most developing nations.” Moreover:

. . .  contrary to the situation in China, Costa Rica, Taiwan, Singapore, and other countries undergoing rapid and significant fertility decline, the fertility decline in Cuba took place in the absence of explicit policies to produce that effect.

_____________________________________

Sources:

H. David Card, “The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review v43 n2 (January 1990): 245-258.

Marifeli Perez-Stable. The Cuban Revolution, Origins, Course, and Legacy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, 150.

Sergio Diaz-Briquets and Lisandro Perez, “Fertility Decline in Cuba: A Socioeconomic Interpretation,” Population and Development Review, Volume 8, Issue 3 (Sept. 1982).

CEDEM1996 (National Office of Statistics). Annual Demographics of the respective years.

Alejandro Portes and Alex Stepick, City on the Edge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 21.

Roberto Segre, Mario Coyula, and Joseph L. Scarpaci. Havana: Two Faces of the Antillean Metropolis (Chichester, England: John Wiley & Sones, 1997), 169.

Grupo para Desarrollo Integral de la Capital Estrategia (Havana: Grupo para Desarrollo Integral de la Capital, June 1990), 18.

Photo courtesy Florida Keys Public Library. Boat Endeavor brings in Cuban refugees during the Mariel Boatlift in 1980. Photo by Raymond L. Blazevic.

 

2017

Given President Trump’s partial rollback of engagement with Cuba, it seems worthwhile to look back on the schism between the island and its superpower neighbor. But, first, here are a few highlights of the new policy:

• Americans may still travel to Cuba in coming months, but only in groups with travel providers. Individual people-to-people travel will be prohibited.
• Transactions with entities controlled by Cuba’s military will be limited. This restriction encompasses most of the island’s tourism industry, placing limits on US companies seeking to do business in Cuba and restricting where US visitors can eat and stay.
• Embassies and diplomatic channels on a range of key issues are to remain open, but it is likely that the tone of the relationship will change.
• Regulations allowing unlimited remittances to Cuba will stay in play, and there will be no limits on Cuban American travel to visit family on the island.
• It’s probable that US businesses with existing operations in Cuba will still be able to operate on the island. This group includes commercial airlines, cruise lines, cell phone companies, Google, and Marriott’s Starwood Hotels.

Many organizations and businesses from a wide array of sectors have spoken out about the importance of engagement with Cuba. Here are just a few: the US Chamber of Commerce; Marriott; the US Grains Council; the American Association for the Advancement of Science; the American Security Project; Associated Equipment Distributors; TechFreedom; and a coalition of conservative “free market” groups, including Grover Norquist’s Americans for Tax Reform.

Lasrly, according to an editorial in the NY Times, restricting the rights of United States citizens to travel and invest in Cuba will cost the American economy $6.6 billion and affect 12,295 American jobs.  Now for the history.

1959

In 1959 the United States was shaken when Fidel Castro’s revolution in nearby Cuba brought the Cold War to its own hemisphere. The US was directly affected economically since at this time Americans owned 50% of Cuba’s public railway system, over 90% of the telephone and power industries, the majority of key manufacturing plants, the largest chain of supermarkets, several large retail stores, and most major tourist facilities. About 25% of all Cuban bank deposits were held by branches of American banks.

Castro’s intent was to overthrow the oppressive dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista whose corrupt and inefficient regime had long been propped up through the support of the United States government.

Castro was joined in his endeavor by diverse elements — from Communists to dignitaries of the Catholic Church.  These divergent social and political forces, along with some members of the business community combined to unseat Batista, thought by many to be a repressive dictator.

Even though the US had also been disillusioned with Batista’s leadership, the superpower had provided $10 million in military assistance to the Cuban government in the eight years prior to the revolution. Arms shipments were finally suspended in March 1958.

Despite America’s formal position of neutrality, in actuality, the arms suspension was of great benefit to Castro’s rebels. On the other hand, the US refused to recall the military advisers who were assisting the Cuban Air Force, engaged at the time in the bombing of Cuban dissidents.

American policy managed to alienate both sides, weakening Batista’s forces at the same time that it incited Castro’s anger.

While it is impossible to know for sure what caused the lasting enmity between Castro and the American government, Cuba’s nationalization of US petroleum properties and Eisenhower’s economic sanctions — including the elimination of Cuba from the US sugar quota — led Castro to turn to the Soviet Union for assistance.

Although the Soviet response was initially hesitant and carefully measured, the USSR soon acquiesced. One must assume that they were seduced by the opportunity to obtain a foothold only 90 miles from the Florida shores as well as by a desire to alter the strategic balance of power between the two superpowers.

Cuba, in fact, was geographically  invaluable.

Moscow was soon able to establish an intelligence center for the  monitoring of US missile range activities in Florida and Texas, and Cuba was also used as a tracking station for Soviet space shots.

1960

By July 1960 the relationship was well established.

Equipment from the Soviet Union soon poured into the island nation, totaling $50 million by the end of 1960. Deliveries included MIG jet fighters, helicopters, tanks, rocket launchers, and various assault and heavy machine guns. Soviet and Czech advisers also arrived.

Castro declared himself a Marxist-Leninist in December 1961. The Soviets saw this announcement as an example of metamorphosis from a national bourgeois leader to a revolutionary democrat. Castro’s rationale may have been more pragmatic. Like Mao, he was aware that he needed to have strong superpower support to consolidate his revolution.

Meanwhile, the United States passed through the predictable phases of disenchantment with Castro, warnings about him, and — finally — scheming against him. America’s diplomatic relations with Cuba were severed in January 1961.

Many Cubans also reacted negatively. From 1959 – 1962, a steady stream of officials from the deposed Batista regime, along with other professionals and technicians opposed to the revolution, left the island.

Many of these individuals subsequently comprised the core group of 1,400 invaders who were involved in a rebellion against Castro, modeled on successful strategies of  covert action employed by the US government in Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954.

Masquerading as Cuban Air Force defectors, the group of exiles was organized and trained by the Central Intelligence Agency, and used American B-26 bombers to carry out their surprise air strike.

1961

Planned during the final months of the Eisenhower administration, the operation was carried out by President Kennedy in April 1961 with invasion forces landing in the area of Cuba known as the Bay of Pigs (Castro’s favorite fishing spot).

The CIA expected civilian uprisings, but underestimated how much Castro’s revolution had done to help the local population. As a result, the incursion failed to incite the expected response. Instead, within three days, Castro’s army and militia had killed, captured, or thrown off the entire landing force.

Reaction to the invasion was marked by a wave of anti-American demonstrations across Latin America, and the stoning of US Embassies in Tokyo, New Delhi, and Cairo. Moreover, the defeat came at the same time as a Soviet success, the first manned orbital spaceflight around the earth.

Although the United States found itself in a weakened public position, President Kennedy was bolstered by the emerging knowledge that the purported missile gap between the two superpowers was nonexistent.

Shortly after this information became public, the Soviets began sending missiles and personnel into Cuba.

Photograph by Lisa Reynolds Wolfe

 

Just as the organization of work within the armed forces was restructured so that military units might function more efficiently, the organization of work in various sectors directly affecting the provision  of urban services for the residents of Havana required change. The housing sector, in particular, cried out for attention.

A New Framework

As a precursor to the implementation of formal institutional change, a new framework focusing on a revitalization of popular participation was developed in an attempt to solve the housing problems of the capital.

Havana, you may recall, had been marginalized by the revolutionary housing  policies of the 1960s which had concentrated on the building of new towns outside of the urban area and the ruralization of the city itself. As a consequence, there had been very little new housing construction in the capital and housing demand had largely depended on vacancies left by emigrating Cubans.

Pent-Up Demand for Housing

By 1970, there was substantial pent-up demand for housing as well as for other urban services. In fact, the cash income of habaneros in 1970 was twice the supply of goods and services available, a problem that, of course, affected housing policy.

In addition, the Revolutionary Offensive of 1968 which eliminated most of the capital’s remaining small business had resulted in the

unintended outcome of deteriorating the quality of the city’s major centers. This occurred when local commercial establishments were readapted as housing units, almost always of an improvised nature and of very low quality. With this came problems of building maintenance in the central areas as well as a dearth of a variety in products and services. (Segre, Coyula, and Scarpaci, Havana: Two Faces of the Antillean Metropolis, p.151.)

Havana’s dire housing situation was exacerbated, according to one expert, by the same problems that stimulated institutional change:

The biggest obstacle to expanding housing production was what appeared to be an acute labor shortage — a shortage that, in fact, was due more to the sharp drop in productivity and increased worker absenteeism in the 1960s. (Jill Hamburg, “The Dynamics of Cuban Housing Policy,” Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1994, p. 598.)

Voluntary Work: The Microbrigade System

On the other hand, residents had shown their willingness to engage in voluntary work, including housing, organized through the CDRs. These factors stimulated the creation of the “microbrigade system” in late 1970. Teams of 20 to 35 individuals were created, consisting of workers from a specific workplace who labored full time on a particular project while their coworkers covered their everyday duties so that productivity would not decrease. On weekends, all workers decided which of their fellow employees should receive the completed units.

Need -Based

Since housing assignment was based on need and not on job performance, those laboring in the brigades did not necessarily receive a home. Workplace teams were augmented by skilled workers and technicians supplied by the Ministry of Construction which also provided building materials, land, and equipment.

Problems of Bureaucratization

The microbrigade system was designed to contribute to the provision of new housing, but it was also an attempt to solve severe problems of bureaucratization caused by an excess of employees in state companies. It was hoped that workplace productivity would increase when fewer workers maintained the same productivity levels, and that productivity would also rise since the distribution of completed housing would be based, in part, on production performance.

In 1971, alone, more than 1,000 workers were assigned to build 1,154 housing units in Place de la Revolucion, Altahabana, Rancho Boyeros, Alamar, Reparto Bahia, San Agustin, and La Coronela: the number of participants and completed units rose steadily until 1975. (By 1971, 12,715 workers made up 444 Microbrigades. By 1975, 30,000 workers constituted 1150 Microbrigades that completed 25,000 housing units in addition to many non-residential (social) projects.)

Havana’s Large Share

Havana received a disproportionately large share of this construction as compensation for previous neglect, and the projects also altered the existing system of suburban expansion whereby spontaneous single dwellings were constructed at the city’s edge. Microbrigade projects, in contrast, were four or five story buildings with 20 to 30 apartments each.

Socialist Housing

The areas mentioned above clustered in three large areas on the outskirts of the city and were located in districts that had a large number of industrial and service-sector workers. These areas included Alamar in East Havana, Altahabana in the south, and San Agustin in the west.

One authority  notes that

these complexes were developed as socialist housing quarters and  are, in fact, larger than those found in socialist eastern European countries.

A second states that the new crop of large scale housing projects on the outskirts of Havana were

characterized by endless rows of four- and five- story walkups in enormous superblocks. Occasional high-rise prefabricated buildings sprang up in a number of provincial capitals and with greater frequency in both central and outlying areas of Havana. (Jill Hamburg, “The Dynamics of Cuban Housing Policy,” Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1994, p. 600.)

Many argue that the units are depressing and that little concern was given to integrating these buildings into the rest of the built environment.

I was told specifically that these developments were constructed on the Soviet model and that they are a type of housing which Cuban planners dislike. Thus, while they were inspired, in part, to counter bureaucratization they reflected  “a deeply engrained bureaucratization of problem solving.” They were also poorly finished with little attention to detail or to technical specifications.

Dogmatism

Housing projects in the early 1970 reflected the dogmatism mentioned earlier. According to Cuban planners:

The Revolutionary government employed rigid institutional structures in architectural projects and cultural life. Varying from the norms or otherwise reinterpreting orders from centralized authority were not permitted . . . . This may explain why urban spaces in Alamar can best be characterized as depressing. Elements of this poor design remain today and can be noted throughout Havana . . . . far removed from the dynamism and lively spirit of Cubans. (Segre, Coyula, and Scarpaci, Havana: Two Faces of the Antillean Metropolis, p.207.)

Photograph by Lisa Reynolds Wolfe

The establishment of the Organs of People’s Power (OPP) and countrywide geographic and political reorganization were especially important to Havana’s future development.

Organs of People’s Power (OPP) were created at three levels: municipal, provincial, and national.

Popularly known as Poder Popular or Popular Power, OPP were

an attempt to decentralize decision-making and advance the process of institutionalization, which in turn was related to economic functions and political organization.

The national OPP (the National Assembly or ‘the supreme organ of state power’) combined constitutional and legislative powers. This body elected the Council of State from among its members, appointed the People’s Supreme Court magistrates and the attorney general, and approved the outlines of domestic and foreign policy, economic plans, and the state budget. It exercised the highest supervision over the organs of state and government.

The lower two levels of the OPP — the provincial and municipal levels — were responsible for municipal and provincial management of services such as schools, day-care centers, hospitals, stores, hotels, restaurants, cinemas, nightclubs, transport, retail trade, housing, public utilities, and sports, as well as ‘some local industries’. These also selected the judges for the corresponding people’s courts.

Delegates to municipal assemblies were elected through secret ballot and multiple candidacy every two and a half years. Municipal assemblies then elected the membership of provincial assemblies and these assemblies, in turn, elected the delegates to the National Assembly.

At least 55% of the delegates to the National Assembly were to be elected in the municipalities. The other 45% were to be selected from a list of candidates proposed by the party leadership.

Some scholars have been highly critical of the OPP, arguing that poder popular was under tight party control. However, in discussions with residents of Havana in June 1997, many took great pride in the opportunity for participation, agreeing that:

At their best, they addressed immediate and concrete issues: local Popular Power allowed the citizenry a voice in the conduct of local affairs, a potential arena for self-government.

Residents noted that even when their voice was to have no impact, as often occurred due to budgetary constraints and conflicting priorities, meetings enabled them to hear presentations from government officials so that they at least understood why certain policies were to be enacted instead of those they deemed preferable. In essence, they agreed that

Popular Power exemplified the politics of Cuban socialism. Local assemblies took public opinion into account more systematically than the politics of mobilization had during the 1960s and enhanced popular involvement in the administration of daily life. They did not, however, bestow upon the population the opportunity — let alone the power — to discuss and decide matters of substance. Their mandate was to supervise the state, not to debate investment policies or resource allocation. Involvement — not substantive participation — was the key characteristic of Popular Power at the local level. Moreover, involvement was to be as individuals, not organized groups.

Many supporters of the Revolution see the institutionalization of the OPP as a democratization process resulting in the revival of mass organizations and the expansion of their role in decision-making at all levels and in all spheres, More critical observers attribute the expansion of various groups to the development of a formal apparatus by the Communist party. From this perspective, organizations like the Federation of Cuban Women (FMC) and the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs) were assigned larger roles in the formulation  of policy and implementation of programs as fulfillment of their function as “transmission belts” between the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) and the people. A similar role was attributed to the trade unions that others argue were revitalized, strengthened, and democratized.

Objectively, though, the democratic nature of the OPP is undermined by three points.

First, the National Assembly, while partially comprised of popularly elected members, meets only twice a year and, therefore, lacks the power to confront or curtail Castro’s power.

Moreover, at least in its early years, the National Assembly was quite elitist and not representative of the population at large. For example, in 1976, only 3% of the deputies represented the 80% of the population that was not a member of either the party (PCC) or the Young Communist League (UJC).

Finally, the powers and functions of the provincial and municipal OPP are significantly limited. And, of course, these are the levels where the citizens could be most involved. Limitations are evident in five areas:

1. The party decides in practice who is eligible to sit in and chair the OPP Executive Committees which are the decision-making and  managerial bodies of poder popular;
2. The OPP manage the least important sectors of the economy (basically services) while the central state agencies administer the key industries, all agriculture, mining, and finance;
3. The size and distribution of resources allocated to the services administered by the OPP are also centrally decided;
4. The Council of State supervises the OPP, and the Council of Ministers (through the state central agencies) exerts direction and supervision over the OPP administrative departments; and
5. The OPP decisions can be annulled, modified, or revoked by other organs of the state and the government.

The make-up of the OPP was also shaped by the political and geographic reorganization of the country which was designed to expedite the

modernization, decentralization, and democratization process . . . related to the implementation of a new plan of placing Cuba favorably in the Soviet economic system.

In July 1976, the six existing provinces were remolded into fourteen and the existing 407 municipalities were combined into 169 with an average urban population of 10,290, excluding Havana City. Each provincial capital was to serve as the highest order center of a local central place hierarchy in an increasingly integrated urban-rural landscape. Potentially, this organization was to maximize the entire population’s access to services, economic infrastructure and political bodies at all levels.

Obviously, Havana was affected by the change.

With the creation of Poder Popular, Havana province was divided in two (the city of Havana and the rest of the province). The capital itself was comprised of fifteen municipios or counties depending solely on a centrally-allocated budget.

Growing Soviet influence was acknowledged when city planners began work on a revised master plan for the capital, a document to be prepared under Soviet supervision.

Eventually, the theoretical plan included ideas similar to those incorporated in the city-planning of Miliutin in Stalingrad.

Soviet involvement came as no surprise for, by the end of the 1970s, even maps were produced under the direction of Soviet cartographers and most Cuban urban professionals were trained in Soviet academies.