As previously stated [see Cold War Cuba: Demographic Change (Part 1)], the policy of full-employment had been maintained at the cost of labor productivity leading to the new emphasis on material incentives (brigade housing units, for example) at the expense of conciencia. Conciencia, as you’ll recall, was the creation of a fresh mindfulness that would lead to a unique revolutionary ethic.

Cuban wages and salaries were quite low with respect to available consumer goods.

Shortages and High Prices

Shortages and high prices were common for “nonessential” goods such as refrigerators and television sets, and many items were only available in an officially established “parallel” market” where products were sold at much higher prices than rationed goods. (Many things were also available on the “black market” at prices which very few average Cubans could afford.)

In 1977-78, for instance, a 17 inch black and white television set cost between 600 and 900 pesos on the parallel market, while a medium-priced refrigerator could be had for between 650 and 800 pesos. By contrast, the average monthly wage in 1978 was 140 pesos This means that the cheapest refrigerator or television set cost about five months salary.

It is important to note that shortages and high prices were not restricted to luxury items. As Diaz-Briquets and Perez show, in pre-revolutionary Cuba, per capita yearly rice consumption was about 50 kilograms. After the revolution, each person was allocated approximately 27 kilograms of rice per year, five of which were provided by ration. Thus, consumers were required to supplement their rations by purchasing rice on the black market for about two pesos per pound.

Mesa-Lago says that on the black market “an entire monthly wage could be spent on one pound of coffee, a pair of shoes, a meter of fabric, and a couple of pounds of beef.”

Post-Revolutionary Gains in Equity

Clearly, in the years of declining fertility, the Cuban economy was unable to satisfy even the most basic of material needs. Nevertheless, it is important to observe that for many Cubans who had been underprivileged before the Revolution, post-revolutionary gains in equity had made an enormous and positive difference in their lives.

As regards the debate on the importance of “modernization,” a lowering of infant mortality rates as well as many other improvements can be clearly linked to Cuba’s advances in healthcare.

Fertility Decline

The debate centering on poor economics versus better healthcare is certainly relevant to the countrywide debate on declining fertility. However, there is another, much simpler explanation for Havana’s fertility decline. Simply put, Havana has had a continuing shortage of men. The. 1981 census reports that Havana is the only region in the country with fewer men than women for each 1,000 inhabitants. In 1990, there were about 10 percent more women than men residing in the city.

Over time, those leaving Havana have increasingly been male, while in-migrants have increasingly been females who are searching for work, particularly in the service industry. Moreover, at times when Old Havana its at its most vibrant, women relocate to the city to sell handicrafts.

A 1997 study found that 55.6 percent of those migrants who arrived in the capital prior to 1995 were women.

Migration

One of Cuba’s principal demographers has stated that women make the migration decisions in Cuba, not men. Thus, even when a male relocates, a woman has been the “behind the scenes” decision maker.

Cuba’s female driven rural-urban migration is quite unique by developing world standards where, most usually, men make the decision to migrate and relocate without their families.

Rural-urban migration, as well as legal and illegal emigration, in conjunction with fertility decline, have assured both the aging and the feminization of Havana’s population. Havana’s growing concern (like the United States) is with the increasing cost of social security and medical care.

Aging

The aging of the capital is evident in statistics garnered from the Cuban census which show that the youngest cohort, the group between 0 and 14 years, has declined from 36.9 percent of the total population in 1970 to 30.3 percent in 1981. From this perspective, Havana’s future vibrancy seems threatened and the city’s current prospects become quite different from the rosy picture painted by urbanists obsessed with such issues as overurbanization and rank-size.

Urban Problems

Havana’s slow growth has not eliminated problems generally associated with urban excess: environmental degradation, substandard housing, and insufficient demand for labor. In the 1970s and 1980s these problems became increasingly severe despite the slow expansion in natural increase, low rates of rural-urban migration, and export of labor flows.

Purposeful government policies adopted to cope with problems in the economy have exacerbated the fertility decline, the aging of the population, and the predominance of unskilled workers in the labor market.

While longterm prospects may portend a smaller population (and more jobs and housing) due to the natural mortality rate, the picture is still of a city struggling to survive, overwhelmed by the inherited problems mentioned above.

Photograph by Lisa Reynolds Wolfe

Cuba’s declining birthrate after 1978 is often portrayed as a gain related to an increasing level of modernization. However, some argue that despite the emphasis on health, educational reform, and changes in women’s roles and status, the ‘modernization’ explanation of Cuban fertility decline is, at best, incomplete. Indeed, Diaz-Briquets and Perez argue that:

The key to Cuba’s very low fertility, in our opinion, lies in the sharply differing prospects of Cuban couples regarding the fulfillment of their material and status expectations during the early 1960s, and in the years since that time. The former period was one of optimism. The latter, reflecting the revolution’s growing inability to meet material expectations, was a period of pessimism. Only in the light of this radical change in outlook can the rapid fertility decline be understood. Had the generation entering reproductive ages in the 1970s been able to fulfill their aspirations, it is unlikely fertility would have declined as fast and to as low a level as it indeed has.

Many of the socioeconomic and political factors impelling emigration also spurred declining fertility. Several are particularly pertinent. These include the housing shortage, low wages, and a poor sense of economic well-being. By 1978, the marriage rate was down and the divorce rate was up. The unavailability of housing was certainly a factor.

A 1973 study cited a sample of Havana’s residents as stating that “the unavailability of housing and the need to share accommodations with relatives” were reasons for the increase in the divorce rate. By 1979, nearly 50 percent of Havana’s households consisted of extended families. Often young couples were required to live with parents for an extended period. As one author argues:

A vicious cycle ensued. The doubling-up of families, and the inevitable overcrowding and loss of privacy, contributed to declining births and rising divorces. Divorce, in turn, broke up households, thereby creating new demands for housing. Not infrequently, divorced people were obliged to continue living with former spouses.

A second study, conducted in 1978 and 1979, polled a group of young men working in the sugar harvest. Eighty-seven percent of the married men in this sample stated that they did not want more children because of housing problems; 80 percent said that they did not want more children because their income was insufficient; and 73 percent said that they did not earn enough to satisfy their families needs. Finally, 96 percent of a sample of emigrants arriving in the United Sates in 1973-1974 stated that “one of the reasons they left Cuba was that they saw a ‘lack of future’ in terms of social and economic aspirations for self and children. Mesa-Lago relates these problems to the implementation of the Soviet model which represented a break with the policy of redistribution.

Under the Soviet-style system, wage subsidies and programs of labor mobilization were curtailed and more sharply differentiated wage-scakes were introduced. Fees were imposed on services which had been provided free of charge — utilities, for example — and the new policies resulted in higher prices for consumer goods, tighter domestic budgets, and some unemployment. In fact, “the income redistribution measures that had played a role in increasing fertility in the 1960s had, by the 1070s, not only run their course, but were deliberately curtailed.

Photographs by Lisa Reynolds Wolfe

________________________________________

Sources:

Sergio Diaz-Briquests and Lisando Perez, “Fertility Decline in Cuba: A Socioeconomic Interpretation,” Population and Development Review, Volume 8, Issue 3 (Sept. 1982): 525; 531.

 

One hundred twenty-five thousand Cubans left the island on a flotilla of privately chartered vessels from May to September 1980. Emigration, which had been quite low since the early 1970s, was spurred by both socioeconomic and political discontent. Certainly the housing crisis was a major contributor since, by 1980, the housing deficit nationwide stood at approximately 1.5 million units.

The housing crisis was most severe in Havana where:

In 1978, the administrator of the city of Havana estimated that 250,000 dwelling units (50 percent of the total) were in need of repair and that, of these, 30,000 were propped up by beams and 40,000 were declared uninhabitable.

Thus in an effort, once again, to export discontent, Castro announced on April 20, 1980, that Cubans wishing to emigrate to the United States were free to leave from the port of Mariel on the outskirts of Havana. As a result, the capital lost more than five percent of its population.

The large outflow of Mariel migrants had some positive affect on the city. It relieved pressure on the labor market since many of the emigrants were quite young with 41 percent under twenty-five years of age. It also disposed of some social undesirables.

Researchers at the Center for the Study of the Americas in Havana reported that 45.25 percent of all persons that abandoned Cuba through the port of Mariel had delinquent backgrounds as follows:

• Crimes against property (theft, etc.)
• Dangerous condition*
• Fraud and falsification
• Crimes against the public administration
• Possession and sale of drugs
• Forbidden games
• Crimes against physical integrity
• Crimes against the normal development of sexual relations
• Crimes against the security of the state
• Violations of the public order
• Others.

*According to the Penal Code of Cuba at the time (Law21, Title 11), dangerous condition is the special likelihood that a person will commit crimes in the future, demonstrated by the conduct he or she observes.

Later survey data confirm that the Mariels had less education, were younger, and were more predominantly male than other Cuban emigrants. It has also been suggested that the Mariels had lower labor force attachment and lower occupational attachment than other Cubans.

Havana’s large out-migration over time was considered by some to be a factor in the city’s favor. Most usually, however, the city lost the best and the brightest. As Segre, Coyula, and Scarpaci note:

The annual net gain from migration to the capital is about 11,000 persons, a figure that is almost laughably small considering the situation in other capitals of large cities [sic] in Latin America. Nonetheless, that figure masks the fact that annually 20,000 people leave Havana, many of them young skilled workers, while about 30,000 migrate to Havana, most of them unskilled.

Moreover, inmigration to the capital, along with natural increase, were not sufficient to compensate for population loss. Over the period from 1970-1980, Havana’s growth trends were the reverse of other cities in Latin America and, indeed, in the Third World as a whole.

While urbanists concerned only with issues of urban balance may look at Havana’s low population growth quite favorably, the declining rate of natural increase was a matter of some concern. Since 1978, fertility in Cuba has been below the level necessary to assure long-term replacement of the population. The estimated fertility rate for 1979 was, in fact, the lowest recorded for any developing country and was “comparable to or lower than that characterizing fertility in most developing nations.” Moreover:

. . .  contrary to the situation in China, Costa Rica, Taiwan, Singapore, and other countries undergoing rapid and significant fertility decline, the fertility decline in Cuba took place in the absence of explicit policies to produce that effect.

_____________________________________

Sources:

H. David Card, “The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review v43 n2 (January 1990): 245-258.

Marifeli Perez-Stable. The Cuban Revolution, Origins, Course, and Legacy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, 150.

Sergio Diaz-Briquets and Lisandro Perez, “Fertility Decline in Cuba: A Socioeconomic Interpretation,” Population and Development Review, Volume 8, Issue 3 (Sept. 1982).

CEDEM1996 (National Office of Statistics). Annual Demographics of the respective years.

Alejandro Portes and Alex Stepick, City on the Edge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 21.

Roberto Segre, Mario Coyula, and Joseph L. Scarpaci. Havana: Two Faces of the Antillean Metropolis (Chichester, England: John Wiley & Sones, 1997), 169.

Grupo para Desarrollo Integral de la Capital Estrategia (Havana: Grupo para Desarrollo Integral de la Capital, June 1990), 18.

Photo courtesy Florida Keys Public Library. Boat Endeavor brings in Cuban refugees during the Mariel Boatlift in 1980. Photo by Raymond L. Blazevic.

 

2017

Given President Trump’s partial rollback of engagement with Cuba, it seems worthwhile to look back on the schism between the island and its superpower neighbor. But, first, here are a few highlights of the new policy:

• Americans may still travel to Cuba in coming months, but only in groups with travel providers. Individual people-to-people travel will be prohibited.
• Transactions with entities controlled by Cuba’s military will be limited. This restriction encompasses most of the island’s tourism industry, placing limits on US companies seeking to do business in Cuba and restricting where US visitors can eat and stay.
• Embassies and diplomatic channels on a range of key issues are to remain open, but it is likely that the tone of the relationship will change.
• Regulations allowing unlimited remittances to Cuba will stay in play, and there will be no limits on Cuban American travel to visit family on the island.
• It’s probable that US businesses with existing operations in Cuba will still be able to operate on the island. This group includes commercial airlines, cruise lines, cell phone companies, Google, and Marriott’s Starwood Hotels.

Many organizations and businesses from a wide array of sectors have spoken out about the importance of engagement with Cuba. Here are just a few: the US Chamber of Commerce; Marriott; the US Grains Council; the American Association for the Advancement of Science; the American Security Project; Associated Equipment Distributors; TechFreedom; and a coalition of conservative “free market” groups, including Grover Norquist’s Americans for Tax Reform.

Lasrly, according to an editorial in the NY Times, restricting the rights of United States citizens to travel and invest in Cuba will cost the American economy $6.6 billion and affect 12,295 American jobs.  Now for the history.

1959

In 1959 the United States was shaken when Fidel Castro’s revolution in nearby Cuba brought the Cold War to its own hemisphere. The US was directly affected economically since at this time Americans owned 50% of Cuba’s public railway system, over 90% of the telephone and power industries, the majority of key manufacturing plants, the largest chain of supermarkets, several large retail stores, and most major tourist facilities. About 25% of all Cuban bank deposits were held by branches of American banks.

Castro’s intent was to overthrow the oppressive dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista whose corrupt and inefficient regime had long been propped up through the support of the United States government.

Castro was joined in his endeavor by diverse elements — from Communists to dignitaries of the Catholic Church.  These divergent social and political forces, along with some members of the business community combined to unseat Batista, thought by many to be a repressive dictator.

Even though the US had also been disillusioned with Batista’s leadership, the superpower had provided $10 million in military assistance to the Cuban government in the eight years prior to the revolution. Arms shipments were finally suspended in March 1958.

Despite America’s formal position of neutrality, in actuality, the arms suspension was of great benefit to Castro’s rebels. On the other hand, the US refused to recall the military advisers who were assisting the Cuban Air Force, engaged at the time in the bombing of Cuban dissidents.

American policy managed to alienate both sides, weakening Batista’s forces at the same time that it incited Castro’s anger.

While it is impossible to know for sure what caused the lasting enmity between Castro and the American government, Cuba’s nationalization of US petroleum properties and Eisenhower’s economic sanctions — including the elimination of Cuba from the US sugar quota — led Castro to turn to the Soviet Union for assistance.

Although the Soviet response was initially hesitant and carefully measured, the USSR soon acquiesced. One must assume that they were seduced by the opportunity to obtain a foothold only 90 miles from the Florida shores as well as by a desire to alter the strategic balance of power between the two superpowers.

Cuba, in fact, was geographically  invaluable.

Moscow was soon able to establish an intelligence center for the  monitoring of US missile range activities in Florida and Texas, and Cuba was also used as a tracking station for Soviet space shots.

1960

By July 1960 the relationship was well established.

Equipment from the Soviet Union soon poured into the island nation, totaling $50 million by the end of 1960. Deliveries included MIG jet fighters, helicopters, tanks, rocket launchers, and various assault and heavy machine guns. Soviet and Czech advisers also arrived.

Castro declared himself a Marxist-Leninist in December 1961. The Soviets saw this announcement as an example of metamorphosis from a national bourgeois leader to a revolutionary democrat. Castro’s rationale may have been more pragmatic. Like Mao, he was aware that he needed to have strong superpower support to consolidate his revolution.

Meanwhile, the United States passed through the predictable phases of disenchantment with Castro, warnings about him, and — finally — scheming against him. America’s diplomatic relations with Cuba were severed in January 1961.

Many Cubans also reacted negatively. From 1959 – 1962, a steady stream of officials from the deposed Batista regime, along with other professionals and technicians opposed to the revolution, left the island.

Many of these individuals subsequently comprised the core group of 1,400 invaders who were involved in a rebellion against Castro, modeled on successful strategies of  covert action employed by the US government in Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954.

Masquerading as Cuban Air Force defectors, the group of exiles was organized and trained by the Central Intelligence Agency, and used American B-26 bombers to carry out their surprise air strike.

1961

Planned during the final months of the Eisenhower administration, the operation was carried out by President Kennedy in April 1961 with invasion forces landing in the area of Cuba known as the Bay of Pigs (Castro’s favorite fishing spot).

The CIA expected civilian uprisings, but underestimated how much Castro’s revolution had done to help the local population. As a result, the incursion failed to incite the expected response. Instead, within three days, Castro’s army and militia had killed, captured, or thrown off the entire landing force.

Reaction to the invasion was marked by a wave of anti-American demonstrations across Latin America, and the stoning of US Embassies in Tokyo, New Delhi, and Cairo. Moreover, the defeat came at the same time as a Soviet success, the first manned orbital spaceflight around the earth.

Although the United States found itself in a weakened public position, President Kennedy was bolstered by the emerging knowledge that the purported missile gap between the two superpowers was nonexistent.

Shortly after this information became public, the Soviets began sending missiles and personnel into Cuba.

Photograph by Lisa Reynolds Wolfe

 

Just as the organization of work within the armed forces was restructured so that military units might function more efficiently, the organization of work in various sectors directly affecting the provision  of urban services for the residents of Havana required change. The housing sector, in particular, cried out for attention.

A New Framework

As a precursor to the implementation of formal institutional change, a new framework focusing on a revitalization of popular participation was developed in an attempt to solve the housing problems of the capital.

Havana, you may recall, had been marginalized by the revolutionary housing  policies of the 1960s which had concentrated on the building of new towns outside of the urban area and the ruralization of the city itself. As a consequence, there had been very little new housing construction in the capital and housing demand had largely depended on vacancies left by emigrating Cubans.

Pent-Up Demand for Housing

By 1970, there was substantial pent-up demand for housing as well as for other urban services. In fact, the cash income of habaneros in 1970 was twice the supply of goods and services available, a problem that, of course, affected housing policy.

In addition, the Revolutionary Offensive of 1968 which eliminated most of the capital’s remaining small business had resulted in the

unintended outcome of deteriorating the quality of the city’s major centers. This occurred when local commercial establishments were readapted as housing units, almost always of an improvised nature and of very low quality. With this came problems of building maintenance in the central areas as well as a dearth of a variety in products and services. (Segre, Coyula, and Scarpaci, Havana: Two Faces of the Antillean Metropolis, p.151.)

Havana’s dire housing situation was exacerbated, according to one expert, by the same problems that stimulated institutional change:

The biggest obstacle to expanding housing production was what appeared to be an acute labor shortage — a shortage that, in fact, was due more to the sharp drop in productivity and increased worker absenteeism in the 1960s. (Jill Hamburg, “The Dynamics of Cuban Housing Policy,” Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1994, p. 598.)

Voluntary Work: The Microbrigade System

On the other hand, residents had shown their willingness to engage in voluntary work, including housing, organized through the CDRs. These factors stimulated the creation of the “microbrigade system” in late 1970. Teams of 20 to 35 individuals were created, consisting of workers from a specific workplace who labored full time on a particular project while their coworkers covered their everyday duties so that productivity would not decrease. On weekends, all workers decided which of their fellow employees should receive the completed units.

Need -Based

Since housing assignment was based on need and not on job performance, those laboring in the brigades did not necessarily receive a home. Workplace teams were augmented by skilled workers and technicians supplied by the Ministry of Construction which also provided building materials, land, and equipment.

Problems of Bureaucratization

The microbrigade system was designed to contribute to the provision of new housing, but it was also an attempt to solve severe problems of bureaucratization caused by an excess of employees in state companies. It was hoped that workplace productivity would increase when fewer workers maintained the same productivity levels, and that productivity would also rise since the distribution of completed housing would be based, in part, on production performance.

In 1971, alone, more than 1,000 workers were assigned to build 1,154 housing units in Place de la Revolucion, Altahabana, Rancho Boyeros, Alamar, Reparto Bahia, San Agustin, and La Coronela: the number of participants and completed units rose steadily until 1975. (By 1971, 12,715 workers made up 444 Microbrigades. By 1975, 30,000 workers constituted 1150 Microbrigades that completed 25,000 housing units in addition to many non-residential (social) projects.)

Havana’s Large Share

Havana received a disproportionately large share of this construction as compensation for previous neglect, and the projects also altered the existing system of suburban expansion whereby spontaneous single dwellings were constructed at the city’s edge. Microbrigade projects, in contrast, were four or five story buildings with 20 to 30 apartments each.

Socialist Housing

The areas mentioned above clustered in three large areas on the outskirts of the city and were located in districts that had a large number of industrial and service-sector workers. These areas included Alamar in East Havana, Altahabana in the south, and San Agustin in the west.

One authority  notes that

these complexes were developed as socialist housing quarters and  are, in fact, larger than those found in socialist eastern European countries.

A second states that the new crop of large scale housing projects on the outskirts of Havana were

characterized by endless rows of four- and five- story walkups in enormous superblocks. Occasional high-rise prefabricated buildings sprang up in a number of provincial capitals and with greater frequency in both central and outlying areas of Havana. (Jill Hamburg, “The Dynamics of Cuban Housing Policy,” Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1994, p. 600.)

Many argue that the units are depressing and that little concern was given to integrating these buildings into the rest of the built environment.

I was told specifically that these developments were constructed on the Soviet model and that they are a type of housing which Cuban planners dislike. Thus, while they were inspired, in part, to counter bureaucratization they reflected  “a deeply engrained bureaucratization of problem solving.” They were also poorly finished with little attention to detail or to technical specifications.

Dogmatism

Housing projects in the early 1970 reflected the dogmatism mentioned earlier. According to Cuban planners:

The Revolutionary government employed rigid institutional structures in architectural projects and cultural life. Varying from the norms or otherwise reinterpreting orders from centralized authority were not permitted . . . . This may explain why urban spaces in Alamar can best be characterized as depressing. Elements of this poor design remain today and can be noted throughout Havana . . . . far removed from the dynamism and lively spirit of Cubans. (Segre, Coyula, and Scarpaci, Havana: Two Faces of the Antillean Metropolis, p.207.)

Photograph by Lisa Reynolds Wolfe

The establishment of the Organs of People’s Power (OPP) and countrywide geographic and political reorganization were especially important to Havana’s future development.

Organs of People’s Power (OPP) were created at three levels: municipal, provincial, and national.

Popularly known as Poder Popular or Popular Power, OPP were

an attempt to decentralize decision-making and advance the process of institutionalization, which in turn was related to economic functions and political organization.

The national OPP (the National Assembly or ‘the supreme organ of state power’) combined constitutional and legislative powers. This body elected the Council of State from among its members, appointed the People’s Supreme Court magistrates and the attorney general, and approved the outlines of domestic and foreign policy, economic plans, and the state budget. It exercised the highest supervision over the organs of state and government.

The lower two levels of the OPP — the provincial and municipal levels — were responsible for municipal and provincial management of services such as schools, day-care centers, hospitals, stores, hotels, restaurants, cinemas, nightclubs, transport, retail trade, housing, public utilities, and sports, as well as ‘some local industries’. These also selected the judges for the corresponding people’s courts.

Delegates to municipal assemblies were elected through secret ballot and multiple candidacy every two and a half years. Municipal assemblies then elected the membership of provincial assemblies and these assemblies, in turn, elected the delegates to the National Assembly.

At least 55% of the delegates to the National Assembly were to be elected in the municipalities. The other 45% were to be selected from a list of candidates proposed by the party leadership.

Some scholars have been highly critical of the OPP, arguing that poder popular was under tight party control. However, in discussions with residents of Havana in June 1997, many took great pride in the opportunity for participation, agreeing that:

At their best, they addressed immediate and concrete issues: local Popular Power allowed the citizenry a voice in the conduct of local affairs, a potential arena for self-government.

Residents noted that even when their voice was to have no impact, as often occurred due to budgetary constraints and conflicting priorities, meetings enabled them to hear presentations from government officials so that they at least understood why certain policies were to be enacted instead of those they deemed preferable. In essence, they agreed that

Popular Power exemplified the politics of Cuban socialism. Local assemblies took public opinion into account more systematically than the politics of mobilization had during the 1960s and enhanced popular involvement in the administration of daily life. They did not, however, bestow upon the population the opportunity — let alone the power — to discuss and decide matters of substance. Their mandate was to supervise the state, not to debate investment policies or resource allocation. Involvement — not substantive participation — was the key characteristic of Popular Power at the local level. Moreover, involvement was to be as individuals, not organized groups.

Many supporters of the Revolution see the institutionalization of the OPP as a democratization process resulting in the revival of mass organizations and the expansion of their role in decision-making at all levels and in all spheres, More critical observers attribute the expansion of various groups to the development of a formal apparatus by the Communist party. From this perspective, organizations like the Federation of Cuban Women (FMC) and the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs) were assigned larger roles in the formulation  of policy and implementation of programs as fulfillment of their function as “transmission belts” between the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) and the people. A similar role was attributed to the trade unions that others argue were revitalized, strengthened, and democratized.

Objectively, though, the democratic nature of the OPP is undermined by three points.

First, the National Assembly, while partially comprised of popularly elected members, meets only twice a year and, therefore, lacks the power to confront or curtail Castro’s power.

Moreover, at least in its early years, the National Assembly was quite elitist and not representative of the population at large. For example, in 1976, only 3% of the deputies represented the 80% of the population that was not a member of either the party (PCC) or the Young Communist League (UJC).

Finally, the powers and functions of the provincial and municipal OPP are significantly limited. And, of course, these are the levels where the citizens could be most involved. Limitations are evident in five areas:

1. The party decides in practice who is eligible to sit in and chair the OPP Executive Committees which are the decision-making and  managerial bodies of poder popular;
2. The OPP manage the least important sectors of the economy (basically services) while the central state agencies administer the key industries, all agriculture, mining, and finance;
3. The size and distribution of resources allocated to the services administered by the OPP are also centrally decided;
4. The Council of State supervises the OPP, and the Council of Ministers (through the state central agencies) exerts direction and supervision over the OPP administrative departments; and
5. The OPP decisions can be annulled, modified, or revoked by other organs of the state and the government.

The make-up of the OPP was also shaped by the political and geographic reorganization of the country which was designed to expedite the

modernization, decentralization, and democratization process . . . related to the implementation of a new plan of placing Cuba favorably in the Soviet economic system.

In July 1976, the six existing provinces were remolded into fourteen and the existing 407 municipalities were combined into 169 with an average urban population of 10,290, excluding Havana City. Each provincial capital was to serve as the highest order center of a local central place hierarchy in an increasingly integrated urban-rural landscape. Potentially, this organization was to maximize the entire population’s access to services, economic infrastructure and political bodies at all levels.

Obviously, Havana was affected by the change.

With the creation of Poder Popular, Havana province was divided in two (the city of Havana and the rest of the province). The capital itself was comprised of fifteen municipios or counties depending solely on a centrally-allocated budget.

Growing Soviet influence was acknowledged when city planners began work on a revised master plan for the capital, a document to be prepared under Soviet supervision.

Eventually, the theoretical plan included ideas similar to those incorporated in the city-planning of Miliutin in Stalingrad.

Soviet involvement came as no surprise for, by the end of the 1970s, even maps were produced under the direction of Soviet cartographers and most Cuban urban professionals were trained in Soviet academies.

 

The Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) emerged in the 1970s as the country’s governing institution at the same time that the weight of the military in its Central Committee moved toward the Soviet pattern. At this time, Castro asserted:

The party today is the soul of the Cuban revolution . . . .

The First Congress of the Cuban Communist Party took place in 1975.

Preparations for the conference spurred changes in Cuba’s appearance. Beautification efforts in key areas of the city were carried out through a program of Urban Revitalization implemented by the Department of Architecture and Urbanism of the City of Havana. The use of large murals called Super Graphics — still common in Havana today — and other elements of urban landscape architecture formed key components of the revitalization campaign.

The conference itself resulted in

the full incorporation of orthodox Soviet-style institutions and practices (making the PCC) resemble its Soviet counterpart in both style and substance.

The Congress approved five significant measures:

1. a draft of a socialist constitution
2. a five-year economic plan
3. a geographic-politico-administrative reorganization of the country
4. a new system of economic management, and,
5. a party platform.

Thus:

. . . the leading role of the Communist party, subordinate to the ruling leaders but with authority over the government, the society, and the economy, has been asserted with increasing emphasis and is backed up by the provisions of the new Constitution. Its leading role is perhaps clearest in its supervision of mass organizations.

Importantly for urban areas such as Havana, the supervision served to limit the freedom of action of groups like the CDRs or the Cuban Women’s Federation (CWF) as they attempted to respond to the needs of their members. For

whenever mass organizations or economic enterprises have sought to set goals, make policy, or undertake tasks on their own, their wings have been clipped.

The 1976 constitution established a presidential system of government and provided for the election of provincial and local governmental officials across the island. Notably, the USSR is mentioned by name in the Preamble, and many features of the Soviet counterpart were incorporated in the Cuban document.

Carmelo Mesa-Lago states that 32% of the articles of Cuba’s 1976 constitution come from the Soviet constitution of 1936, and 36% from Cuba’s constitution of 1940. Eighteen percent are influenced by both sources with Soviet predominance, and only 13% of articles are at least partially innovative.

The fundamental political bodies introduced in the new constitution closely resembled the Soviet model with Cuba’s National Assembly of People’s Power equivalent to the Supreme Soviet, the Council of State corresponding to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and the Council of Ministers, the judiciary, and the Organs of People’s Power paired with similar institutions in the USSR.

As a result of the institutional changes discussed above, at the end of 1979, Castro stated that after 18 years of revolution the process of institutionalization was basically concluded. Soon the changes dictated by the process were to greatly change Havana’s urban landscape. For example, at the party conference, the government stated clearly that:

. . . it should fill the vacuum in building construction created by the ruralist approach of the 1960s. Housing assumed an important symbolic presence in the city, matching the availability of social services, schools, and recreational facilities. Some of the more noteworthy projects were Jose Antonio Echevarria University Campus, the Lenin Vocational School, Lenin Park, and the Botanical Gardens and Zoo, which were located at the city’s edge. High-rise public housing on the outskirts of Havana not only countered the presence of similar structures in Vedado, but became reference points for the Revolution’s modernization efforts in Havana. These high-rise structures spread to the most unlikely and remote corners of the city. Twenty-story high-rise housing in Havana during the first decades of the Revolution paralleled in many ways Stalin’s location of seven scrapers in Moscow at the end of the Second World War . . . . Soviet planning sought to show new features and rights of the unfolding socialist society.

Socialist housing in Havana was similar to the many complexes that existed in Prague, Budapest, Sofia, Dresden, Stalingrad, and Moscow.

 

As we learned in Cold War Cuba: Institutional Changes in the Cuban Military (Part 1), the military was increasingly professionalized.

After the military’s reorganization in 1972, only individuals with good military qualifications were allowed to remain in the structure of the regular Armed Forces (FAR). Greater emphasis was put on professional military education, and many officers were sent abroad for specialized training “such as that provided at the F.V. Military Academy and the K.E. Voroshilov General Staff Academy in the Soviet Union.”

The Professional Military

Most of the graduates of Soviet academies remained in the FAR, concentrating on strictly military tasks, and by the end of the decade “hundreds of FAR personnel were being sent each year for advanced training in Eastern Europe as well as in the Soviet Union.”

As previously mentioned, the officer corps had their ranking system reorganized into a hierarchy more equivalent to that of the USSR and international standards. Moreover, the military was now closely linked to the Communist Party.

Following the same pattern of the Soviet military and its Eastern European allies, the Cuban military maintains political sections throughout the entire military organization down to the squad level. Political commissars are tasked with the education of the rank and file in Marxist doctrine and maintain a high level of discipline and loyalty to the government and the Communist Party. As in the Soviet military, the political commissars have a high degree of authority which rivals that of the military commanders at all levels. All the flag rank officers are members of the Communist Party Central Committee. According to Fidel Castro . . . in December of 1975, 85% of the members of the Armed Forces were either members of the Union of Communist Youth or the CCP.

Each of the actions described above contributed to an increasing professionalization of the army which, as Fidel Castro argued

made possible an increase in the armed forces’ defensive power while at the same time maintaining their participation in economic tasks.

The growing expertise of the armed forces was accomplished primarily with the assistance of resident Soviet military personnel and hardware.

Conflict Among the Military Officers

It is important to note, however, that the increasing professionalization did not eliminate military conflict among the officers. There was an on-going friction among three groups:

• graduates of the Frunze Military Academy
• graduates of Cuban military academies
• veterans of the Sierra Maestra.

These groups differed greatly in power and status, with graduates of the Frunze Military Academy in the Soviet Union holding the most important posts, including control of missile and radar bases. Graduates of Cuban military schools held secondary positions, with Sierra Maestra veterans at the bottom of the hierarchy.

The Military Penetrates Every Sector of Society

After 1973, the military — under the advice and consent of the Soviets — increased its penetration of every sector of society and, at the same time, political control penetrated the military. According to Horowitz

The accelerated movement of the Cuban Revolution into militaristic forms reflects the multiple needs of the Cuban Regime. First, the regime employed the military . . . for internal police functions, through the CDRs. Second, it used the military to mobilize the  population after the less than successful phase in which moral incentives were used to spur economic development. During this phase, the youth brigades in particular were converted into  a paramilitary fight force subject to military discipline and at the same time able to perform as labor shock troops in the event of any decline in sugar production. Third . . . the regime encouraged the rise of a professional attitude in the military so that it could perform on international terrain . . . .

Military Impact on the Cuban Educational System

Strong military impact was also seen in the Cuban education system where a “fully articulated system of military schools” began to be established in the 1960s and had high level influence as the military became increasingly professionalized in the 1970s.

The education system included a tracking mechanism (beginning at the junior high school level) whereby the best students were either placed in a university preparatory school or sent to provincial military schools where they were trained to enter the senior military academies. Active participation in pro-regime youth groups was also required for admission. Those students with lover academic performance were sent to vocational schools.

The military schools graduated their first students in the 1971 school year.

Internal Security

Internal security forces were also reorganized in the early 1970s under the supervision of the Soviet Union. The two principal organizations that were reorganized were the Ministry of the Interior’s Directorio General de Investigaciones (DGI) and the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution.

The DGI began to coordinate its activities much closer than in the past with Soviet intelligence services.

The CDRs were given expanded responsibilities while remaining “an instrument of the party, unable to set its own fundamental policies.” Also, most bars to membership were dropped and the CDRs ” sought to encompass virtually the entire adult population.”

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If you want to learn more about the Cuban military, you might find the following books useful.

Dominguez, Jorge I. “Institutionalization and Civil-Military Relations in Cuba” Cuban Studies Volume 16 nos. 1-2 (January and July 1976).

Fermoselle, Rafael The Evolution of the Cuban Military: 1492-1986. Miami: Ediciones I Universal, 1987.

Horowitz, Irving Louis,ed. Cuban Communism 1959-1995 8th ed. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1995.