Over the course of New Year’s Eve on Dec. 31, 1958 and January 1, 1959, the reigning Cuban dictator, Fulgencio Batista, abdicated his position as a result of the growing revolution led by Che Guevara and Fidel Castro, who replaced the government with a revolutionary socialist state.

Fidel Castro — popularly named “Savior of the Fatherland” and “Maximum Leader” — reached Havana  on January 8, 1959, a day after the US extended diplomatic recognition to his revolutionary government.

In their book, The Cuban Insurrection 1952-1959, Ramon L. Bonachea and Marta San Martin make a surprising claim. They say that believers in santeria saw in Fidel the reincarnation of previous leaders like the great nationalist Jose Marti who had been sent to save the nation and the people at a time of crisis. These devotees placed their special ‘protections’ along “the leader’s” path, and banners and flags hung from almost every building in Havana.

The guerillas accompanying Castro marched to waving crowds, their uniforms decorated with religious medals and santeria bead collars of various colors.

Fidel stopped at the Presidential Palace on the eastern side of the Almendares River and then crossed the river, marching toward Marinao and Camp Columbia. While the guerilla leader addressed the nation, several white pigeons, symbols of peace, were let loose. One of them circled above Castro’s head and gently landed on his shoulder.

Very few people in attendance doubted that Fidel Castro was, indeed, a man with a mission.

None the less, Havana, relatively untouched by the Cold War and anxious to shed the trappings of violence and conflict, could not envision the path that the regime would ultimately pursue.

In the 2001 essay The Day Havana Fell, published in his book Havana: the Revolutionary Moment, the photographer Burt Glinn shares his first hand photographs of the Cuban Revolution. Click here to see the photographs. They are in gorgeous black and white, and not to be missed.

The Capitalist Legacy 1945-1959

Havana, in 1959, reflected excesses and inequalities that were a consequence of the American business presence as well as foreign investment.

During the early Cold War period, Havana’s loyalty to the US had been taken for granted, and the government was considered a staunch ally in the fight against communism. From 1945-1959, Cuba could even be defined as a client of the United States if by cliency one refers to

a mutually beneficial, security-oriented relationship between the governments of two countries that differ greatly in size, wealth, and military political power. Clients reciprocate for the delivery of goods and services by either participating in . . . regional security plans or by accommodating to . . . desires on questions of international diplomacy and economic policy-making.

While one might debate the primacy of a Cuban-American ‘security oriented’ relationship during these early postwar years, it is hard to argue the issue of economic accommodation. Nevertheless, it is a strain to assert that the city was locked into a pattern of classic dependency in its association with the United States. It was clear, though, that to move forward Cuba needed to redefine its relationship with the superpower.

Still, the United States insisted on her unique relationship with Cuba, and the more privileged inhabitants of Havana were resistant to any reform that would threaten their many links to the American economy. For most ordinary habaneros, however, the situation was dismal.

Havana real estate had become a major investment arena, characterized by rampant real estate speculation in the post World War II period. As a consequence, at the time of the revolution, between 650,000 and 750,000 housing units were considered substandard, about one-half of the total stock of 1.4 million units. Six percent of Havana’s population lived in squatter settlements.  Much of the problem was linked to the shift to condominium construction financed by  the American business community.

Migrants Exacerbate Havana’s Problems

Havana’s problems were exacerbated by the arrival of approximately 25,000 migrants per year who were relocating to the capital from less urbanized sections of the country.

Until the revolution, the City of Havana was the destination of about 45% of all internal migrants and, with a shortage of housing and with decent paying jobs in short supply, this group placed a disproportionate strain on the city.

Even though Havana’s growth rate during the 1950s was only two percent above that for Cuba as a whole, much lower than the same figure for most capital cities in Latin America, the city’s population density was 2,200 inhabitants per square meter. Not surprisingly, the capital showed little enthusiasm for the new arrivals.

Migrants named a variety of reasons for moving to Havana.  Many (32.4%) mentioned that they were in search of new jobs. Of this group, 36.1% had low levels of schooling, 26.8% had attended some high school, and 13.7% had some college.

So long as the construction sector continued to expand, it is probable that the poorly educated, primarily white male migrants could find employment. However, only 5% of the inadequately skilled new arrivals wanted to work in construction, the sector which offered the most jobs. Thus, those moving to Havana in search of work were the least prepared or willing to take advantage of the opportunities of the labor market.

As an aside, Havana had three fourths of all Cuba’s construction jobs. The capital employed 20% of the country’s active population: 41.9% of those employed worked in the service sector, 17.9% worked in commerce, and 6.2% held jobs in industry. Interestingly, until, 1960, almost all migrants to Havana who were active in the labor force were seeking agricultural work.

New migrants with professional or technical training were not seeking employment. Rather, they had come seeking a better quality of life. Still, housing was scarce and few migrants were able to fulfill their expectations.

The Vedado Section of Havana

As previously mentioned, most available housing consisted of pricey new condominiums, a form of shelter that few newcomers were able to afford. The condominiums were concentrated in the Vedado section of Havana where construction activities related to hotels and high rises were transformative from 1945-1959.

American investment in the Vedado area was not only focused on condominium and hotel development, it was also linked to a proliferation of underworld operations.  To this day Cubans living in the area can point out mob-associated structures and recount anecdotes about the mafia notables who hung out in the area.

Hotels constructed in the area between 1953 and 1958 include the Havana Hilton, Habana Riviera, Capri, Vedado, Flamingo, and others.

The Hotel Capri was a favorite haunt of Lucky Luciano and Meyer Lanski. This Mafia group is said to have supplied financing for the Riviera.

A 1958 law facilitated international transactions by Cuban banks and is said to have supported a growing drug trade and banking sector.  In any event, the city was a center of commercialized vice, much of it underwritten by US organized crime.

Havana was famous for its glitzy, Las Vegas style atmosphere, and American businessmen were attracted by illegal drugs, prostitution and the gambling casinos which were the city’s major industry.  Not surprisingly, there was a relatively high crime rate.  A vast informal economy centered on beggars and prostitution.

American Financed Projects

American financed projects in Havana’s built environment did not revolve around Cold War militarism. Rather, they reflected the imperatives of capitalism.  These included high rise apartment buildings with water views designed to  house American businessmen and wealthy habaneros, and 3 tunnels to facilitate automobile travel in the city.

One of the tunnels, built between 1955 and 1958, was 735 meters long and was drilled between Old Havana and Havana del Este under the harbor mouth to facilitate travel to the beaches east of the city.  Another tunnel connected the luxury hotel area of Vedado with the high income housing community of Miramar to the west. Additional public works projects were associated with highway improvement, public buildings, water supply, and airports.

Capitalism, rather than militarism, was the driving factor in the city’s relationship with external actors. On the domestic scene, however, the situation was different.

The urban underground centered at the University of Havana organized opposition forces in the city and eventually confronted the Cuban regular military, supplied, in part, by the American superpower. Through this vehicle, Havana had a primary role in the insurrectionary struggle which was identified at this time primarily with Cuban nationalism.

Havana’s built environment became a symbol of the conflict when, in January 1959, Fidel Castro arrived from the Sierra Maestra and set up headquarters on the 22nd floor of the 25-story Havana Hilton dislodging both reputable American businessmen and mafia associates.  The hotel became a symbol of the fight for cuba libre, was renamed the Havana Libre, and is an emblem of the revolutionary struggle to this day.

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Sources:

Enrique A. Baloyra and Roberto Lozano, “Soviet-Cuban Relations: The New Environment and Its Impact,” in Conflict and Change in Cuba, ed. Enrique A. Baloyra and James A. Morris (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993), 267.

Ramon L. Bonachea and Marta San Martin, The Cuban Insurrection 1952-1959 (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1974), 74 and 329.

Jill Hamburg, “The Dynamics of Cuban Housing Policy” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1994), 588.

Grupo de Trabajo Nacional de la Encuesta de Migraciones Internas, Resultados de la Encuesta Nacional de Migraciones Internas según Niveles del Sistema de Asentamientos: El caso de Ciudad de La Havana (Havana: Centro de Estudios DEMograficos, 1996), 7.

https://www.magnumphotos.com/newsroom/politics/burt-glinn-havana-the-revolutionary-moment/

 

Why did the Soviet Union place missiles in Cuba? And why didn’t they hide them? They were well aware of U-2 reconnaissance flights over the island.

Like many of you, I still am wondering why on earth Nikita Khruschev thought it would be a good idea to put missiles in Cuba, just 90 miles away from the American mainland.

Looking toward the 60th anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis, I began re-reading the well regarded analysis by Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. (1)  I wanted to refresh my memory and look for answers to the questions I posed earlier.

The book employs three explanatory models to explore the crisis: a rational actor or classical model; an organizational process model; and a governmental politics model.  My focus was on the ‘rational actor’ because it presented the most information on my overarching question: Why did the Soviet Union place missiles in Cuba?

The model presents five possibilities or hypotheses that I’m going to pass on to you. But first, here’s some context (and a selected timeline) on what’s been called “the finest hour of John F. Kennedy’s presidency.”

Context and Timeline Leading Up to the Cuban Missile Crisis

Throughout 1962, in the midst of the Cold War, the movement of Soviet personnel and equipment to Cuba aroused suspicions in the American intelligence community. In response, U.S. ships and planes began photographing every Cuba-bound Soviet vessel, and U-2 spy planes began regular reconnaissance flights over the island, just 90 miles off the coast of Florida.

September 4, 1962: Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin presents Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy with a confidential message from Chairman Khruschev. In the message, Khruschev promises that the Soviet Union will create no trouble for the United States during the coming election campaign.

President Kennedy responds that same day, warning that “the introduction of offensive missiles into Cuba would raise the gravest issue.”

September 6, 1962:  Dobrynin requests an urgent meeting with Special Counsel to the President Theodore Sorenson. He delivers a second personal message from Khruschev to Kennedy:

Nothing will be undertaken before the American Congressional elections that could complicate the international situation or aggravate the tension in the relations between our two countries . . . The Chairman does not wish to become involved in your internal affairs.

When Sorenson challenges the sincerity of this message, he is assured that the Soviets are doing nothing new in Cuba.

George Bolshakov, a Soviet official with a relationship to Bobby Kennedy, relays another message, asserting that “No missile capable of reaching the United States would be placed in Cuba.”

September 7, 1962: Congress grants the President standby authority to call up additional reservists.

September 11, 1962: Tass, the Russian news agency, is authorized to reiterate the Soviet government’s policy on the transfer of nuclear weapons to third nations:

. . . there is no need for the Soviet Union to shift its weapons for the repulsion of aggression, for a retaliatory blow, to any other country, for instance Cuba. Our nuclear weapons are so powerful in their explosive force and the Soviet Union has such powerful weapons to carry these nuclear warheads, that there is no need to search for sites for them beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union.

September 13, 1962: The President makes a major public statement on a Communist build-up in Cuba saying:

[if Cuba should] “become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies.

September 19, 1962: The United States Intelligence Board (USIB) approves the September National Intelligence Estimate that concludes that Soviet emplacement of missiles in Cuba is highly unlikely.

October 13, 1962: When questioned by Chester Bowles about the presence of Soviet “offensive weapons” in Cuba, Dobrynin emphatically denies any such possibility.

October 14, 1962: The US discovers Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba.

October 16, 1962: The Executive Committee of the National Security Council meets and discusses 5 alternative hypotheses, focusing on:

• Why did the Soviet Union undertake such a reckless move?
• What objective could the Soviets have had that would have justified a course of action which entailed a high probability of nuclear confrontation?
• What was the Soviet intention in placing offensive missiles in Cuba?

Five Hypotheses for the Emplacement of Missiles in Cuba

1. Bargaining Barter

Khruschev installed missiles in Cuba with the intent of using them as a bargaining device in a summit or U.N. confrontation with Kennedy. Withdrawal of Soviet missiles in Cuba would be traded for withdrawal of US missile bases in Turkey.

2. Diverting Trap

This hypothesis centers on Berlin, and imagines that the Soviets intended the missiles in Cuba to serve as a lightning rod. It goes something like this. If the US struck “little Cuba,” NATO would split, and Latin America would become rabidly anti-American. While the US was dealing with a public relations nightmare, the Soviets would make a strong move against Berlin. Think Suez and a second Hungary.

3. Cuban Defense

Although the Bay of Pigs was unsuccessful, it proved that the US could act. If  Kennedy decided to send in the Marines, Castro’s defeat was certain. The Soviet Union was so far away that it couldn’t provide enough conventional support to make a difference. If there was a significant probability of US action against Cuba, the Soviets had to act first in order to deter it. The missiles in Cuba were an answer to this threat.

4. Cold War Politics

Khruschev believed that the American people were “too liberal to fight,” but to demonstrate this he needed a fait accompli. He thought that “when confronted with operational missiles, the United States would react indecisively. . . . By unmasking an irresolute America, the Soviet Union would drastically reduce the credibility of U.S. commitments to other nations.” A victory in this instance would show that the tide in the Cold War had turned.

5. Missile Power

At the time of the crisis it was widely understood that the US held strategic  superiority over the Soviet Union. Thus, the Cuban missile deployment was a bold effort to show the world that the Soviet Union was not strategically inferior to the US in the realm of missile defense. In reality, there was a gap, and it could only be closed if the Soviets made considerable expenditures. Turning Cuba into a missile launcher that could strike the United States was perceived to be an inexpensive solution to a major problem.

(If you’re intrigued and would like a more in-depth discussion, including the pros and cons of each hypothesis, consult Essence of Decision.)

Conclusion and Additional Sources

Which hypothesis do you buy into? Have you already made up your mind?

Well, here’s the most widely accepted explanation.

. . . the introduction of strategic missiles into Cuba was motivated chiefly by the Soviet leaders’ desire to overcome . . . the existing large margin of United States strategic superiority. (Rand sovietologists Arnold Horeleck and Myron Rush.)

Not convinced? You can read the pros and cons of each hypothesis in Essence of Decision.

Those of you who like your reading to be lighter fare might enjoy Thirteen Days by Robert Kennedy or One Minute to Midnight by Michael Dobbs.  Of course you can always just make some popcorn and watch the movie Thirteen Days with Kevin Costner.

(As always, if you buy something on one of our Amazon links, CWS will receive a small bonus. Your price will not increase.)

For a trove of photographs go to the National Security Archives at George Washington University. Just click here.

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Featured photograph:

In the early stages of the Cuban missile crisis, this photograph showed that the Soviet Union was amassing offensive ballistic missiles in Cuba. It’s of Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) Launch Site Number 1 at San Cristobal, Cuba, and was taken on October 14, 1962.The photograph highlights launch equipment and missile trailers, proving that the Soviet Union was building offensive nuclear missile bases in Cuba.

Citation: Photograph PX1966-020-007; Photograph of MRBM Field Launch Site No. 1 in San Cristobal, Cuba; 10/14/1962; Briefing Board #07; Briefing Materials, 1962 – 1963; Collection JFK-5047: Department of Defense Cuban Missile Crisis Briefing Materials; John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA; National Archives and Records Administration.

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(1) My edition of  Essence of Decision is copyright 1971. There’s also a newer, updated edition by Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, published in 1999. I haven’t read the new edition.

If you keep up with the news, I’m sure you’re aware of the global movement of displaced people fleeing their home countries.

But did you know that, according to the United Nations, in June of 2022, one in 78 people across the world were considered displaced?

According to the New York Times, Syrians are the largest group of displaced people while Venezuelans are estimated to be the second-largest group.

The historic pace of undocumented immigrants entering the United States has continued even though the number of removals over the past year — more than 1.3 million — was more than any previous year.

However, the demographics of those immigrating has changed. The number of undocumented immigrants from Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras is down 43 percent from August 2021 while the number of Cubans, Nicaraguans and Venezuelans is up 175 percent.

According to Chris Magnus, US Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection:

Failing Communist regimes in Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba are driving a new wave of migration across the Western Hemisphere, including the recent increase in encounters at the southwest U.S. border . . .

Many of the immigrants are seeking asylum. (For more on the asylum issue read this  NYTimes Opinion piece.)

[Much of the information in the rest of this post is drawn from the work of the Center for Democracy in the Americas. I highly recommend their weekly email on Cuba titled U.S. – Cuba News Brief. Their recent interview with Julio Antonio Fernández Estrada, Visiting Scholar at the Cuba Studies Program at the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, and Denisse Delgado Vázquez, Doctoral Candidate in Public Policy at the University of Massachusetts, Boston, has also been useful. In the interview, they articulate their thoughts on recent trends in Cuban emigration, the possible causes of the record-breaking migration, what makes this current migratory wave distinct, and the role that U.S. policy plays in Cuban migration here. I quote them frequently in the post. Click here to read the interview. It’s available in Spanish here.]

The Numbers

So far in Fiscal Year 2022, over one percent of Cuba’s population has left the island.

More than 177,800 Cubans have arrived in the United States according to information provided by US Customs and Border Protection. This is the largest migration surge in recent decades, surpassing both the 1980 Mariel Exodus (125,000) and the 1994 Balsero Crisis (30,900).

Source: Elaborated by CDA with data from the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)

While the number of Cuban migrants attempting entrance into the US continues to rise, the number of Cuban minors – many of whom are unaccompanied – attempting entrance into the US has also increased significantly.  

There have been 662 encounters with unaccompanied Cuban minors at the US southern border since October 2021, which is a 1969% increase from the previous fiscal year.

The increase in unaccompanied minors is a symptom of the deteriorating living conditions found on the island.

Source: Elaborated by CDA with data from the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)

Previous Migratory Waves

1980: Mariel

For background information on Mariel, refer to the Cold War Studies post titled Cold War Cuba: Mariel.

Denisse Delgado notes:

In 1980, with the opening of the maritime bridge between the Cuban port of Mariel and Key West (Florida), Cuban exiles in the United States sailed to Cuba to pick up their relatives. In addition, Cuban officials put other people they considered a problem for Cuban society on these ships, including prisoners and psychiatric patients. This introduced greater diversity to the migratory flow, since in comparison to previous waves of migration, the Mariel Exodus was composed of a more racially and economically diverse population, whose educational level was lower.

Balsero Crisis: 1994

Denisse says:

The Balsero Crisis, unlike the Mariel Exodus, occurred in a context of deep economic crisis, after the fall of the Socialist bloc during which the Cuban people were affected by the paralysis of transportation by experiencing food and medicine shortages. The migration of the rafters (balseros, in Spanish) takes place by sea, like the Mariel, but the route is much more dangerous.

The “balseros” left in rustic boats that they built themselves.

The “balseros” were predominantly urban men who went alone, without their families, were younger than the general Cuban population, and had varying levels of education. They left mainly for economic reasons, although there were also political reasons.

Factors Relating to Cuban Migration Today

Cuba is currently in the midst of its worst economic crisis since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s as it faces record high inflation rates and a severe shortage of foreign currency. Contributory factors include a decline in tourism and exports associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as a reduction in remittances related to US policy.

According to Denisse:

Unlike the Mariel Exodus and the Balsero Crisis, the routes of the recent migratory outburst are more diverse, as they include maritime, air, and land routes. Particularly, border crossings between Mexico and the United States have increased, and Cubans have joined the irregular migratory caravans of Latin American migrants. It is a highly risky migration, like the Balsero Crisis, but where there is a greater presence of families migrating together, including more vulnerable members, such as children, the elderly and people with medical conditions.

Regarding family factors, Julio suggests:

Because of more widespread communication via the internet and social media, the structural crisis of the Cuban economy, political system, and society is now perceived with more anguish, desperation, and hopelessness than before.

Previously, parents of the young people did not advise them to leave the country. Now, families now make emigration plans in which they even organize solo departures from Cuba for young people.

The Impact of Emigration on Cuba

Inequality

Denisse argues:

Although irregular migration is racially diverse, Cuban migration is characterized by a greater presence of people who identify as white. Thus, remittances are received predominantly by white families living on the island, thereby reproducing economic inequalities that are intertwined within the island’s racial profile. It is important to mention that vulnerable or marginalized communities in Cuba have a greater presence of black and mestizo people.

Aging

For detailed information on demographics in Cuba, read this Cold War Studies Post. Aging and fertility decline are long-term trends, exacerbated further by the migration of young people and females.

Americans Can Now Expect to Live Three Years Less than Cubans, Rob Minto, Newsweek

Vulnerable and Marginalized Communities

Julio explains:

The marginalized and vulnerable communities are in increasingly worse situations because their families don’t have the necessary resources to pay for plane tickets to Nicaragua, Guyana or other countries, embassy fees, the cost of human traffickers, etc. In these circumstances, when a family manages to get someone to leave the country, they do so at the cost of losing assets accumulated throughout their lives or getting into debt, often with loan sharks.

Denisse says (as noted before):

Cuban migration is characterized by a greater presence of people who identify as white. Thus, remittances are received predominantly by white families living on the island, thereby reproducing economic inequalities that are intertwined within the island’s racial profile. It is important to mention that vulnerable or marginalized communities in Cuba have a greater presence of black and mestizo people.

Conclusion

To conclude, seaborne migration from Cuba for Fiscal Year 2022 now totals more than for the past five years combined.

Eleven months into FY2022, Cuban migration to the US has eclipsed the Mariel Boatlift of 1980 and the Balsero Crisis of 1994 combined.

Cubans are less likely than other nationalities to make repeated attempts to enter the US because, at least so far, they are not subject to immediate expulsion.

So long as living conditions on the island remain untenable, migratory waves will continue.

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If you’d like more information on Cuban migration today, take a look at the following:

After arriving in the United States, thousands of Cuban migrants face new legal hurdles, Norma Gámez Torres and Syra Ortiz Blanes, Miami Herald

Cubans flee island’s economic woes by air, land and sea, Gisela Salomon, AP News

Video: Why Cubans are facing the worst power outages in decades, Patrick Oppman, CN

The video below is the second in a two part series that takes you quickly through the last 50 or so years of Cuba’s political and economic history.

Here are the salient points:

By 1990, when the Russians were gone, things were really tough. It was becoming very clear that the Cuban people could not sustain life at such a minimal level indefinitely.

Castro and his advisers came up with a new strategy.

Agriculture was one of three areas of focus.

Acquisition of scarce hard currency through tourism and biotechnology was also central.

The key was to develop things that would produce a high rate of return.

Cuba’s economic decision-makers wanted to allow capitalist investment and enterprise to operate within Cuba itself.

They counted on the appeal of Cuba’s beautiful beaches.

They also believed that historic attractions like Old Havana could be used to promote the tourist sector.

Prostitution has increased and inequality between those working in the dollar economy and others has become a reality.

Multiplier effects include sales of tobacco and rum.

In mid 1990, the first joint venture hotel opened in Varadero beach with profits to be split 50-50.

The hotel, built with foreign capital, had construction costs of $30 million.

The growth of the tourist industry has been accompanied by large investments in construction to enlarge hotel facilities.

By 2011 there were well over 2 million tourists, many more than before the Revolution.

Joint venture capital includes major investors from Spain, Germany, Austria, and Finland among others.

Cuba’s military is highly involved in the tourist sector.

There has been substantial construction of tourist facilities within Havana itself, which retains its position as the main tourist attraction within the country.

Old Havana, a UNESCO World Heritage site, is particularly attractive to tourists.

Old Havana, the colonial core, is known for its lovely old buildings.

Finance was centered in Old Havana in an area known as ‘little Wall Street.’ This was a symbol of North Americanization.

Most activities was centered around the various plazas.

In Havana, rather than displacing residents of the old core, the area is being redeveloped with a concern for the integration of social services and living quarters.

While commercial activities are in place on the first floor of many buildings, renovated housing is available on the upper levels.

Due to a shortage of classrooms, elementary school classes are held in the public space of recently reconstructed museums.

Joint ventures and foreign real estate investment insure that resources are available to redevelop historical commercial structures.

UNESCO continues to assist with the renovation of convents, cathedrals, and other designated buildings.

Despite strenuous US objections, tourism alone is ensuring Cuba a fair amount of success in its efforts to be reintegrated into the regional economy of Latin America and the Caribbean.

Jamaica, Mexico, and other Latin American nations are involved in substantial joint ventures related to tourism.

Other Cuban trade efforts are also meeting with regional success.

The relaxation of US sanctions would provide a definite boost to the Cuban tourism industry.

Raul says: “We have to eliminate forever the notion that Cuba is the only country in the world where one can live without working.”

He goes on to say: “Without an increase in efficiency and productivity, it is impossible to sustain definitively the enormous social expenditures of our socialist system.”

Right now Cuba’s economy is stagnant.

The real value of wages in Cuba remains at around 40% of the 1989 level.

Cuenta-Propistas — the self-employed — have become the designated saviors of the Cuban economy.

Raul diplays remarkable faith in micro-enterprise and the “Gospel of Productivity.”

The key question: Can the micro (and cooperative)-enterprise sector absorb 500,000-1,200,000 apparently redundant workers?

The Fidelista model is discredited.

We will have to wait and see what happens.

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Video by Lisa Reynolds Wolfe

(Please don’t use the contact info at the end of the video. You can always reach me at lisa@coldwarstudies.com)

 

I wrote this post for Cold War Magazine in 2016 when, for the first time in 88 years, an American president was visiting the island of Cuba. Now, Cuban Americans are in the news again because of their voting power in the upcoming 2020 presidential election, so I thought this would be a good time to reprint the article. The focus is on what’s been happening in Cuba since the 1959 revolution.

The video below will give you the insight you need to understand Cuba’s sociocultural, political, and economic conditions.

It is the first of two parts that will take you quickly through the last 50 or so years of Cuba’s political and economic history. (I’ll post Part Two next week.)

Here are the highlights:

Fidel Castro – popularly named “Savior of the Fatherland” and “Maximum Leader” – reached Havana on January 8, 1959.

President Batista fled Cuba very early in the morning on January 1, 1959.

Opposition to Batista first emerged in 1955. By December 1958 most Cubans despised his government.

Even the Eisenhower Administration wanted Batista out of office.

At the time of the Revolution, Havana was home to the privileged, hardworking, and marginalized.

A great deal of American investment was in the Vedado section of Havana where the Hotel Nacional was located.

In the 1950s, Havana was the center of commercialized vice, much of it underwritten by US organized crime.

The city was famous for its glitzy atmosphere.

At first everything was fine between Castro and the American government. But soon bad blood ensued.

When Cuba nationalized US petroleum properties, Eisenhower eliminated Cuba from the US sugar quota.

As the 1960s progressed, Castro was preoccupied with developing a model of socialist self-government that was uniquely Cuban.

Castro wanted to “ruralize the city” and “urbanize the countryside.”

Resources poured into rural areas for electrification and the construction of new towns.

Roads and buildings in Havana suffered from a lack of upkeep and maintenance.

In 1972, Cuba joined COMECON, the economic arm of the Soviet bloc, and in 1975 Cuba began implementing Soviet economic and planning principles.

Soviet models of economic and social planning facilitated Havana’s social, cultural, and political integration with the Soviet bloc.

1986 marked the beginning of a new period called the Period of Rectification. By this time, Cubans were disillusioned with the Soviets.

Cubans were pressuring their government to return to the core Revolutionary project with its significant gains in the status of women and blacks.

Unfortunately for Cuba, glasnost and perestroika in the Soviet Union put an end to any hoped for reforms.

In 1990, with the end of the Cold War, Cuba entered a challenging period known as The Special Period (of War) in Time of Peace.

Cuba had an oil driven economy and 98% of the island’s petroleum came from the Soviet bloc.

Aside from oil, 66% of Cuba’s food, 86% of all raw material, and 80% of machinery and spare parts came from Soviet dominated trading partners.

Factory closures became common, food scarcity was widespread, and the already inadequate technology base began eroding.

Exports were also affected since 66% of Cuba’s sugar, 73% of the island’s nickel, and 98% of the country’s citrus fruits had been exported to the Soviet bloc.

Cuba’s abandonment by the USSR was further complicated by a tightening of US sanctions.

Things were very tough. Learn more in Part II.

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Video by Lisa Reynolds Wolfe

(Please don’t use the contact info at the end of the video. You can always reach me at lisa@coldwarstudies.com)

 

Migration from the countryside of Cuba to the nation’s capital, Havana, was extremely sluggish during much of the 1970s. This, along with other factors, contributed to the capital’s low population increase.

Havana’s percentage increase remained low compared to that of other Latin American cities throughout the decade.

The capital’s rate of growth increased over the period 1980-1990 while expansion in other areas of Latin America was beginning to slow during the same period.

Population shifts impacted Havana differentially.

At the municipio level, those areas of the city most affected by population growth were Diez de Octobre, Playa, Centro Havana, Arroyo Naranjo, and Playa. These areas contained more than 50% of all the capital’s inhabitants.

The most densely populated municipios were those located in the center of the city — Centro Havana, Old Havana, Diez de Octobre, Cerro, and Plaza. These areas had density levels as high as 10,000 inhabitants per square kilometer.

The municipios with the lowest density levels were those on the periphery of the city — Guanabacoa, Habana del Este, Cororro, Boyeros, and Arroyo.

After 1970, however, the municipios that made up the urban core of the capital — Old Havana, Centro Havana, Regla, Diez de Octobre, and Cerro — began to grow more slowly as areas on the periphery having more free space began to attract residents.

Also, the capital began to reflect the effects of differential migration, with a lower percentage of male residents (91.6 males for every 100 females) than elsewhere in Cuba, and a higher proportion of residents over 60 years of age (14.7% of all residents as compared to 11.7% for the rest of the country). Once again, these factors were both cause and effect of Havana’s lowered fertility rate.

Over much of the period, growth due to in-migration was higher — and in all cases was proportionally greater — than growth due to natural increase. Nevertheless, the proportion of the capital’s growth attributable to in-migration continued to remain low over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, particularly in comparison to pre-1958 levels when Havana was the destination of 45% of the country’s migrants.

Over the entire period 1970-1981, the capital absorbed only 12.9% of the country’s migrants, while Havana absorbed 25.8% of all Cuba’s internal migrants from 1976-1981.

These figures can be compared to other areas of Latin America. For example, Santiago de Chile, Lima, and Caracas received 34.2%, 40%, and 34.2% of their countries migrants respectively during this approximate time frame.

In sum, since in-migration was balanced by emigration and low fertility, Havana exhibited slow growth over the entire period when that capital could be called a Cold War City.

Export of Labor Flows

The outflow of Cuban labor associated with the country’s military activity overseas is well documented. However, Cuba’s export of labor flows for revenue and training purposes is less discussed. Still, these programs affected Havana during the 1970s and 1980s because they targeted the most desirable members of the city’s labor force, young men loyal to the revolution.

Most of the workers selected were at the lower end of the 18 to 27 age bracket. They were required to be single, have completed elementary school, have a “revolutionary record” and good moral character, and pass a physical examination. Twenty percent of the workers were female, and a high percentage (50 percent or more) were members of the Union of Communist Youth (UJC). The tour of duty was generally four years, with the first six months devoted to training. At mid- assignment, the workers were given an all expense paid home leave.

Cuba’s Labor Challenges

In conjunction with Cuba’s international military activities and civilian assistance programs, migration exacerbated the labor challenges that Havana was facing. Now the city was increasingly required to solve problems encompassing revolutionary promises of full employment in the context of its expanding unskilled and unmotivated labor supply.

During the decade of the 1970s, the economically active population in Cuba — those employed, unemployed or first-time job seekers — was increasing at an annual rate of over three percent a year. This growth was expected to continue at the rate of two percent per year over the decade of the 1980s after which it was expected to drop substantially. Exporting labor was one way to deal with the expanding supply of workers.

Cuban Guest Workers Abroad

By the second half of the 1970s, Cuba was supplying unskilled labor to factories in East Germany and Czechoslovakia and, in the early 1980s, Cuban workers were also sent to Hungary.

The number of Cuban guest workers abroad grew from 12,000 in mid-1981 to approximately 15,000 in early 1983, and the number was anticipated to climb to 50,000 by the end of 1995. By that time, Bulgaria was also expected to host Cuban workers. Cubans began to work in the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s and, in 1989, Cuban construction workers were sent to Armenia to assist in construction after a major earthquake. These workers filled the need for labor in the most developed communist countries.

The Government’s Rationale

While labor migration is thought to be a phenomenon associated primarily with capitalism, several explanations have been given for the shortage of workers in centrally planned economies. These include a tendency for enterprises to overestimate the number of workers they actually need, a demand for additional labor resources to meet quantitative output goals and, conversely, a tendency to underestimate costs, resulting in a systematic understatement of labor requirements.

Two explanations were used to justify sending temporary migrant workers to other socialist countries.

• First, migrant sending countries were able to temporarily deal with labor surplus problems.
• Second, migrant workers were perceived to be participants in co-operative training programs.

The Cuban government used both of these reasons in presenting its rationale to the Cuban people. The government argued that through 1975 employment had outstripped supply. However, since that time:

. . . the troubles that arise from the [US economic] blockade and the very nature of underdevelopment, have not permitted the balanced growth between labor supply and demand, so that there has been a slight imbalance in favor of those entering the labor force during the five-year period 1976-1980.

Moreover:

. . . since Cuba would need skilled workers to operate the new industries already invested in or planned, sending young workers to Eastern Europe to receive training was seen as being beneficial to Cuba in the medium and long term.

The majority of workers assigned to Eastern Europe were first time entrants into the labor force who had been recruited by local organs of People’s Power. These workers signed an employment agreement with CUBATECHNICA, an enterprise within Cuba’s State Committee for Economic Cooperation.

Working Conditions and Benefits

After a six-month training period, Cubans were said to receive the same salary and be subject to the same work rules and working conditions as other workers in the host country. They were also eligible for productivity bonuses and fringe benefits — paid holidays, medical services, and social security.

CUBATECHNICA acted as an intermediary in the payment of wages. Domestic currency accounts were opened in Cuban banks under the workers’ names. From these accounts, the Cuban government deducted expenses for clothing, lodging, and transportation. The balance of the account was turned over to the worker upon his or her final return. In the interim, relatives or other individuals in Cuba (authorized by the worker) had access to the account. Returning Cuban workers were permitted to import duty-free the goods they had purchased while abroad. Some workers who had “excelled in their work in East Germany were allowed to import a motorcycle upon their final return.”

Problems

Interestingly, guest workers from Cuba employed in other socialist countries faced problems similar to those encountered by the same type of workers in Western Europe. They were accused by permanent residents of criminal activity — black market activities, drug trafficking, capital crimes, and prostitution — and they were sometimes involved in disturbances with locals. One such event was described as follows:

The incident reportedly began when a German blocked the entrance of a Cuban guest worker to a discotheque. During the fight that ensued, a German citizen was knifed to death. Subsequently, a group of Germans approached the area where the Cuban guest workers lived, seeking revenge, and defaced the Cuban flag. The near-riot ended when the police intervened.

Similar  happenings occurred occasionally despite the knowledge that any guest worker engaged in antisocial or disruptive behavior would be deported immediately.

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Source:

Jorge Perez-Lopez and Sergio Diaz-Briquets, “Labor Migration and Offshore Assembly in the Socialist World: The Cuban Experience,” Population and Development Review, Volume 16 Issue 2 (June 1990).

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Photograph by Jean S (Flickr: Creative Commons)