Why did the Soviet Union place missiles in Cuba? And why didn’t they hide them? They were well aware of U-2 reconnaissance flights over the island.

Like many of you, I still am wondering why on earth Nikita Khruschev thought it would be a good idea to put missiles in Cuba, just 90 miles away from the American mainland.

Looking toward the 60th anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis, I began re-reading the well regarded analysis by Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. (1)  I wanted to refresh my memory and look for answers to the questions I posed earlier.

The book employs three explanatory models to explore the crisis: a rational actor or classical model; an organizational process model; and a governmental politics model.  My focus was on the ‘rational actor’ because it presented the most information on my overarching question: Why did the Soviet Union place missiles in Cuba?

The model presents five possibilities or hypotheses that I’m going to pass on to you. But first, here’s some context (and a selected timeline) on what’s been called “the finest hour of John F. Kennedy’s presidency.”

Context and Timeline Leading Up to the Cuban Missile Crisis

Throughout 1962, in the midst of the Cold War, the movement of Soviet personnel and equipment to Cuba aroused suspicions in the American intelligence community. In response, U.S. ships and planes began photographing every Cuba-bound Soviet vessel, and U-2 spy planes began regular reconnaissance flights over the island, just 90 miles off the coast of Florida.

September 4, 1962: Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin presents Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy with a confidential message from Chairman Khruschev. In the message, Khruschev promises that the Soviet Union will create no trouble for the United States during the coming election campaign.

President Kennedy responds that same day, warning that “the introduction of offensive missiles into Cuba would raise the gravest issue.”

September 6, 1962:  Dobrynin requests an urgent meeting with Special Counsel to the President Theodore Sorenson. He delivers a second personal message from Khruschev to Kennedy:

Nothing will be undertaken before the American Congressional elections that could complicate the international situation or aggravate the tension in the relations between our two countries . . . The Chairman does not wish to become involved in your internal affairs.

When Sorenson challenges the sincerity of this message, he is assured that the Soviets are doing nothing new in Cuba.

George Bolshakov, a Soviet official with a relationship to Bobby Kennedy, relays another message, asserting that “No missile capable of reaching the United States would be placed in Cuba.”

September 7, 1962: Congress grants the President standby authority to call up additional reservists.

September 11, 1962: Tass, the Russian news agency, is authorized to reiterate the Soviet government’s policy on the transfer of nuclear weapons to third nations:

. . . there is no need for the Soviet Union to shift its weapons for the repulsion of aggression, for a retaliatory blow, to any other country, for instance Cuba. Our nuclear weapons are so powerful in their explosive force and the Soviet Union has such powerful weapons to carry these nuclear warheads, that there is no need to search for sites for them beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union.

September 13, 1962: The President makes a major public statement on a Communist build-up in Cuba saying:

[if Cuba should] “become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies.

September 19, 1962: The United States Intelligence Board (USIB) approves the September National Intelligence Estimate that concludes that Soviet emplacement of missiles in Cuba is highly unlikely.

October 13, 1962: When questioned by Chester Bowles about the presence of Soviet “offensive weapons” in Cuba, Dobrynin emphatically denies any such possibility.

October 14, 1962: The US discovers Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba.

October 16, 1962: The Executive Committee of the National Security Council meets and discusses 5 alternative hypotheses, focusing on:

• Why did the Soviet Union undertake such a reckless move?
• What objective could the Soviets have had that would have justified a course of action which entailed a high probability of nuclear confrontation?
• What was the Soviet intention in placing offensive missiles in Cuba?

Five Hypotheses for the Emplacement of Missiles in Cuba

1. Bargaining Barter

Khruschev installed missiles in Cuba with the intent of using them as a bargaining device in a summit or U.N. confrontation with Kennedy. Withdrawal of Soviet missiles in Cuba would be traded for withdrawal of US missile bases in Turkey.

2. Diverting Trap

This hypothesis centers on Berlin, and imagines that the Soviets intended the missiles in Cuba to serve as a lightning rod. It goes something like this. If the US struck “little Cuba,” NATO would split, and Latin America would become rabidly anti-American. While the US was dealing with a public relations nightmare, the Soviets would make a strong move against Berlin. Think Suez and a second Hungary.

3. Cuban Defense

Although the Bay of Pigs was unsuccessful, it proved that the US could act. If  Kennedy decided to send in the Marines, Castro’s defeat was certain. The Soviet Union was so far away that it couldn’t provide enough conventional support to make a difference. If there was a significant probability of US action against Cuba, the Soviets had to act first in order to deter it. The missiles in Cuba were an answer to this threat.

4. Cold War Politics

Khruschev believed that the American people were “too liberal to fight,” but to demonstrate this he needed a fait accompli. He thought that “when confronted with operational missiles, the United States would react indecisively. . . . By unmasking an irresolute America, the Soviet Union would drastically reduce the credibility of U.S. commitments to other nations.” A victory in this instance would show that the tide in the Cold War had turned.

5. Missile Power

At the time of the crisis it was widely understood that the US held strategic  superiority over the Soviet Union. Thus, the Cuban missile deployment was a bold effort to show the world that the Soviet Union was not strategically inferior to the US in the realm of missile defense. In reality, there was a gap, and it could only be closed if the Soviets made considerable expenditures. Turning Cuba into a missile launcher that could strike the United States was perceived to be an inexpensive solution to a major problem.

(If you’re intrigued and would like a more in-depth discussion, including the pros and cons of each hypothesis, consult Essence of Decision.)

Conclusion and Additional Sources

Which hypothesis do you buy into? Have you already made up your mind?

Well, here’s the most widely accepted explanation.

. . . the introduction of strategic missiles into Cuba was motivated chiefly by the Soviet leaders’ desire to overcome . . . the existing large margin of United States strategic superiority. (Rand sovietologists Arnold Horeleck and Myron Rush.)

Not convinced? You can read the pros and cons of each hypothesis in Essence of Decision.

Those of you who like your reading to be lighter fare might enjoy Thirteen Days by Robert Kennedy or One Minute to Midnight by Michael Dobbs.  Of course you can always just make some popcorn and watch the movie Thirteen Days with Kevin Costner.

(As always, if you buy something on one of our Amazon links, CWS will receive a small bonus. Your price will not increase.)

For a trove of photographs go to the National Security Archives at George Washington University. Just click here.

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Featured photograph:

In the early stages of the Cuban missile crisis, this photograph showed that the Soviet Union was amassing offensive ballistic missiles in Cuba. It’s of Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) Launch Site Number 1 at San Cristobal, Cuba, and was taken on October 14, 1962.The photograph highlights launch equipment and missile trailers, proving that the Soviet Union was building offensive nuclear missile bases in Cuba.

Citation: Photograph PX1966-020-007; Photograph of MRBM Field Launch Site No. 1 in San Cristobal, Cuba; 10/14/1962; Briefing Board #07; Briefing Materials, 1962 – 1963; Collection JFK-5047: Department of Defense Cuban Missile Crisis Briefing Materials; John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA; National Archives and Records Administration.

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(1) My edition of  Essence of Decision is copyright 1971. There’s also a newer, updated edition by Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, published in 1999. I haven’t read the new edition.

If you keep up with the news, I’m sure you’re aware of the global movement of displaced people fleeing their home countries.

But did you know that, according to the United Nations, in June of 2022, one in 78 people across the world were considered displaced?

According to the New York Times, Syrians are the largest group of displaced people while Venezuelans are estimated to be the second-largest group.

The historic pace of undocumented immigrants entering the United States has continued even though the number of removals over the past year — more than 1.3 million — was more than any previous year.

However, the demographics of those immigrating has changed. The number of undocumented immigrants from Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras is down 43 percent from August 2021 while the number of Cubans, Nicaraguans and Venezuelans is up 175 percent.

According to Chris Magnus, US Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection:

Failing Communist regimes in Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba are driving a new wave of migration across the Western Hemisphere, including the recent increase in encounters at the southwest U.S. border . . .

Many of the immigrants are seeking asylum. (For more on the asylum issue read this  NYTimes Opinion piece.)

[Much of the information in the rest of this post is drawn from the work of the Center for Democracy in the Americas. I highly recommend their weekly email on Cuba titled U.S. – Cuba News Brief. Their recent interview with Julio Antonio Fernández Estrada, Visiting Scholar at the Cuba Studies Program at the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, and Denisse Delgado Vázquez, Doctoral Candidate in Public Policy at the University of Massachusetts, Boston, has also been useful. In the interview, they articulate their thoughts on recent trends in Cuban emigration, the possible causes of the record-breaking migration, what makes this current migratory wave distinct, and the role that U.S. policy plays in Cuban migration here. I quote them frequently in the post. Click here to read the interview. It’s available in Spanish here.]

The Numbers

So far in Fiscal Year 2022, over one percent of Cuba’s population has left the island.

More than 177,800 Cubans have arrived in the United States according to information provided by US Customs and Border Protection. This is the largest migration surge in recent decades, surpassing both the 1980 Mariel Exodus (125,000) and the 1994 Balsero Crisis (30,900).

Source: Elaborated by CDA with data from the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)

While the number of Cuban migrants attempting entrance into the US continues to rise, the number of Cuban minors – many of whom are unaccompanied – attempting entrance into the US has also increased significantly.  

There have been 662 encounters with unaccompanied Cuban minors at the US southern border since October 2021, which is a 1969% increase from the previous fiscal year.

The increase in unaccompanied minors is a symptom of the deteriorating living conditions found on the island.

Source: Elaborated by CDA with data from the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)

Previous Migratory Waves

1980: Mariel

For background information on Mariel, refer to the Cold War Studies post titled Cold War Cuba: Mariel.

Denisse Delgado notes:

In 1980, with the opening of the maritime bridge between the Cuban port of Mariel and Key West (Florida), Cuban exiles in the United States sailed to Cuba to pick up their relatives. In addition, Cuban officials put other people they considered a problem for Cuban society on these ships, including prisoners and psychiatric patients. This introduced greater diversity to the migratory flow, since in comparison to previous waves of migration, the Mariel Exodus was composed of a more racially and economically diverse population, whose educational level was lower.

Balsero Crisis: 1994

Denisse says:

The Balsero Crisis, unlike the Mariel Exodus, occurred in a context of deep economic crisis, after the fall of the Socialist bloc during which the Cuban people were affected by the paralysis of transportation by experiencing food and medicine shortages. The migration of the rafters (balseros, in Spanish) takes place by sea, like the Mariel, but the route is much more dangerous.

The “balseros” left in rustic boats that they built themselves.

The “balseros” were predominantly urban men who went alone, without their families, were younger than the general Cuban population, and had varying levels of education. They left mainly for economic reasons, although there were also political reasons.

Factors Relating to Cuban Migration Today

Cuba is currently in the midst of its worst economic crisis since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s as it faces record high inflation rates and a severe shortage of foreign currency. Contributory factors include a decline in tourism and exports associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as a reduction in remittances related to US policy.

According to Denisse:

Unlike the Mariel Exodus and the Balsero Crisis, the routes of the recent migratory outburst are more diverse, as they include maritime, air, and land routes. Particularly, border crossings between Mexico and the United States have increased, and Cubans have joined the irregular migratory caravans of Latin American migrants. It is a highly risky migration, like the Balsero Crisis, but where there is a greater presence of families migrating together, including more vulnerable members, such as children, the elderly and people with medical conditions.

Regarding family factors, Julio suggests:

Because of more widespread communication via the internet and social media, the structural crisis of the Cuban economy, political system, and society is now perceived with more anguish, desperation, and hopelessness than before.

Previously, parents of the young people did not advise them to leave the country. Now, families now make emigration plans in which they even organize solo departures from Cuba for young people.

The Impact of Emigration on Cuba

Inequality

Denisse argues:

Although irregular migration is racially diverse, Cuban migration is characterized by a greater presence of people who identify as white. Thus, remittances are received predominantly by white families living on the island, thereby reproducing economic inequalities that are intertwined within the island’s racial profile. It is important to mention that vulnerable or marginalized communities in Cuba have a greater presence of black and mestizo people.

Aging

For detailed information on demographics in Cuba, read this Cold War Studies Post. Aging and fertility decline are long-term trends, exacerbated further by the migration of young people and females.

Americans Can Now Expect to Live Three Years Less than Cubans, Rob Minto, Newsweek

Vulnerable and Marginalized Communities

Julio explains:

The marginalized and vulnerable communities are in increasingly worse situations because their families don’t have the necessary resources to pay for plane tickets to Nicaragua, Guyana or other countries, embassy fees, the cost of human traffickers, etc. In these circumstances, when a family manages to get someone to leave the country, they do so at the cost of losing assets accumulated throughout their lives or getting into debt, often with loan sharks.

Denisse says (as noted before):

Cuban migration is characterized by a greater presence of people who identify as white. Thus, remittances are received predominantly by white families living on the island, thereby reproducing economic inequalities that are intertwined within the island’s racial profile. It is important to mention that vulnerable or marginalized communities in Cuba have a greater presence of black and mestizo people.

Conclusion

To conclude, seaborne migration from Cuba for Fiscal Year 2022 now totals more than for the past five years combined.

Eleven months into FY2022, Cuban migration to the US has eclipsed the Mariel Boatlift of 1980 and the Balsero Crisis of 1994 combined.

Cubans are less likely than other nationalities to make repeated attempts to enter the US because, at least so far, they are not subject to immediate expulsion.

So long as living conditions on the island remain untenable, migratory waves will continue.

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If you’d like more information on Cuban migration today, take a look at the following:

After arriving in the United States, thousands of Cuban migrants face new legal hurdles, Norma Gámez Torres and Syra Ortiz Blanes, Miami Herald

Cubans flee island’s economic woes by air, land and sea, Gisela Salomon, AP News

Video: Why Cubans are facing the worst power outages in decades, Patrick Oppman, CN

The video below is the second in a two part series that takes you quickly through the last 50 or so years of Cuba’s political and economic history.

Here are the salient points:

By 1990, when the Russians were gone, things were really tough. It was becoming very clear that the Cuban people could not sustain life at such a minimal level indefinitely.

Castro and his advisers came up with a new strategy.

Agriculture was one of three areas of focus.

Acquisition of scarce hard currency through tourism and biotechnology was also central.

The key was to develop things that would produce a high rate of return.

Cuba’s economic decision-makers wanted to allow capitalist investment and enterprise to operate within Cuba itself.

They counted on the appeal of Cuba’s beautiful beaches.

They also believed that historic attractions like Old Havana could be used to promote the tourist sector.

Prostitution has increased and inequality between those working in the dollar economy and others has become a reality.

Multiplier effects include sales of tobacco and rum.

In mid 1990, the first joint venture hotel opened in Varadero beach with profits to be split 50-50.

The hotel, built with foreign capital, had construction costs of $30 million.

The growth of the tourist industry has been accompanied by large investments in construction to enlarge hotel facilities.

By 2011 there were well over 2 million tourists, many more than before the Revolution.

Joint venture capital includes major investors from Spain, Germany, Austria, and Finland among others.

Cuba’s military is highly involved in the tourist sector.

There has been substantial construction of tourist facilities within Havana itself, which retains its position as the main tourist attraction within the country.

Old Havana, a UNESCO World Heritage site, is particularly attractive to tourists.

Old Havana, the colonial core, is known for its lovely old buildings.

Finance was centered in Old Havana in an area known as ‘little Wall Street.’ This was a symbol of North Americanization.

Most activities was centered around the various plazas.

In Havana, rather than displacing residents of the old core, the area is being redeveloped with a concern for the integration of social services and living quarters.

While commercial activities are in place on the first floor of many buildings, renovated housing is available on the upper levels.

Due to a shortage of classrooms, elementary school classes are held in the public space of recently reconstructed museums.

Joint ventures and foreign real estate investment insure that resources are available to redevelop historical commercial structures.

UNESCO continues to assist with the renovation of convents, cathedrals, and other designated buildings.

Despite strenuous US objections, tourism alone is ensuring Cuba a fair amount of success in its efforts to be reintegrated into the regional economy of Latin America and the Caribbean.

Jamaica, Mexico, and other Latin American nations are involved in substantial joint ventures related to tourism.

Other Cuban trade efforts are also meeting with regional success.

The relaxation of US sanctions would provide a definite boost to the Cuban tourism industry.

Raul says: “We have to eliminate forever the notion that Cuba is the only country in the world where one can live without working.”

He goes on to say: “Without an increase in efficiency and productivity, it is impossible to sustain definitively the enormous social expenditures of our socialist system.”

Right now Cuba’s economy is stagnant.

The real value of wages in Cuba remains at around 40% of the 1989 level.

Cuenta-Propistas — the self-employed — have become the designated saviors of the Cuban economy.

Raul diplays remarkable faith in micro-enterprise and the “Gospel of Productivity.”

The key question: Can the micro (and cooperative)-enterprise sector absorb 500,000-1,200,000 apparently redundant workers?

The Fidelista model is discredited.

We will have to wait and see what happens.

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Video by Lisa Reynolds Wolfe

(Please don’t use the contact info at the end of the video. You can always reach me at lisa@coldwarstudies.com)

 

I wrote this post for Cold War Magazine in 2016 when, for the first time in 88 years, an American president was visiting the island of Cuba. Now, Cuban Americans are in the news again because of their voting power in the upcoming 2020 presidential election, so I thought this would be a good time to reprint the article. The focus is on what’s been happening in Cuba since the 1959 revolution.

The video below will give you the insight you need to understand Cuba’s sociocultural, political, and economic conditions.

It is the first of two parts that will take you quickly through the last 50 or so years of Cuba’s political and economic history. (I’ll post Part Two next week.)

Here are the highlights:

Fidel Castro – popularly named “Savior of the Fatherland” and “Maximum Leader” – reached Havana on January 8, 1959.

President Batista fled Cuba very early in the morning on January 1, 1959.

Opposition to Batista first emerged in 1955. By December 1958 most Cubans despised his government.

Even the Eisenhower Administration wanted Batista out of office.

At the time of the Revolution, Havana was home to the privileged, hardworking, and marginalized.

A great deal of American investment was in the Vedado section of Havana where the Hotel Nacional was located.

In the 1950s, Havana was the center of commercialized vice, much of it underwritten by US organized crime.

The city was famous for its glitzy atmosphere.

At first everything was fine between Castro and the American government. But soon bad blood ensued.

When Cuba nationalized US petroleum properties, Eisenhower eliminated Cuba from the US sugar quota.

As the 1960s progressed, Castro was preoccupied with developing a model of socialist self-government that was uniquely Cuban.

Castro wanted to “ruralize the city” and “urbanize the countryside.”

Resources poured into rural areas for electrification and the construction of new towns.

Roads and buildings in Havana suffered from a lack of upkeep and maintenance.

In 1972, Cuba joined COMECON, the economic arm of the Soviet bloc, and in 1975 Cuba began implementing Soviet economic and planning principles.

Soviet models of economic and social planning facilitated Havana’s social, cultural, and political integration with the Soviet bloc.

1986 marked the beginning of a new period called the Period of Rectification. By this time, Cubans were disillusioned with the Soviets.

Cubans were pressuring their government to return to the core Revolutionary project with its significant gains in the status of women and blacks.

Unfortunately for Cuba, glasnost and perestroika in the Soviet Union put an end to any hoped for reforms.

In 1990, with the end of the Cold War, Cuba entered a challenging period known as The Special Period (of War) in Time of Peace.

Cuba had an oil driven economy and 98% of the island’s petroleum came from the Soviet bloc.

Aside from oil, 66% of Cuba’s food, 86% of all raw material, and 80% of machinery and spare parts came from Soviet dominated trading partners.

Factory closures became common, food scarcity was widespread, and the already inadequate technology base began eroding.

Exports were also affected since 66% of Cuba’s sugar, 73% of the island’s nickel, and 98% of the country’s citrus fruits had been exported to the Soviet bloc.

Cuba’s abandonment by the USSR was further complicated by a tightening of US sanctions.

Things were very tough. Learn more in Part II.

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Video by Lisa Reynolds Wolfe

(Please don’t use the contact info at the end of the video. You can always reach me at lisa@coldwarstudies.com)

 

Migration from the countryside of Cuba to the nation’s capital, Havana, was extremely sluggish during much of the 1970s. This, along with other factors, contributed to the capital’s low population increase.

Havana’s percentage increase remained low compared to that of other Latin American cities throughout the decade.

The capital’s rate of growth increased over the period 1980-1990 while expansion in other areas of Latin America was beginning to slow during the same period.

Population shifts impacted Havana differentially.

At the municipio level, those areas of the city most affected by population growth were Diez de Octobre, Playa, Centro Havana, Arroyo Naranjo, and Playa. These areas contained more than 50% of all the capital’s inhabitants.

The most densely populated municipios were those located in the center of the city — Centro Havana, Old Havana, Diez de Octobre, Cerro, and Plaza. These areas had density levels as high as 10,000 inhabitants per square kilometer.

The municipios with the lowest density levels were those on the periphery of the city — Guanabacoa, Habana del Este, Cororro, Boyeros, and Arroyo.

After 1970, however, the municipios that made up the urban core of the capital — Old Havana, Centro Havana, Regla, Diez de Octobre, and Cerro — began to grow more slowly as areas on the periphery having more free space began to attract residents.

Also, the capital began to reflect the effects of differential migration, with a lower percentage of male residents (91.6 males for every 100 females) than elsewhere in Cuba, and a higher proportion of residents over 60 years of age (14.7% of all residents as compared to 11.7% for the rest of the country). Once again, these factors were both cause and effect of Havana’s lowered fertility rate.

Over much of the period, growth due to in-migration was higher — and in all cases was proportionally greater — than growth due to natural increase. Nevertheless, the proportion of the capital’s growth attributable to in-migration continued to remain low over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, particularly in comparison to pre-1958 levels when Havana was the destination of 45% of the country’s migrants.

Over the entire period 1970-1981, the capital absorbed only 12.9% of the country’s migrants, while Havana absorbed 25.8% of all Cuba’s internal migrants from 1976-1981.

These figures can be compared to other areas of Latin America. For example, Santiago de Chile, Lima, and Caracas received 34.2%, 40%, and 34.2% of their countries migrants respectively during this approximate time frame.

In sum, since in-migration was balanced by emigration and low fertility, Havana exhibited slow growth over the entire period when that capital could be called a Cold War City.

Export of Labor Flows

The outflow of Cuban labor associated with the country’s military activity overseas is well documented. However, Cuba’s export of labor flows for revenue and training purposes is less discussed. Still, these programs affected Havana during the 1970s and 1980s because they targeted the most desirable members of the city’s labor force, young men loyal to the revolution.

Most of the workers selected were at the lower end of the 18 to 27 age bracket. They were required to be single, have completed elementary school, have a “revolutionary record” and good moral character, and pass a physical examination. Twenty percent of the workers were female, and a high percentage (50 percent or more) were members of the Union of Communist Youth (UJC). The tour of duty was generally four years, with the first six months devoted to training. At mid- assignment, the workers were given an all expense paid home leave.

Cuba’s Labor Challenges

In conjunction with Cuba’s international military activities and civilian assistance programs, migration exacerbated the labor challenges that Havana was facing. Now the city was increasingly required to solve problems encompassing revolutionary promises of full employment in the context of its expanding unskilled and unmotivated labor supply.

During the decade of the 1970s, the economically active population in Cuba — those employed, unemployed or first-time job seekers — was increasing at an annual rate of over three percent a year. This growth was expected to continue at the rate of two percent per year over the decade of the 1980s after which it was expected to drop substantially. Exporting labor was one way to deal with the expanding supply of workers.

Cuban Guest Workers Abroad

By the second half of the 1970s, Cuba was supplying unskilled labor to factories in East Germany and Czechoslovakia and, in the early 1980s, Cuban workers were also sent to Hungary.

The number of Cuban guest workers abroad grew from 12,000 in mid-1981 to approximately 15,000 in early 1983, and the number was anticipated to climb to 50,000 by the end of 1995. By that time, Bulgaria was also expected to host Cuban workers. Cubans began to work in the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s and, in 1989, Cuban construction workers were sent to Armenia to assist in construction after a major earthquake. These workers filled the need for labor in the most developed communist countries.

The Government’s Rationale

While labor migration is thought to be a phenomenon associated primarily with capitalism, several explanations have been given for the shortage of workers in centrally planned economies. These include a tendency for enterprises to overestimate the number of workers they actually need, a demand for additional labor resources to meet quantitative output goals and, conversely, a tendency to underestimate costs, resulting in a systematic understatement of labor requirements.

Two explanations were used to justify sending temporary migrant workers to other socialist countries.

• First, migrant sending countries were able to temporarily deal with labor surplus problems.
• Second, migrant workers were perceived to be participants in co-operative training programs.

The Cuban government used both of these reasons in presenting its rationale to the Cuban people. The government argued that through 1975 employment had outstripped supply. However, since that time:

. . . the troubles that arise from the [US economic] blockade and the very nature of underdevelopment, have not permitted the balanced growth between labor supply and demand, so that there has been a slight imbalance in favor of those entering the labor force during the five-year period 1976-1980.

Moreover:

. . . since Cuba would need skilled workers to operate the new industries already invested in or planned, sending young workers to Eastern Europe to receive training was seen as being beneficial to Cuba in the medium and long term.

The majority of workers assigned to Eastern Europe were first time entrants into the labor force who had been recruited by local organs of People’s Power. These workers signed an employment agreement with CUBATECHNICA, an enterprise within Cuba’s State Committee for Economic Cooperation.

Working Conditions and Benefits

After a six-month training period, Cubans were said to receive the same salary and be subject to the same work rules and working conditions as other workers in the host country. They were also eligible for productivity bonuses and fringe benefits — paid holidays, medical services, and social security.

CUBATECHNICA acted as an intermediary in the payment of wages. Domestic currency accounts were opened in Cuban banks under the workers’ names. From these accounts, the Cuban government deducted expenses for clothing, lodging, and transportation. The balance of the account was turned over to the worker upon his or her final return. In the interim, relatives or other individuals in Cuba (authorized by the worker) had access to the account. Returning Cuban workers were permitted to import duty-free the goods they had purchased while abroad. Some workers who had “excelled in their work in East Germany were allowed to import a motorcycle upon their final return.”

Problems

Interestingly, guest workers from Cuba employed in other socialist countries faced problems similar to those encountered by the same type of workers in Western Europe. They were accused by permanent residents of criminal activity — black market activities, drug trafficking, capital crimes, and prostitution — and they were sometimes involved in disturbances with locals. One such event was described as follows:

The incident reportedly began when a German blocked the entrance of a Cuban guest worker to a discotheque. During the fight that ensued, a German citizen was knifed to death. Subsequently, a group of Germans approached the area where the Cuban guest workers lived, seeking revenge, and defaced the Cuban flag. The near-riot ended when the police intervened.

Similar  happenings occurred occasionally despite the knowledge that any guest worker engaged in antisocial or disruptive behavior would be deported immediately.

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Source:

Jorge Perez-Lopez and Sergio Diaz-Briquets, “Labor Migration and Offshore Assembly in the Socialist World: The Cuban Experience,” Population and Development Review, Volume 16 Issue 2 (June 1990).

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Photograph by Jean S (Flickr: Creative Commons)

During the 1970s, Cuba expanded its involvement overseas, initially volunteering, but soon selling its military and civilian services to other nations of the Third World.

Some argue that Cuba was merely a puppet with the Soviet Union pulling the strings. However, many believe that Cuba had its own reasons for international opportunism. In fact, as can be deduced from discussions on housing and consumer goods, it is certainly plausible for Cuba to have adopted its 1970s outreach policy largely because of domestic economic considerations.

As a consequence of Soviet trade bloc deficiencies, the Cubans continued to approach capitalist countries for needed items, and this activity, in turn, resulted in a cumulative deficit with Western industrial countries totaling $2.6 billion for the years 1975-1978. At the same time, the regime began providing both military and civilian assistance worldwide. These commitments expanded over time and Cuba was eventually paid on a contract by contract basis.

By 1977, Cuba had about 5,400 workers in Africa. By 1978, there were close to 39,000 military advisors and troops in Africa, and by 1980 the government was involved in civilian assistance programs in thirty-seven countries. These outreach efforts served as a pressure valve for the urban labor market and provided a variety of material perks for participants. Benefits included a 20 percent raise in salary, special pension benefits, priority access to housing and other scarce consumer goods, prestige, and access to party membership.

Construction was the principal component of the civilian aid program and, by the late 1970s, about three percent of Cuba’s construction workers were involved in overseas projects. They built hospitals, highways, hotels, poultry complexes, milking barns, airports, and schools in a variety of locations such as Peru, North Vietnam, Laos, Guinea, and Tanzania.

The number of construction workers overseas rose from 4,500 in 1978 to 7,900 a year later, and it was estimated that 25,000 would be assigned overseas jobs in the “near future.” Meanwhile, medical and education projects were also common.

In 1979, at least 2,300 Cuban teachers were abroad (about two percent of Cuba’s total), while 9,000 students, mostly African, studied in Cuba.

The medical program involved 700 personnel in 1977, almost 1,200 in 1979, and about 2,000 in 1980. The 1980 program “employed somewhere between seven and thirteen percent of Cuba’s stock of doctors” along with dentists, nurses, and technicians.

Many other specialists also ended up overseas, including experts in such diverse activities as agriculture, sugar cultivation and refining, fishing, transportation, cattle raising, irrigation, industry, economic and physical planning, and management.

Certainly this was a loss for Havana and other places of origin within Cuba. At the the same time, there were clearly economic gains for the workers, as we have seen, as well as benefits and advantages for the society as a whole.

The overseas assistance programs provided a reasonable amount of hard currency, about $50 million in 1977. Two years later only two contracts (those with Libya and Angola) generated 18 percent of the value of Cuba’s hard currency trade. The country also benefited by establishing relationships with potential suppliers for key import needs and by opening up investment opportunities. For example, Cuba was granted permission to operate within Angola’s fishing zones and also received permission to operate fishing vessels off the West African coast, a boon for one of Cuba’s key economic sectors.

Despite their benefits, the aid programs had several negative consequences at home. Since seventy percent of those fighting in Angola were reservists, Havana lost civilian personnel. Many employers became increasingly reluctant to release workers for active duty because overseas programs deleted the domestic labor force of skilled personnel at a time when unskilled laborers were flooding the streets of Havana. Those available for work in the capital lacked the skills required by many of the vacancies. At the same time, the unemployed received 70 percent of their prospective wages while waiting for a job to materialize.

Aid programs were highly dependent on construction workers and, as can be deduced from the state of Havana’s housing, this was the employment sector that the city could least afford to lose.

Construction contracts were highly competitive and the best workers and craftsmen were sent abroad in an effort to avoid losing the projects. Not surprisingly, the number of housing units declined as the number of construction workers sent overseas expanded.

Scarce building supplies were diverted to the export economy. For example, cement, an item always in short supply, was exported in 1975 for foreign exchange. Similarly, opportunity costs could be cited for the loss of teachers and medical personnel.

Despite some drawbacks for society as a whole, workers were quite eager to volunteer for overseas assignments. “When Castro called for volunteers to serve in Nicaragua . . . 29,500 teachers offered to go.” Their willingness can be interpreted in several ways. First, the effort might be seen as a way to serve the revolution. On the other hand, given the scarcity and cost of consumer goods, volunteering might be seen as an opportunity to gain economically.

Whatever the reason, as a variety of overseas opportunities developed, many habaneros, along with other Cubans, made themselves available for the type of overseas work more usually associated with capitalist workers.