GROUP B: THROUGH A COLD WAR LENS

Group B teams include Argentina, Nigeria, South Korea, and Greece. Stats and team info are courtesy of ESPN.

ARGENTINA

Nickname: LA ALBACELESTE (White and Blue Sky)
Appearance: 15th
Record: W 33/ D 13/ L 19
Best Performance: Winners in ’78, ’86
Group Stage Schedule:
June 12 vs. Nigeria- Win
June 17 vs. South Korea – Win
June 22 vs. Greece at 2:00 PM ET

Two-time champion Argentina will be making its 10th straight World Cup appearance, its first with the legendary Diego Maradona as Manager. Qualifying was rough, and Group B won’t be easy, but when FIFA World Player of the Year, Lionel Messi, laces up his boots, Football Worldcup 2010 could easily become a return to ’78 and ’86 for LA ALBICELESTE.

During the Cold War, the United States viewed its relationship with Argentina through the lens of its larger Latin American policies, and Argentina used its relationship with the United States to shape its relationships with neighboring countries. This meant fighting Communist and left-wing subversion.

Argentine foreign policy was highly influenced by competing domestic political forces, most notably the military. The military overthrow of populist President Juan Peron in 1955 was crucial to US-Argentine relations. The frostiness of the US relationship with Peron was replaced by friendliness with the military regimes that followed.

The Argentine military led the country through many of the most important periods of the Cold War. Their dictatorships advanced anti-Communist rhetoric as a fundamental tenet of Argentine nationalism, and advanced the protection of the Argentine elite as fundamental to Argentine national security.

Argentina’s foreign policy meshed nicely with US Cold War ideology. US and Argentine strategic interests coincided, resulting in the National Security Doctrine. This set forth shared assumptions and techniques for countering Communist and left-wing subversion.

The US and Argentina were especially cooperative over nuclear policy.

The Second World War and early Cold War tensions were the backdrop for Argentina’s first foray into nuclear power. An Argentine War Ministry decree (No. 22855-45) in 1945 blocked the export of uranium, signaling an early awareness of the strategic importance of nuclear power. A year later, the country debated the nationalization of uranium mines. The nuclear sector emerged as Argentina’s most important area of technological advancement in the Cold War Period.

After a rocky start, the US and Argentina signed a nuclear cooperation agreement in 1953. The accord provided Argentians with information and technology on an Argonaut experimental reactor. In return, the US government had the chance to conduct aerial surveys of Argentinian zones thought to contain uranium-rich deposits.

Negotiations concerning international nuclear policy reflect the true strength of the US-Argentine relationship.

NIGERIA

Nickname: THE SUPER EAGLES
Appearance: 4th
Record: W 4/ D 1/ L 6
Best Performance: Round of 16 in ’94, ’98
Group Stage Schedule:
June 12 vs. Argentina – Loss
June 17 vs. Greece – Loss
June 22 vs. Greece at 2:00 PM ET

Nigeria learned to play the beautiful game in friendly matches against its colonial British rulers in the ’50s. But it wasn’t until ’94 that THE SUPER EAGLES showed the world what they had learned by soaring into the Second Round of the World Cup. Football Worldcup 2010 may prove to be their return to form on the back of star midfielder John Obi Mikel.

Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were interested in Nigeria because of its size, population, economic and military potential, and, especially for the United States, its oil.

From 1966 to 1977, Nigeria was very cool toward the United States. The two countries took opposing positions over southern African liberation.

Nigerians were angered by pro Biafran propaganda in the United States and by America’s refusal to sell arms to the federation during the civil war. United States involvement was even suspected by Nigeria in the assassination of Murtala Muhammad, the military ruler of Nigeria from 1975 until his assassination in 1976.

In 1977 Jimmy Carter became president, and Nigerian relations with the United States suddenly changed. The United States recognized Nigeria as a stabilizing force in Africa and was willing to consult with Nigeria on African issues.

America and Nigeria appeared to have similar interests in southern Africa. The special relationship had a weak basis, however, depending mostly upon continuing agreement and cooperation over southern African issues. Once Ronald Reagan replaced Carter as president (1981-88), the countries again had divergent interests in southern Africa.

Just as the balance of trade was not expected to shift dramatically with the opening of Eastern Europe so, too, Nigeria’s political position was not expected to change greatly. In a time of shifting world coalitions, a position of nonalignment with a leaning toward the West provided more options for Nigeria than ever.

Events in southern Africa, including Namibia‘s independence and the opening of debate for eliminating apartheid in South Africa, removed the largest obstacles to closer relations with the United States without excluding the Soviet Union or other leading powers. (Courtesy of http://www.country-studies.com/nigeria/foreign-relations.html)

SOUTH KOREA

Nickname: TREGUK JEONSA (Treguk Warriors)
Appearance: 7th
Record: W 4/ D 7/ L 13
Best Performance: Fourth Place in ‘o2
Group Stage Schedule:
June 12 vs. Greece – Win
June 17 vs. Argentina – Loss
June 22 vs. Nigeria at 2:00 PM ET

South Korea is making its 7th straight World Cup appearance. As hosts in 2002, the Treguk Warriors broke through to the semifinals under Manager Guus Hiddink. But after an early exit in 2006, South Korea is eager for a return to the knockout stage. 2010 also marks the only time South and North Korea have played in the same World Cup.

Korea (like Germany) was jointly occupied by Soviet and American forces at the end of World War II, more by accident than design. The US ended up in the south, the USSR in the north.

Moscow and Washington were able to agree without difficulty that the 38th parallel, which split the peninsula in half, would serve as a line of demarcation pending the creation of a single Korean government and the subsequent withdrawal of occupation forces.

The Americans and Soviets left Korea in 1948-49, but there was no agreement on who would run the country. It remained divided with the American supported Republic of Korea in control of the south by virtue of an election sanctioned by the United Nations.

The Soviet supported Democratic Republic of Korea ruled the north where elections were not held.

The only thing unifying the country was a civil war, with each side claiming to be the legitimate government and threatening to invade the other.
Neither side could do this without superpower support, so the spasmodic skirmishes between North and South Korean troops did not raise much alarm.

Stalin eventually became convinced that the US would not fight in Korea, so he gave the “green light” to Kim-Il sung, the leader of North Korea, to invade the south.

The invasion of South Korea on June 25,1950, came as a complete surprise to Washington even though a CIA report in March had predicted an invasion in June. It took the Truman administration only hours to decide that the US would come to the defense of South Korea under the authority of the United Nations.

The situation became more complicated in November 1950 when some 300,000 Chinese entered the war.

Syngman Rhee, the President of South Korea, was a staunch anticommunist and he adamantly opposed the 1953 armistice that left his country divided.

Rhee did not succeed in scrapping the armistice, but he did signal the Eisenhower administration that being a dependent ally would not necessarily make him an obedient ally.

Rhee’s most effective argument (according to Gaddis) was that if the US did not support him and the repressive regime he was imposing on South Korea that country would collapse, and the Americans would be in worse shape on the Korean peninsula than if they assisted him.

Rhee got a bilateral security treaty, together with a commitment from Washington to keep America in South Korea for as long as they were needed to ensure that country’s safety.

Rhee’s Cold War blackmail left the US defending an authoritarian regime. Interestingly, approximately 28,550 American troops are still based on the Korean peninsula.

GREECE

Nickname: THE PIRATE SHIP
Appearance: 2nd
Record: W 0/ D 0/ L 3
Best Performance: Group Stage in ’94
Group Stage Schedule:
June 12 vs. South Korea – Loss
June 17 vs. Nigeria – Win
June 22 vs. Argentina at 2:00 PM ET

Despite being founded in the early 1900s, the Greek soccer team is a newcomer to international success. Its first international title in 2004 established THE PIRATE SHIP as a force to be reckoned with. Striker Theofanis Gekas and Manager King Otto want to add to this success as they attempt to steer Greece to the top of Group B in Football Worldcup 2010.

In October 1944, in the famous “percentages” agreement, Churchill and Stalin agreed that the British would have authority in Greece. But in early 1947 the British government announced that it could no longer bear the cost of supporting that nation.

The US had little choice but to involve itself in the eastern Mediterranean.

On the morning of March 12, 1947, President Harry S. Truman appeared before Congress to ask for $400 million of aid to Greece and Turkey.

Truman forcefully presented a clear picture of the ideological struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. His articulation of that struggle became known as the “Truman Doctrine.”

Although based on a simplistic analysis of internal strife in Greece and Turkey, it became the single dominating influence over U.S. policy until at least the Vietnam War.

Truman’s Doctrine called on the United States to “support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”

The President’s speech had a tremendous effect. The anti-communist feelings that had just begun to hatch in the U.S. were given a great boost, and a silenced Congress voted overwhelmingly in approval of aid.  From then on, the US actively engaged any communist threats anywhere in the globe, brandishing its role as the leader of the “free world.” Meanwhile, the Soviet Union brandished its position as the leader of the “progressive” and “anti-imperialist” camp.

In many ways, the Truman Doctrine marked the formal declaration of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union — it also solidified the United States’ position regarding containment.

The Soviets accepted the Truman Doctrine’s “two rival worlds” idea. It went along with the notion of a world divided into two hostile camps — one capitalist, the other communist. For Stalin, a final class struggle would mean certain Soviet victory. For more on the “two camps” see our earlier post.

To further contain the spread of communism, in June 1947 newly appointed Secretary of State George C. Marshall announced the comprehensive program of financial assistance that came to bear his name: The Marshall Plan. But it’s important to remember, that just like the Olympics, American Cold War policy was cemented in Greece.

GROUP A: THROUGH A COLD WAR LENS

World Cup Fever is here!! Since you can’t get away from it, I thought it might be fun to look at the South Africa World Cup Qualifiers through a Cold War lens. Who are they and what role did they play in the half century Cold War conflict?

Let’s start with Group A:  South Africa, Mexico, Uruguay, and France.  (All stats and team info are courtesy of ESPN.)

SOUTH AFRICA

Nickname: BAFANA, BAFANA (The Boys, The Boys)
Appearance: 3rd
Record: W 1/ D 3/ L 2
Best Performance: Group Stage in ’98, ’02
Group Stage Schedule:
June 11 vs. Mexico – Draw
June 16 vs. Uruguay at 2 PM ET
June 22 vs. France at 9:30 AM ET

BAFANA BAFANA and the South African people are elated to be hosting the 2010 World Cup. Their makarrpas and vuvuzelas contribute to the palpable excitement on and off the field. Their manager Carlos Parreira (from Brazil) and Captain Aaron Mokdena hope that the home field advantage and the team’s “Piano and Shoeshine” style of play will give the country even more reason to celebrate!

For two centuries South Africa’s center of the political universe was Great Britain. After World War II, however, this focus was replaced by the United States. South African pilots participated in the Berlin airlift of 1948-1949. Later, a squadron flew ground attack and interdiction missions as part of the US Air Force’s 18th Fighter Bomber Wing in the Korean War.

During the Cold War, South Africa was a racially divided country. The majority black population was ruled by a white minority. The racial fault line — APARTHEID — almost perfectly paralleled the Cold War divide.

Fear of Communism haunted the white minority government from the 1950s to the collapse of single party rule in Eastern Europe in 1989. Anti-communism informed almost every aspect of the South African government’s foreign policy and much of its domestic policy during the Cold War years.

In contrast, the  impoverished black majority in South Africa looked to the Soviet Union and its allies for intellectual and financial support. In fact, South Africa and Egypt were the first two countries in Africa to give rise to Communist parties — both in the 1920s.

From America’s perspective, however, the core concern in South Africa was not ‘communism’  or ‘anti-communism.’  Instead, the US was worried about whether the minority regime had access to nuclear weapons. As it turns out, they did. But although they manufactured seven fission gun-type devices, these were never used and South Africa signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on July 10, 1991.

The 1974 Carnation Revolution in Portugal (team playing in Group G) led to the end of Portuguese colonial rule in Africa. Angola, a former colony, entered into a decades-long civil war. The superpowers and South Africa were quickly drawn into the conflict which became a flash point for the Cold War. Three main guerrilla groups, the FNLA, MPLA and UNITA were fighting each other and the country was well on its way to being divided into zones controlled by rival armed political groups. The United States, Portugal, Brazil and South Africa supported the FNLA and UNITA. The Soviet Union and Cuba supported the MPLA.

After a short period of stability another former colony Mozambique also entered into a devastating civil war. Their new government gave shelter and support to the South African liberation movement, the African National Congress.

By 1989 when the Berlin Wall was breached, the continuing conflict involving South Africa had grown domestically untenable. Western multinationals were pressured by the stigma attached to investing in APARTHEID South Africa and the negative effect it had on their corporate image. So far as the US was concerned, South Africa had lost its pivotal role.

The Soviet Union no longer had any desire to be involved in expensive wars abroad.

Multiparty democracy was the only way forward. The success of South Africa in ending apartheid and moving forward as a multiracial democracy is evident in their ability to host and promote the South Africa World Cup Soccer event!

MEXICO

Nickname: EL TRI (The Three Colored)
Appearance: 14th
Record: W 11/ D 12/ L 22
Best Performance: Quarterfinals in ’70, ’86
Group Stage Schedule:
June 11 vs. South Africa – Draw
June 17 vs. France at 2 PM ET
June 22 vs. Uruguay at 9:30 AM ET

Mexico enters  World Cup 2010 with renewed spirit and hope, united around Manager Javier Aguirre. When EL TRI began to struggle, Aguirre returned to the team as Manager. He turned things around just in time for Mexico to qualify for the South Africa World Cup Soccer extravaganza.

As we know, the United States saw the Cold War as a global struggle against communism as embodied by the totalitarian Soviet state.  The United States government and a significant portion of its citizenry considered communism an evil force in the world, one that must be combated with all available ideological, military, and financial means.

On the other hand, Mexico, America’s close neighbor, took a much less critical view of communism and was less likely to associate all things communist with the Soviet Union.  As a result, Mexicans viewed the Cold War not as a principled crusade, but as an example of aggression by imperialist states whose financial and military power allowed them to dominate less developed countries.

Hemispheric unity was shaken when Mexico decided that snubbing Russia’s client, Cuba, was not worth the risk. Mexico’s government maintained diplomatic and economic relations with the island nation over the objections of the United States.

URUGUAY

Nickname: LA CELESTE (The Sky Blue)
Appearance: 11th
Record: W 15/ D 10/ L 15
Best Performance: Winners in ’30, ’50
Group Stage Schedule:
June 11 vs. France – Draw
June 16 vs. South Africa at 2 PM ET
June 22 vs. Mexico at 9:30 AM ET

Uruguay is one of five countries to have won the World Cup twice, in 1930 and 1950. Although LA CELESTE has been quiet for decades, in 2010 its explosive offense — led by prolific goal scorer Diego Forlan — has re-energized the team and given the country hope for a third trophy.

In 1930, Uruguay was chosen as the site of the first Football World Cup. Although the field was much smaller than the competitions of today, the event was a source of national pride when the home team won the tournament over neighboring Argentina.

At the height of the competition between Washington and Moscow for influence in South America, Uruguay was thought to be a nest of US and Soviet spies.

Drawing on the recollections of those involved as well as on declassified intelligence documents, Raul Vallarino, author of The CIA in Uruguay, claims that the country was the Soviet spy center for all of Latin America.

An urban guerrilla movement known as the Tupamaros formed in the early 1960s, first engaging in Robin Hood type protest activities, such as robbing banks and distributing the proceeds to the poor, and then attempting political dialogue.

The Tupamaros were also known as the MLN (Movimiento de Liberación Nacional) or National Liberation Movement.

When the government banned their political activities and the police became more oppressive, the Tupamaros  engaged in armed struggle with the police, kidnapping corrupt officials and perceived enemies.

The US Office of Public Safety (OPS) began operating in Uruguay in 1965,  training Uruguayan police and intelligence agents in policing and interrogration techniques.

President Jorge Pacheco declared a state of emergency in 1968. This was followed by a further suspension of civil liberties in 1972 by his successor, President Juan María Bordaberry, who brought in the Army to combat the guerillas.

After defeating the Tupamaros, the military seized power in 1973.

In 1984, massive protests against military rule broke out. After a 24-hour general strike, talks began and the armed forces announced a plan that would  return Uruguay to civilian rule.

National elections were held in 1984. Subsequently, economic reforms were implemented and there was a consolidation of democratic rule.

FRANCE

Nickname: LES BLEUS (The Blues)
Appearance: 13th
Record: W 25/ D 10/ L 16
Best Performance: Winners in ’98
Group Stage Schedule:
June 11 vs. Uruguay – Draw
June 17 vs. Mexico at 2 PM ET
June 22 vs. South Africa at 9:30 AM ET

In the last three World Cups, France has reached the finals twice, winning in ’98 and coming in second in ’06. But lately LES BLEUS have been overtaken by controversy. In South Africa, Henry, Ribery, and Anelka hope to put the “Hand of Gaul” behind them. They want to give the French a reason to celebrate on the Champs-Elysees.

France hosted the 1938 and 1998 FIFA World Cups.

During the Cold War France fashioned its foreign policy first in conjunction with, and then in opposition to, the United States. In the immediate post-war era the French diverted American monies intended for economic growth and military defense against the USSR to colonial struggles in Indochina and Algeria.

On April 27, 1954, the Geneva Conference produced the Geneva Agreements; supporting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Indochina and granting it independence from France.

France relinquished any claim to territory in the Indochinese peninsula.

Neither the US nor South Vietnam signed the Geneva Accords. South Vietnamese leader Diem rejected the idea of nationwide election as proposed in the agreement, saying that a free election was impossible in the communist North and that his government was not bound by the Geneva Accords.

The events of 1954 marked the beginnings of serious involvement in Vietnam by the United States.

This involvement led to the Vietnam War.

In the 1960s, France dissented from American policy in Vietnam, withdrew from NATO’s integrated command, and pursued its own agenda in the hope of achieving détente.

In the wake of the Cuban missile crisis, the United States was determined to counter “wars of liberation” before they could be exploited by emerging nationalist leaders.

Vietnam was an important supplier of rice, rubber, tungsten, and tin, and the US wanted both the Chinese and the Russians to know that America would not tolerate “wars of liberation” in areas considered vital to its national interest. Vietnam was a good example.

Overall America’s involvement in IndoChina allowed the Soviet Union to catch its breath and regroup.

Interestingly, as the US escalated the war to “contain communism,” conflict with the Kremlin diminished, and a period of detente emerged.

Kruschev thought that detente was made possible by the Soviet attainment of nuclear retaliatory capability and subsequent strategic parity.

The US, on the other hand, pursued detente in the hope that the Soviets (as the largest supplier of military goods to North Vietnam) might be able to press for peace. Economic assistance was even offered to Moscow if the Kremlin would cooperate in Vietnam, and also agree to arms limitation.

On the other hand, Vietnam was only one of many revolutions in the less developed world and, as such, should not be examined in isolation.

Meanwhile, Kennedy’s theories of development created problems for America’s staunch ally, the shah of Iran, when it was determined that “the foreign policy of the United States will no longer be concerned solely with the external relations of states: the evolution of their domestic life has become a direct and legitimate concern.”

Kennedy insisted that American strategic and economic interests in the region required that the shah broaden the Iranian government’s internal base and reduce corruption.

As an indication of the administration’s seriousness, and despite Iran’s Cold War support for the United States, the US cut off $30 million in loans and grants pending internal social and economic reform. Subsequent change was coupled with a steady upgrading of Iran’s military establishment as the armed forces were given a central role in social change, a policy linked to theories of modernization and development then in vogue.

Aid levels were also threatened in Taiwan where the US insisted on accelerated economic development.

A 19-Point Program of Economic and Financial Reform was implemented in 1960 emphasizing the maintenance and expansion of economic sectors most critical for warfare.

In contrast to Iran, the program was so successful that it set the stage for export-led growth; moreover, economic assistance to the island was terminated in 1965 when the country was perceived to have attained its own capability for self-sustained expansion.

Reform was rewarded by a 1969 loan to build a factory to co-produce military helicopters with Bell Helicopter Company along with an agreement with the Northrop Aircraft Company to co-produce F-5E fighter planes.

With the death of Stalin in March 1953, the Soviets renewed their long dormant interest in the revolutionary potential of the less developed world.

Khruschev resolutely determined to mobilize the newly emerging and decolonializing nations against the West, intending to exploit the end of colonial empires to promote his own interests.

The issue took on increased significance when the growing militarism of American policy led the Soviets to believe that the Cold War was about to be won or lost in the Third World.

Krushchev re-evaluated the Soviet approach to neutrality and devised a zone-of-peace strategy to pull the neutral nations into the Soviet orbit.

Soviet policy was redesigned to extend military and economic aid programs to selected non communist countries.

Under Stalin, direct military aid had been supplied only in areas contiguous to the boundaries of the USSR. Now the Kremlin was reaching out, hoping to “communize” the developing nations which were neither socialist nor capitalist.

Additionally, the Soviets hoped to disrupt Western markets and block the flow of raw materials to the United States and its allies.

The Soviets also wanted to build a market for their own goods, thereby improving their adverse balance-of-trade position.

Meanwhile, the American Congress passed the Mutual Security Act (1951), legislation which fused US economic, military, and technical assistance programs, allowing the injection of a stronger military emphasis.

As the Soviets moved toward a more active role in world affairs, they abandoned the extreme notions of Zhdanov’s two camp theory which, after all, had been formulated to provide an ideological justification for Soviet isolationism.

Peaceful  coexistence, a policy used sporadically by the Soviets from October 1917 on, was re-introduced, supplying the necessary theoretical backing for a program of dynamic engagement in world affairs.

Although this strategy focused on living in peace with states of differing social systems in order to prevent war, it also involved economic competition between the capitalist and socialist systems.

More explicitly, according to Peter Rodman, while the Americans aimed to “guide the underdeveloped regions of the world through a transition to full-fledged participation in the international system,” the Soviets adopted a “doctrine of mortal struggle, of irreconcilable class conflicts.” They saw a military assistance program as an “integral part of contemporary Soviet policy,” a way of breaking through the Western containment arrangement.

By the mid-1950s each superpower believed that the future vitality of its ideological, economic, and strategic systems depended upon ‘winning’ the Third World.

Both the US and the USSR now perceived that the Cold War conflict would be played out in large part among the decolonizing and developing nations who would be forced to choose between Marxist and capitalist theories of economic progress, between totalitarian and democratic models of political organization, and between class struggle and collective security as principles of international order.

Many Third World nations were dismayed at the prospect of serving as pawns in a revised version of  The Great Game. This term refers to the intense British-Russian rivalry for influence, concessions, and territorial control which played out in Central Asia and Iran in the 19th century.

According to Rodman (again), the Bandung Conference, a meeting of Aftican and Asian states in April 1955 marked the

moment when the Third World tried to come of political age, and to define some room for independent manoeuvre between the two blocks …. Bandung was the moment when this implicit economic rivalry between West and East took on a strategic dimension, as the countries of the developing world ceased to be pawns and spectators in the global rivalry, but began to become players in their own right.

Soon it became apparent to all that many Third World leaders held their own agenda as they expertly played the two superpowers against each other.

Despite a move by some nations toward nonalignment, the Soviets were able to take advantage of the fact that a number of developing countries were anxious to reduce or eliminate Western influence in their regions.

As a result, American military assistance now became part of a strategy designed to pre-empt and offset any arms which the Soviets might supply.

The 1957 Eisenhower Doctrine concretized the new approach by proposing an increase in military and economic assistance, and authorizing the use of US troops to protect nations against aggression for any nation “controlled by international communism.”

To some in the Third World, it seemed that the US was now willing to pay with cash and arms for them to abandon their neutral position.

The cases of Iran and Manchuria show us that in the first year or so of the Cold War period neither the United States or the Soviet Union emphasized differences in ideological philosophy.

Although Stalin’s actions were rooted in his Marxist-Leninist worldview, he was (as previously mentioned) focused primarily on the expansionist and balance of power considerations that were consistent with his perception of Russia’s threatened security. This included his sense of nuclear inferiority based on the American monopoly on atomic weaponry.

Truman, on the other hand, was determined to protect American interests in the Third World by encircling the USSR militarily. In doing so, he hoped to prevent Soviet infringement on neighboring territories.

By the end of 1947, however, the two powers had each taken steps to cloak their goals and objectives in a mantle of ideological rhetoric.

Using its success in Iran as a model, the United States toughened its policy toward the Soviet Union.  The Truman Doctrine — announced in March 1947 — employed excessive language to ensure that Congress would allocate funds the president had requested. These monies — ostensibly for Greece and Turkey —  had, instead, been informally promised to the shah of Iran.

Truman forcefully asserted:

at the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternate ways of life … I believe that  it must be the policy of the  United States to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures …

He went on to describe a crisis

dramatized as a contest between two ways of life, the Communist one spreading in ‘the evil soil of poverty and strife,’ and the democratic one ‘based upon the will of the majority … free elections … individual liberty … freedom of speech.’

In September 1947, the ideological debate intensified when a Politburo member, Andrei Zhdanov, announced that the world was now divided into two camps

the ‘imperialist and anti-democratic camp’ and the ‘anti-imperialist and democratic camp.’ The principle driving force of the imperialist camp’ was the United States, emboldened by its newfound power and ‘temporary’ atomic monopoly to ‘extort’ from Britain and France the dominant role among capitalist powers around the globe. America’s ‘predatory and expansionist’ policies led it to absorb the colonies of its allies into its own sphere of influence.

Soon after Zhdanov delivered his speech, the Soviet Union withdrew from world affairs so that it could create a deterrent power able to match Western military capability.

Meanwhile, American attitudes toward communism, shaped in  large part by events in Iran and Manchuria, became even more entrenched.

So far as Americans were concerned, the image of the Soviet Union changed from that of ally “towards an image of a demonic society which was repellent to the United States.”

Stalin believed that the agreement he signed with Churchill, and Roosevelt at the Crimean port of Yalta on February 11, 1945, resolved “Far Eastern questions’ and promoted the expansion of Soviet supremacy in Asia. Consequently, the signing set the stage for Russia’s entrance into the war against Japan.

Later that same year, on August 14, 1945, Stalin formalized another treaty. This time he signed a Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Assistance with the Chinese Nationalists and their leader Chiang Kai-shek. He believed that this treaty would provide for a long-term Soviet sphere of influence in Manchuria and Mongolia. Accordingly, he asserted that he would not support the Chinese Communist Party or CCP in China’s civil war.

Stalin’s motivation for the treaty was transparent: “In the past, Russia wanted an alliance with Japan in order to break up China. Now we want an alliance with China to curb Japan.”

Actually, though, it was Stalin’s interpretation of Russian interests — not his commitment to treaty obligations — that dictated his actions. As mentioned in a previous post, the Soviets were determined to prevent foreign domination of territories contiguous to their borders. Stalin’s obsession is not difficult to understand given Soviet losses in World War II.

According to Bruce R. Kuniholm, the United States suffered 291,557 battle deaths and the British 373,372. The Soviets, on the other hand, lost in the neighborhood of 11,000,000 military personnel and 7,000,000 civilians. Seventy thousand villages and 1,710 towns were reduced to rubble.

Fearing foreign encroachment, as early as February 1946, Stalin described a ‘capitalist encirclement of the Soviet Union’ and depicted the capitalist economy as ‘setting the stage for war.’

Stalin’s comments were analyzed by George Kennan in what became known as the “long telegram.” In this 8,000 word cable dated February 22, 1946, Kennan speaks of Russia’s insecurity and of her persistent efforts to extend her borders. He recommends that the United States adopt a “policy of containment.” As we will see in future posts, containment strategy was first used in the Iranian crisis of 1946.

In sum, while the Soviets were committed to defending themselves against potentially hostile interests in  China and a resurgent Japan, American leaders were concerned with expanding their economic markets and rebuilding Japan as a thwart to Soviet expansionism.

A strong, stable China was the cornerstone of American postwar Far Eastern policy. In fact, the Americans believed that China would take Japan’s place as the West’s prime Asian commercial partner.

When the Russians abrogated their Sino-Soviet treaty obligations, and allowed arms and ammunition to fall into the hands of the CCP, President Truman attempted to help the Nationalists by moving 100,000 American troops into China. However, as LaFeber notes, it soon became apparent that “If Americans tried to save Chiang they would ‘virtually [have] to take over the Chinese government.'”

By February 1949, the Nationalists had lost nearly half their troops, mostly by defection. Eighty percent of the American equipment given Chiang had fallen into Communist hands.

In effect, Stalin held Manchuria hostage. Buhite argues that the province was “the most important area of China,” containing the country’s only “nearly developed industrial complex,” and was “the only CCP source for the machinery required for industrial development.”

So far as American interests in China were concerned, since Communist China could not achieve economic progress without Manchuria, Mao had no flexibility for a rapprochement with the United States.

The Soviets successfully influenced the Chinese Communists using material and technical aid as leverage. The pattern of assistance employed in Manchuria would be replicated repeatedly during the half century Cold War as the Soviets expertly allocated economic and military aid to the less developed world in their attempts to broaden their sphere of influence.

Importantly, with Mao’s final victory in 1949, over a million KMT government and army personnel were forced to flee their homeland, most of them settling in Taipei on the island of Formosa (Taiwan).

Meanwhile, a Western campaign for the military encirclement of the Soviet Union known as “the containment of international communism” had begun.

Was the Cold War a direct result of the breakdown of World War II alliances?  Not really. In actuality, it took form in the late 19th century on the plains of Northern China and Manchuria.  Conflict arose when the American emphasis on business, markets, and profits clashed with the czarist emphasis on expansion and empire.

The US believed that its prosperity required an open door to trade in Manchuria. Nevertheless, when the Russians occupied the rich, industrial Chinese province in 1901, the Americans were unwilling to fight for their interests. Later, when the Japanese colonized the province in 1931, the Soviets appealed to the Americans for assistance.  Still, the US opted for a policy of balanced antagonism. Only when Nazi and Japanese aggression proved overwhelming did the US enter into a reluctant — and temporary — partnership with its longterm rival, the Soviet Union.

Memories of past contests reemerged when, in September 1945, Stalin honored a wartime agreement with the United States and invaded enemy strongholds in Manchuria, disarming the Japanese and confiscating arms and property worth between 800 and 900 million dollars.

Military and industrial equipment was dismantled and moved to the Soviet Union to aid in the rebirth of Soviet industry.

In return for early withdrawal from the territory, the Soviets demanded large-scale ownership of virtually every aspect of the Manchurian economy.

Stalin’s activities were rooted in the Soviet perception of reality. The United States and its allies were emerging from World War II with worldwide military superiority. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was facing an urgent need to bolster national security and rebuild its wartorn economy. Since industrial capacity and  manufacturing ability had been severely damaged, any and all resources that could be used in the reconstruction and restoration of the motherland were to be acquired and mobilized so as to facilitate a rapid economic recovery.

Along with the industrial buildup, Stalin was obsessed with guaranteeing his nation’s vulnerable borders. Since German armies had invaded the Soviets through Eastern Europe twice in 25 years, he decided that it was best to exert control over all countries bordering the Soviet Union — countries like Manchuria and Iran. The idea was to create a Soviet sphere of influence that would provide protection against incursions.

Stalin’s interpretation of Russian interests impelled him to intervene in China where civil war was raging between the Nationalist or KMT forces led by Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Communist Part under the leadership of Mao-tse-tung.

Although Stalin had treaty obligations with the Nationalists, he feared a resurgent US presence in Manchuria if the Nationalists returned. So he stepped up support for the Communists, allowing 600,000 tons of light arms and ammunition to fall into the hands of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This facilitated the CCP’s movement into Manchuria and enabled them to establish administrative control over much of the province.

While the Kremlin was fixated on a need to retain control over Manchuria’s raw materials and industrial resources, the United States was intent on developing a proAmerican China which would serve as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union.

The West clearly saw the implementation of Soviet policy as a communist threat. Speaking in March 1946 in President Truman’s home state of Missouri, Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Great Britain said: the Soviets covet “the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines.”

Churchill’s remarks set the stage for global confrontation, and were legitimated by Truman’s presence on the platform.

From the end of World War II in 1945 until the ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, the world was polarized by a global conflict between two wartime allies, the Soviet Union and the United States.

The Cold War’s impact was global in scope and created political divisions based on free world orientation, socialist orientation, or nonalignment.

The two superpowers — the United States and the Soviet Union — struggled for dominance. Their obsession with national security was reflected in strategies of containment, pact building, and military and economic assistance programs.

To many the Cold War was perceived to be:

• a contest between democratic and totalitarian political systems
• a clash between Marxist and capitalist theories of development/economic progress.

Superpower competition in the less developed world — the Third World — centered on tactics of covert action, insurgency, wars of liberation, and trade dependency.  Accompanying activity included escalating militarism and disproportionate allocations of revenue for arms build-ups.

The term competitive grand strategy refers to the rivalry between the individual grand strategies of the two superpowers as they competed for power and influence in the less developed world.

American grand strategy can be defined as an integration of military and economic objectives in the war against communism.

The military component of grand strategy was concerned with repelling the Soviet threat through a policy of containment.

The economic component was concentrated on protecting America’s desire for open markets.

At first these two prongs could be separated. By the end of the Eisenhower administration though the two were intertwined.

American grand strategy evolved into liberal grand strategy as the US became more explicit in its drive to foster democracy and capitalism abroad.

Soviet grand strategy focused on combating the threat of capitalist encirclement and on acquiring the resources necessary to develop economic and industrial prowess as a preparation for the ‘hot war’ that the Russians thought was inevitable as long as capitalism existed.

To summarize, after World War ll, the United States was obsessed with the war against communism and the idea of containment which scholars say “has truly been America’s grand strategy since the late 1940s.”

The overarching US objective was to prevent Soviet penetration of emerging nations.

The USSR, on the other hand, was determined to prevent ‘capitalist encirclement’ of its territories and was eager to prove its economic and industrial prowess.

By the mid-1950s, each superpower believed that the success of its grand strategy depended on “winning” the Third World. The competition to supply military and economic assistance, weapons, technology, and expert advice to the less developed world accelerated.

Cold War rivalry dominated the last half of the 20th century.