Taiwan’s citizenry had a negative perception of the mainlanders and their military that was underscored when hundreds of thousands more soldiers began to enter Taiwan in the spring of 1949. This group, defeated by the peasant soldiers of Mao Tse-Tung, came to Taiwan both individually and as part of units. They appeared downtrodden and demoralized.

One observer noted:

We all went down to greet the Chinese troops carrying Nationalist flags, and the Formosans were really sincere in welcoming the new government. But the mainland troops were so poor and shabby that the Formosans were disillusioned even before experiencing the graft and corruption….They’d been used to smartly-dressed and disciplined Japanese soldiers who were clean, neat, and well- behaved. Now these KMT troops were filthy, illiterate, and treated the Formosans as an occupied people.

As previously mentioned, it is estimated that about one million military personnel and another million government and civilian personnel arrived on the island, most of them settling in Taipei.

Debate continues about the caliber of the arriving mainlanders and their ability to assume the critical posts the Japanese exit left vacant in the scientific, technical, and administrative structure of Taipei’s economy.

In contrast to the accepted judgement, some believe that the mainland Chinese were not “skilled or experienced in activities which required replacement management, [even though] the business and government leaders were well educated, bringing strong administrative and technical expertise to the capital.”

Most agree that the migrating army was heavily weighted toward young men with limited education credentials.

The arrival of the mainlanders immediately affected Taipei’s urban landscape, placing severe strain on the city’s infrastructure and services.

The Taiwanese expressed apprehension over the incorporation of large numbers of civilian and military refugees into Taipei’s struggling economic and political environment.

The Nationalist government was also concerned and, since most of the refugees were military or government workers, the government felt obligated to take care of them.

The new arrivals were given most of the key jobs in the government bureaucracy, in the education system, and in government enterprises despite their status as a numerical minority.

They were also given most of the homes abandoned by the Japanese. Still many became homeless and lived in the squatter settlements which were emerging all over the city.

The situation became increasingly serious because most of the new arrivals did not speak the same language as the locals. Misunderstandings and tensions became the norm.

In December 1949, the government of the Republic of China moved to Taiwan where a force of 300,000 Nationalist troops was already stationed.

Prior to Chiang’s arrival, the Taiwan Garrison Command proclaimed an Emergency Decree (martial law) throughout the province.

The relocated KMT government was marginalized by the United States until after the outbreak of war in Korea in June 1950.

Secretary of State Acheson made clear the US position in a January 1950 speech when he stated that the Philippines and Japan, lying within what he called the American “defense perimeter,” were

inescapable responsibilities, part of a defense perimeter which starts from the Philippines and continues through the Ryuku Archipelago, which includes its main bastion, Okinawa. Then it bends back through Japan and the Aleutian Island chain to Alaska.

He went on to say that

so far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack.

Thus, both Taiwan and Korea were excluded from the area that would be defended by the United States.

So far as the demography of the 1949 migration is concerned, it is estimated that about one million military personnel retreated from the mainland along with about one million non-military individuals.

This population movement immediately changed the face of Taipei since, while there was a major effort to channel migrants into rural areas, most exiles settled in cities, many of them in the capital.

The migrants began to dominate the politics and society of Taipei almost immediately for, even though they had little knowledge of or ties to Taiwan, they brought with them skills which enabled them to fill the vacuum left by the repatriated Japanese.

The islanders had no political movement or armed force to challenge their rule. Facing no internal opposition and having no social base within Taiwan, the Nationalist-mainlander government had unusually wide room for maneuvering. And it had an unusually dominant position in the economy, for it inherited all the productive assets and control mechanisms that the Japanese had built up over fifty years. The monopolies owned by the colonial administration, Japanese-owned shares in industrial enterprises, Japanese-owned lands — all passed to the incoming government.

The mainland regime gained power quickly.

Taiwan became a one-party state under the military leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. This action was contrary to the general expectation that, at the end of World War II, the entire island of Taiwan, long subject to Japanese military control, would return to civilian rule.

The establishment of martial law and the influx of one million military personnel from the mainland meant that this would not come to pass. Rather the island as a whole was to remain under martial law for almost fifty years.

It is worth noting that, while the Americans and the Soviets were certainly involved in the Chinese civil war, they did not play and explicit role in the militarization of Taipei between 1945 and 1950. Soon, though, militarism was to become linked to Cold War realities, and the island’s major transformation would begin.

When World War II ended, Taipei began a period of transition. For the preceding 50 years (1895-1945), the metropolis had served as administrative headquarters for the Japanese colony of Taiwan, also known as Formosa. One of Taiwan’s four largest urban areas, the city spread over an area of 66.99 square kilometers and was populated by about 400,000 inhabitants.

The city’s population was 353,744 in 1940. The other large cities were Tainan, Keelung, and Kaohshiung.

A study in contrasts, Taipei was classified as a large (and densely populated) metropolitan area, yet 47 percent of its land was used for agriculture.

Taipei had a large foreign population. In 1944, about 123,000 persons — 30.6 percent of the total — were not native born. Of this number, 99,680 or 81 percent were Japanese. Yet, aside from this, the city’s neighborhoods were characterized by stability with almost all native-born residents living in the district of their birth.

The demographic equilibrium was disrupted when Taiwan was returned to mainland China in 1945.

At this time, although the island became a provincial capital of the Republic of China, it was neglected by the central government which was under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek.

The party on the mainland, the Kuomintang (Nationalist) Party, was engaged in civil war against the Chinese communists and had little time for provincial oversight.

The administrator appointed to manage Taiwan took advantage of the situation, obtained control of Japanese assets, and reorganized them as official monopolies to be administered by Chinese from the mainland.

Much of the island’s infrastructure, industry, food, and consumer goods was also expropriated. These actions exacerbated losses from wartime bombings which had seriously damaged the city’s built environment.

Squatter housing, previously unheard of, began to develop, especially on major roads near the administrative center in Old Taipei. Moreover, the residential segregation which had emerged under Japanese rule remained, with mainland China replacing the Japanese in preferred residential areas.

The behavior of early Nationalist officials antagonized large numbers of Taipei’s residents — and with good reason. According to Gerald A. McBeath:

Bureaucratic corruption was rife, with payoffs to most KMT officials expected, expensive permits required for virtually every transaction, and mountains of time-consuming and expensive government red tape . . . . Smuggling was rampant after the Nationalists took control. Corruption was widespread, ranging from burglary of homes and stores to looting of warehouses and factories. Profiteers diverted local goods and Japanese supplies to the mainland black market.

The arrival of the KMT as well as Taipei’s earlier history would eventually dictate the ethnic divisions which characterized the city during the Cold War era.

Although Taipei is situated in close proximity to mainland China, Korea, and Japan, the US did not consider the city to be of geostrategic importance in the immediate post World War II period.

Not until the communist invasion of South Korea in 1950 was the area thought to be an essential link in America’s effort to forestall Soviet aggression and protect Japanese markets.

Still, the city’s Cold War urban transformation began with its retrocession to the Republic of China at the conclusion of World War II.

At this time,  the city’s colonial relationship  with Japan was abruptly severed, and mainland China became the major market for Taiwan’s exports which consisted chiefly of rice and sugar.

The Chinese civil war soon expanded and, in 1949, despite US financial assistance and limited troop support, Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government (KMT) and its backers were forced to flee their homeland.

Taipei became the ‘temporary’ capital of the Republic of China, and more than a million and a half government and army personnel poured into the city.

After the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950, a large infusion of US economic and military aid flowed into Taipei lessening internal competition for domestic assets. Over the period 1950-1979, total US military assistance to Taiwan amounted to $4.9 billion.

In fact, it is argued that virtually every idea and implementation formula devised for the distribution of US military assistance was applied in the Taiwan case, and that the level of aid ($425 for each civilian from 1950 -1967 ) is unique by international standards. Taiwan was also the largest recipient of major arms in the Far East from 1950 – 1969.

A substantial amount of this capital was allocated to Taipei where it was concentrated on dual-use infrastructural improvements such as highways and factories as well as on national-capital-level building construction. In addition, US monetary disbursements provided needed foreign exchange.

Since most assistance was earmarked for military purposes, domestic expenditures to support the country’s heavy military burden were greatly reduced.  This allowed the government to concentrate its domestic resources on achieving economic objectives.

By the 1960s, strong opportunity for economic growth was unfolding, consistent with the prevailing defense orientation of the capital.

In Taipei, military run production facilities, subsidized by the United States and supplied with basic inputs by state enterprises, manufactured much of the equipment, less sophisticated weaponry, and ammunition needed by the armed forces.

US pressure stimulated internal economic and financial reform which was rewarded by a 1969 loan to build a factory to co-produce military helicopters with Bell Helicopter Company; subsequently, an agreement was finalized with the Northrop Aircraft Company to co-produce F-5E fighter planes.

From the mid 1970s on, domestic production of jet fighters, helicopters, guided missiles, artillery, and other weaponry increased, often under contract to US manufacturers.

Taipei also gained during this time period from the American presence in Vietnam.  The US purchased agricultural and industrial commodities, used military facilities and depots for the repair of equipment, designated Taipei as a destination for rest and recreation, and used the area as a provider of contract work for and in Vietnam.

On January 1, 1979, America’s formal relationship with the Taipei government came to an end when diplomatic relations were institutionalized with the People’s Republic of China.  The American Embassy in Taipei was closed, the Mutual Defense Treaty was allowed to expire, and the country was expelled from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

 

 

Even though the isolation and containment of mainland China had been a standing principle of US foreign policy, President Nixon, with his strong anti-Communist background, felt that it was time to adopt a more conciliatory attitude.

According to Hsu in The Rise of Modern China

The Nixon-Kissinger world perspective was a product of Realpolitik. It postulated that the bipolarization of the post-World War II era, characterized by American and Soviet domination had drawn to a close. In the next decade, and probably the rest of this century, there would exist five power centers in the world: the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Japan, and Western Europe. Of the five, only China was isolated from the world community and therefore it was “imperative” that it be reintegrated.

The Chinese proved receptive since they were facing a  massive Soviet build-up on their borders, and had also been weakened internally as a result of the Cultural Revolution . They understood that the United States — not the Soviet Union — held the key to China’s reentry into the world community, and that a relaxation of US hostilities would allow rapid normalization of relations with Japan and various other Western nations, culminating in both economic and political strategic benefits.

Kissinger’s “ping – pong” diplomacy was capped by President Nixon’s official visit to Peking in February 1972.

In the Shanghai Communique issued at the conclusion of the visit, Nixon, in effect, established a policy recognizing “One China.” Hsu says:

The United States declared that it acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all US forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meanwhile, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.

The Chinese, for their part, did not insist that Peking be declared the legal government of all China, nor did they insist that the US abrogate their 1954 mutual defense treaty with Taiwan.

In actuality, military assistance to the island nation had already been terminated when Peking was admitted to the United Nations in 1971, and the US had then refused direct sales of advanced military equipment.

Afterwards, American security support had focused on helping Taiwan upgrade its own defense industries. From the mid 1970s on, domestic production of jet fighters, helicopters, guided missiles, artillery, and other weaponry increased, often under contract to US manufacturers.

In addition to the changes the Nixon Doctrine facilitated with America’s  Middle East partners, Nixon and Kissinger were also reshaping the American relationship with other allies, namely Taiwan.

American policy toward Taiwan had a “bandwagon” effect. By October 1974, Taiwan had diplomatic relations with only thirty-two countries, as opposed to sixty-five in 1969.

On January 1, 1979, the United States formal relationship with Taipei came to an end when diplomatic relations were institutionalized with the People’s Republic of China. The American Embassy in Taipei was closed, the Mutual Defense Treaty was allowed to expire, and the country was expelled from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

By 1981, only twenty countries recognized the Nationalist government on Taiwan, although  many more retained trading relations with it.

The US trade relationship with Taiwan also remained strong. Even though the Mutual Defense Treaty was terminated on January 31, 1979, the US resumed the sale of military equipment and arms to the country on January 2, 1980.

As a consequence of American actions toward Mainland China and Taiwan, the United States had weakened the international position of the Soviet Union, and had “enabled Peking to purchase the American airliners, scientific instruments, and chemical, industrial, and agricultural products needed for China’s modernization.”

The Soviets reacted boldly to what they perceived to be a Chinese-American geopolitical alignment against Soviet interests in Asia and the Third World.

Embarking on a new period of global expansion ” … Brezhnev in the 1970s added a long-missing Soviet combat increment to the political attack on Western interests in the Third World which Kruschev between 1955 and 1964 had conducted with subversion, propaganda, economic aid, threats, and weapons supply.”

The Soviets began

a large military build-up … [and] attained rough nuclear parity with the United States, thereby redressing the strategic and conventional power imbalance that had affected the outcome of the 1962 missile crisis. Emerging as a genuine global power with a blue-water capability, the Soviets established a military presence in Cuba and the Caribbean with their electronic monitoring facility at Lourdes, outside Havana, and with the Soviet Navy’s routine port calls …. Most critically, the Soviets started in 1975 to embark upon an expansionist surge that carried them, directly or indirectly through Cuba, into Africa, Nicaragua, Central America, and Grenada.

Fortunately, for the Soviets, their interests and those of many Third World nations coincided, particularly on the issue of colonialism, an issue so intensely felt in the Third World that it overrides other considerations.

In fact, the emerging world was more deeply concerned with issues of colonialism than with issues of international security. As a result, three American administrations (Nixon, Ford, and Carter) were embarrassed by Soviet actions and by the strong domestic dissension which complicated US policy.

As we saw in yesterday’s post on Soviet Efforts in the Third World, in the 1950s, superpower policy toward Third World nations was recast. The Soviet Union and the United States converted their nations into national security states and were in battle for the allegiance — and the resources — of the less industrialized nations.

The Soviets would challenge the West ideologically, economically, and through the allocation of military assistance. Still, though, they would not go so far as to risk actual confrontation with American forces. More importantly, they would avoid — at almost any cost — the danger of nuclear war.

Soviet policy, however, was complicated by an increasingly strained relationship with Mao Tse-tung’s Mainland China.

Gaddis says that “the Russians saw the Chinese as running unnecessary risks in challenging Washington’s hard line on Quemoy and Matsu.”

Soviet apprehensions became apparent in 1954 and 1955

when the Chinese communists threatened the offshore islands … which lay between the mainland and Taiwan …. As the communists shelled the islands and then announced the imminent ‘liberation’ of Taiwan, Eisenhower warned that such liberation forces would have to run over the American Seventh fleet stationed in the Formosa straits.

Tension over the islands escalated in 1958 when China began shelling the offshore islands.

The American Seventh Fleet provided artillery capable, at least in theory, of firing atomic shells.

Mao asked the Soviets for nuclear weapons. Khruschev ignored the request, saying, instead, that the Soviet Union would come to China’s support if the Americans actually mounted an attack.

China saw Khruschev’s response as a betrayal.

Krushchev, though, saw things differently.

We didn’t want to give them the idea we were their obedient slaves, who would give them whatever they wanted, no matter how much they insulted us.