(This post relies heavily on information presented in Chapter Two of Trita Parsi’s book Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States. You can find more information about the book on Amazon. Just click here.)
To understand the relationship between Iran and Israel during the Cold War, it’s necessary to know a bit of history. You can dig deep into Israel’s backstory by accessing our Israel-Palestine timelines. You might start with Israel-Palestine Timelines: 65 BC-2012.
Post World War I
After the end of World War I, in 1920, the British controlled Palestine by virtue of a League of Nations sanctioned mandate. The mandate’s terms included support for the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine, as outlined in the Balfour Declaration. It also aimed to accommodate the interests of the Arab population. Click here for more information.
The Zionist movement flourished under the mandate, but the two populations – Jewish and Arab – clashed constantly. The Arabs held the majority of the population at this point in time.
If you want to watch a film about Israel’s early years, Exodus is a good choice. You can watch the trailer below.
The United Nations
In the spring of 1947, the British asked the United Nations to settle the problem. The UN created a Special Committee on Palestine to find a way to end the hostilities. Iran was chosen to be a member of an 11-state committee.
After several months, a plan was developed, but it had the support of only 8 members of the committee. The majority favored a partition of Palestine with the creation of independent Arab and Jewish States. Iran (led by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi), India, and Yugoslavia were opposed, predicting that the partition would lead to even more violence. The Shah believed that the only solution was a federal state containing both Jewish and Arab constituent states.
In late fall, the plan, Resolution 181, was adopted by the UN General Assembly against Tehran’s objections. Fighting broke out immediately.
Less than 6 months later, David Ben-Gurion, the primary national founder and first prime minister of the State of Israel, declared Israel’s independence in 1948.
The Cold War’s Early Years
In the early years of the Cold War, Iran and Israel found themselves navigating a Middle East divided by ideology, oil, and post-colonial ambitions. Neither country was Arab. Both feared Soviet expansion. And both had to walk a fine line in public while working together behind the scenes.
Unlike most Arab states, Iran didn’t go to war with Israel. But it also didn’t recognize the nation, at least not officially. The Shah held that line for the rest of his reign.
The Shah’s Rationale: Strategic Not Ideological
Iran’s position wasn’t ideological. It was strategic.
The Shah knew that siding openly with Israel would alienate the Arab world. At the same time, he believed Israel’s presence as a pro-Western, non-Arab state could help balance power in the region—especially as Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser pushed pan-Arabism and Soviet ties.
Israel, for its part, was navigating its own Cold War puzzle. While leaning West, Ben-Gurion’s government had flirted with Soviet support, particularly in the early days when immigration and economic aid were vital. This ambiguity made the Shah cautious. He waited to see where Israel would land.
By the early 1950s, things began to shift. Tel Aviv distanced itself from the Soviet Camp, and Iran’s Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq extended de facto recognition to Israel. That meant Iran wouldn’t support Israel’s destruction, but still wouldn’t go so far as to establish diplomatic relations.
Israel: Strategy vs Ideology
Israel adopted what became known as the Periphery Doctrine—an effort to reach out to non-Arab states like Iran, Turkey, and Ethiopia, as well as minority groups like the Kurds and Lebanese Christians. The goal was to undermine Arab unity and strengthen Israel’s position in the region.
For Iran, pan-Arab rhetoric wasn’t just political—it was personal. Arab leaders had laid claim to Iran’s oil-rich province of Khuzestan. And much of Iran’s oil and imports traveled through the Egyptian-controlled Suez Canal.
The Partnership Becomes Practical
By the late 1950s, Israel and Iran had an understanding grounded in opposition to the Egypt-Soviet relationship and the emergence of Nasser as the Arab leader after the 1956 Suez War.
In the summer of 1957, Israel was desperate for oil. After the Suez Crisis, its supply routes were unstable, so Iran stepped in. The two countries quietly built a pipeline from Eilat to Ashkelon, bypassing the canal entirely. Soon the pipeline was upgraded to handle more capacity.
Israel was desperate for oil, and the Shah wanted to avoid dependence on the Egyptian-controlled Suez Canal since 73% of Iran’s imports and 76% of its oil exports passed through the shipway.
The Shah wanted to avoid dependence on the Egyptian-controlled Suez Canal because 73 percent of Iran’s imports and 76 percent of its oil exports passed through there.
By 1958, the pipeline was upgraded. That same year, Israel’s Prime Minister met with the Shah—marking the first direct high-level contact between the two nations.
An Open Secret
At the same time, the US was quietly backing the alliance. President Eisenhower saw the Iran-Israel-Turkey bloc as a way to counter Soviet influence. Officially, nothing was acknowledged. But the cooperation deepened.
Iran benefited too. Israeli experts helped train 10,000 Iranian agricultural technicians. Israeli irrigation models were studied for applicability across Iran’s arid regions. Tehran even allowed Iraqi and Iranian Jews to use Iran as a transit route to reach Israel.
Still, the Shah kept things quiet. He understood the regional optics. The relationship with Israel was an open secret—acknowledged behind closed doors, denied in public speeches.
The result was a highly effective Cold War partnership that suited both sides—until 1979. However, even then, as Parsi notes:
Though the Iranian revolution was a major setback for Israel, it didn’t stop the Jewish State from supporting Iran and seeking to improve its relations with the Khomeini government as a counter to Israel’s Arab enemies. Ironically, when Iranian leaders called for Israel’s destruction in the 1980s, Israel and the pro-Israel lobby in Washington lobbied the United States not to pay attention to Iranian rhetoric.
I’ll discuss the relationship after the Revolution in a future post. If you want to find out more now, here’s the link to purchase the book.
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