There were 100,000 deaths in clashes in Korea between 1946 and the formal beginning of the Korean War in June 1950.
The struggle at that time was between left-wing Koreans who were ardent nationalists (led by Kim Il Sung) and right-wing authoritarian Koreans (led by Syngman Rhee). Consequently, when President Truman decided to send American men to war in Korea he was involving them in an on-going civil war, not involving them in a conflict against Stalin. The US wanted to keep the rightist groups in power.
Stalin
North Korea’s Kim had been closely tied to Mao Tse-Tung’s Chinese communists since 1946, although he inched closer to the Soviet military in 1949. Kim wanted to unify Korea, and he thought that Rhee was highly vulnerable. He sought Stalin’s approval to conquer the South and, after several requests, Stalin gave a green light.
Stalin went along with an invasion for two reasons. First, he was concerned about the growing unity between the US and Japan, and thought that if North Korea could unify Korea the threat of a militarized, Western-oriented Japan would be blunted or neutralized. Second, Mao’s success against the Nationalists in China had encouraged revolutions throughout Asia, in Indochina, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Stalin was concerned that these revolutions could threaten his authority over the communist bloc. Therefore, he promised Kim supplies at the same time making clear that Soviet forces would not be involved.
In sum, Stalin believed that a short and successful war by a Russian controlled North Korea could intimidate Japan and check the expansive aims and reputation of Mao.
Truman and the United Nations Security Council
Truman assumed that the North Korean invasion of the South was Russian directed, perhaps the beginning of an extensive Sino-Soviet thrust. He sent supplies to South Korean troops and ordered the Seventh Fleet to sail between China and Formosa (now Taiwan). He also appealed to the Security Council of the United Nations (UNSC).
The UNSC branded the North Koreans as aggressors, adopting Resolution 82 on June 25, 1950. The action called for “the immediate cessation of hostilities” and for “the authorities in North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel.” The Soviet Union wasn’t present for the vote; they were boycotting the UN at the time for its recognition of Taiwan as China’s representative to the organization.
Five days later, on June 30, Truman sent American ground units to Korea. While he hoped that Korea might be only a diversion, he used the UN resolution to establish a military command in Korea that took orders from Washington, not from the UN. The terms “collective security” and “UN action” became buzzwords.
The Soviets responded by accusing South Korean forces of invading North Korea. Ten days later the Soviets changed their position and stated that the war was a civil war amongst Koreans. They would take no action.
American Plans
The Americans prepared plans for the reconstruction of all Korea without consulting anyone as they suffered 142,000 casualties.
The US government decided that the invasion signaled a direct threat to American interests in both Asia and Europe, and Truman and Secretary of State Acheson used the war as an opening to develop new American policies around the globe.
The Korean War offered a chance for the administration to quiet their critics at home and to take advantage of new opportunities abroad.
The war allowed them to put NSC-68 in motion and to revitalize American military alliances around the world. In the summer of 1950, the US became committed to Formosa (Taiwan) and Indochina, began rearming Germany, and nearly tripled American defense spending. With the invasion of North Korea, Truman hoped to show opponents at home and abroad that the US was not content with “containment” but was committed to liberation.
When Truman reversed early 1950s US policy, Mao Tse-Tung was shocked. He didn’t understand the sudden US move into what he considered China’s civil war, even though Truman’s protection of Formosa was one reason why Mao was ready to fight the Americans in Korea.
In Indochina (rich in rice, rubber, tin, and oil), France and the revolutionary nationalist/communist Ho Chi Minh were locked in war. Both the US and the Soviets had refused to recognize Ho’s Republic of Vietnam. By 1948, Ho was turning to Communist China for aid.
In January 1950, China recognized Ho’s government. The Soviets followed.
The US committed itself to the French cause soon after the Korean War began. Truman sent financial aid and, in July, revealed that he was sending an American mission to Vietnam.
Why did Truman act?
Japan was the key to the entire American position in the Pacific. That country could move in only two directions — toward its traditional markets in China or toward markets in Southeast Asia. Thus, Southeast Asia had to remain open for Japanese exploitation.
Still, Acheson and Truman considered Europe to be most important. They believed that future European political problems could be solved through the use of military alliances and they proposed that Germany be rearmed. The British and French were horrified, but the US quieted them in several ways:
- The Americans sent more money to aid Europe with its financial problems
- The US sent four to six divisions of troops to assure Europe of American aid in case of future Russian or German aggression
- The administration sponsored an integrated military command headed by an American general.
In the end the administration successfully used the Korean War to create the framework within which European and general East-West problems would be discussed during the next decade.
The Korean War Intensifies
As the Korean War intensified, McCarthyism received a second life. Communists were perceived to be “everywhere.”
Congress passed the McCarran Internal Security Act which required communist organizations and their members to register with the attorney general. While it didn’t call communist party membership a crime, this was covered by the Smith Act of 1940 which prohibited membership in any group advocating violent overthrow of the American government.
Meanwhile, it was decided that the US would cross the 38th parallel and liberate North Korea. General MacArthur was instructed to move through North Korea if he didn’t encounter Chinese or Russian resistance and if he was certain of success. This was an invitation for him to drive to the Yalu River bordering China.
The US was informed through India that China would attack if UN troops moved into North Korea. The US discounted the threat. (The US didn’t know that the Chinese were willing to die to keep a US force away from their borders and that they were being egged on by China.)
Stalin wanted the US and China to sink into a full conventional war with each other and refused to send air support to Mao. He did send arms and planes.
The Chinese moved across the Yalu into North Korea.
Truman flew to Wake Island to check on MacArthur.
A month later the Chinese moved across the Yalu in mass. UN forces retreated.
The Chinese decision to cross the Yalu was exceptionally costly to the US. The US — in what has been called a catastrophe — did not cross the Yalu. You can read about it here.
The war in Korea froze the US into a Cold War posture for the next two decades paralyzing American-Chinese relations and escalating fear of the “Yellow Peril.”
America’s Domestic Politics
The war with China allowed the passage of huge defense budgets through Congress and provided the opportunity to put the US on full military footing to fiight the larger Cold War.
US domestic politics provide the key to understanding Truman’s decisions to move above the 38th parallel and fight a war with China. His aims:
- to quiet Republican critics who wanted “Asia first”
- to silence McCarthy’s attacks
- to push through the massive budget deficits envisioned by NSC-68; these budgets ushered in the high defense spending of the next 50 years.
Truman hardened his view of the Chinese. He thought they were “Russian satellites,” and so he adopted the domino theory.
Truman argued that the West must develop great military power and that the US could not be “internationalist” in Europe and “isolationist” in Asia. Domestic pressures made that impossible.
In Asia, the administration focused on tightening American military ties with Japan through a new peace treaty which allowed the stationing of American troops and planes on Japanese soil.
Mutual defense treaties were signed with the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand against Japan and China.
British influence in the Pacific was reduced.
The US was single-handedly preparing Asia for the containment of China.
Truman Recalls MacArthur
After continual disagreement, Truman recalled General MacArthur. Korea was to be viewed as part of a “collective security system.”
- All out war in Korea wasn’t possible because that would suck in Russian troops. Europe was uppermost.
- If Europe and the prevention of Russian entry in force were the main objectives, American forces had scored a powerful victory by dealing Communist imperialist aims in Asia a severe setback in preventing the armed conquest of all Korea.
The war in Korea stalemated and the military buildup of Europe accelerated.
There was a De Facto armistice in July 1953.
Forgotten Forever War
Per the Smithsonian Associates website:
A temporary armistice between the two Koreas has essentially kept the military conflict frozen in place since 1953. But the lack of a permanent peace treaty has effectively preserved the Korean conflict as the last remaining remnant of the Cold War and, technically, America’s longest engagement in an on-going “hot” war, with close to 28,500 active U.S. military personnel still deployed in South Korea today.
For more, see the Cold War Studies post below:
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Source: This post is based on information found in Chapter 5 of Walter LaFeber’s America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1996.
Photograph: manhhai (Flickr)
Troops of the 31st Infantry Regiment land at Inchon Harbor, Korea, aboard LSTs on September 18, 1950.
rarehistoricalphotos.com/korean-war-rare-pictures-1951-1953/
